注定挑戰?崛起中國的國際建制參與類型分析

Abstract

2008 年起中國崛起體現於全球性國際建制的現象日益顯著,許多探討此一 現象的文獻多從霸權穩定理論出發,化約理論中的單線邏輯:即「挑戰既有建制 規制」則「損害霸權權威」。然而筆者認為此種推論過於簡化,使得對於中國國 際參與策略僅侷限於「挑戰 vs 遵循」視野。因此本研究試圖修正了理論的假設 偏誤,提出「建制霸權結構」作為依變項的修正式理論,分析中國大陸參與「核 不擴散條約」(NPT)、「國際貨幣基金」(IMF)及「後京都氣候談判」(Post-Kyoto Negotiation)三項建制領域的策略,特別聚焦於北京政府面對「建制霸權結構」 當中「權力優勢」及「治理權威」強弱有別時所產生的回應模式。本文首先針對 各建制發展歷程分析規範創設、演化與現狀霸權-美國之間的關聯,並且界定美 國公共財投資所反映出的結構強度。接著,橫向比較崛起強權-中國大陸的正負 向感知及其參與策略的差異。 本研究發現,中國國際參與之策略變化受到「建制霸權結構」強弱影響,其 中「治理權威」衰落更容易引發中國大陸負向感知,引導出另起爐灶的挑戰誘因。 目前,北京當局的參與策略暨美中互動跳脫了既有文獻「挑戰 vs 遵循」的二分 預測,於結構強度最高的核控領域傾向「多數遵循、零星柔性制衡」;在支撐其 綜合國力的金融貨幣領域,展示了最明顯的「制衡」舉措;而結構最為鬆散的氣 候建制裡美國並非建制維繫者,使其與同樣遭到減量壓力的中國,形成「體制外 合作」來對抗其他主導談判的集團。

China’s actively participation in international regimes has recently arisen discussions of its impacts on the existing hegemonic governance. Most of the analyses adopt the vision of “Hegemonic Stability Theory,” considering that the rising power may have only two strategic choices, either to “compliance” or to “deflect” the regime order. However, this predictive dichotomy is too parsimonious, leads to ambiguity about the relations between the hegemonic power and the rising power. For better explanation on how China’s responses to the regimes with different intensity of hegemonic leadership, this thesis discusses the bias of the Hegemonic Stability Theory and therefore suggests an analytical tool which theorized “hegemonic structure in regimes” by developing its two components: “power predominance” and “governance authority”. In this research, I selected three regimes as cases, mainly focusing on “Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),” “International Monetary Fund (IMF)” and “Post-Kyoto negotiations on climate change”. In general, China’s participation and policy attitudes has indeed been influenced by “hegemonic structure in regimes”, especially the declined of U.S. governance authority may easily lead to negative awareness as well as balancing behaviors against U.S. of Chinese government. This thesis also found that China’s strategy has lots of varieties. In the strong structural intensity of NPT, China complied most of the regime norms but to soft balance against U.S in specific issues whereas with middle level of structural intensity in IMF, China performed obvious balancing measures to safeguard its financial power. For the loosen structure in climate change negotiation, China cooperated with non-regime leader-U.S to resist emission cutting pressures and to formulate mutual benefiting climate norms.