憲法法院回應國會的司法策略： 臺灣與印尼的比較研究

Abstract

第三波民主轉型的浪潮中形成的東亞新興民主國家，在面臨轉型問題時普遍引進西方違憲審查制度，責由法院擔負憲法價值維護者的角色。與此同時，在西方已臻成熟的政治司法化，在東亞新興民主國家褪去行政高權的外衣後，也開始影響東亞的憲政體制。東亞憲法法院因而開始承擔政治場域無法解決的政治爭議處理，加深憲法法院與政治部門的互動，也使雙方的衝突逐漸浮上檯面。 東亞憲法法院中，台灣和印尼二國的憲法法院，都曾經因為職權的行使未符國會的利益，遭受來自國會運用體制內權限而直接限制或削減憲法法院的權限或保障，但二國憲法法院在回應國會的司法策略上卻有顯著的不同。台灣大法官面臨四起因政治爭議觸發的國會行動，採取的司法策略呈現由弱轉強的趨勢，僅在最後一次專業加給預算遭刪除時，作成釋字601號解釋宣告預算案違憲，其於案件則無相應解釋案之作成。印尼憲法法院則在國會不滿憲法法院宣告方式有侵犯立法權限之虞，因而修法限制憲法法院職權行使時，第一時間作成二則判決宣告增修條文違憲，展現較果斷的形象。 本文杷梳台灣和印尼二國的案件及憲法法院和國會的互動方式，歸納出二個共同點和三個相異點。二個共同點分別為觸動國會行動的案件，都是國會的權力或利益被直接限縮的情形、憲法法院和國會都採取體制內的權限進行對話。三個相異點則包含觸發國會回應的案件類型不同、憲法法院回應國會的司法策略強度不同，以及國會對憲法法院宣告「違憲立即失效」的反應不同。 本文試著從二國的制度設計、歷史脈絡和政治勢力分散程度，與憲法法院威信和憲法法院院長影響力三處著眼，分析造成台灣和印尼憲法法院回應國會的司法策略同異的因素，並得出三種因素相互牽連、揉合而形成二國同異的結果。憲法法院設立的時間和是否經過威權時代，影響憲法法院對政治部門的態度；政治勢力分散的程度同時影響憲法法院成立時的制度設計，反映政治行動者對憲法法院的期待，以及影響政治行動者組成其他政治部門時，是否有能力累積與憲法法院相抗衡的量能；另外，對憲法法院的期待和憲法法院院長的影響也可能提升憲法法院的威信。 本文觀察台灣和印尼憲法法院的司法策略，儘管外觀上似有積極程度的不同，但都是立基在憲法法院威信的養成。亦即，台灣大法官早期在威權時代中，為維繫自身的生存並累積威信，採取較低調的態度；而印尼憲法法院則挾帶民主轉型的新氣象和外界的期待，相較於普遍貪腐的其他政府機關，於設立初期即能累積相當的威信，採取較積極的態度。儘管二國憲法法院未來的威信和發展仍有待觀察，但基於肯定憲法法院威信對憲法法院回應國會時採取司法策略的影響力，本文整理出五項憲法法院回應國會的司法策略建議，包含：憲法法院威信的建立、權力分立動態平衡下預留憲法對話的彈性、憲法價值的遵守、論理明確和程序透明、保留社會大眾形成決定的空間，以期憲法法院能在不逾越憲政架構的情況下，得因應權力結構的變動而維繫權力分立動態平衡，並不受其他政治勢力打擊而失其效能。

Judicial review was introduced to emerging democracies in East Asia built in Democracy’s Third Wave, and made court be the one to protect the value of Constitutionalism. Meanwhile, after the weakening of the legacies of executive dominance, the trend of Judicialization of politics start to affect the emerging democracies in East Asia. Therefore increase the battle between Constitutional Courts and other political departments. Both Justices of Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan of Taiwan and the Constitutional Court of Indonesia have been limited authorities or decreased interests by Parliament since the parliaments were not satisfied with the courts’ decisions. However, the judicial strategies of these two constitutional courts are very different. During the four actions of the Parliament triggered by political disputes, the position of Justices of Constitutional Court of Taiwan is from weak to strong, only making one decision in response to the Parliament’s backlash in the fourth case, in which the Parliament cut the budget of the Court. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia takes a rather strong position when it comes to its first backlash from DPR, invalidating the amendment of the Law on Constitutional Court, which limited the way of declaring decision. Two similarities and three differences could be concluded after analyzing the cases in Taiwan and Indonesia. Both the cases were triggered when the parliaments’ authorities or interests were limited directly. The other is that both the courts and parliaments make a dialogue in the form of Constitutionalism. The differences includes the types of cases, the degree of judicial strategies, and the parliaments’ reactions to the decision declaring statutes invalid and no longer having bonding force. This thesis try to analysis the factors to the similarities and differences from three aspects: institution-building, historical contexts and political diffusion, the legitimacy of the Court and the influence of the Chief Justice. This thesis find that all the factors interact with each other a lot. Although the judicial strategies seem very different between Taiwan and Indonesia, both of them are based on the legitimacy of Constitutional Courts. In the early authoritarian time, Justices of Constitutional Court was in a lower position, trying not to offense political departments and earn their respect in some cases, while the Constitutional Court of Indonesia is much more aggressive since the support and expectation from citizens. Though how the Courts’ legitimacy develops is still worth observing, due to the importance of the influence of legitimacy to the judicial strategy of the Courts, five things are suggested to the Courts when they are making judicial strategy: legitimacy-building, remaining the flexibility of constitutional dialogue in dynamic balance, following the value of Constitutionalism, making decisions openly and giving clear reasons, and reserving the space for the public to make decision Therefore, the Constitutional Courts could keep the dynamic balance without fearing the backlash from other political departments.