會計師教育程度、審計品質與其法律責任之分析性研究

Abstract

本文參考Schwartz (1997)的研究架構，提出一理論模型以探討在考慮會計師教育程度之後，在不同法律制度下對審計市場以及投資額的影響。在本模型中，由於投資人可直接觀察會計師教育程度，因此會計師教育程度會透過審計公費對投資人以及會計師本身的決策造成影響。在模糊過失責任的法律制度下，會計師投入的均衡努力程度，接受的均衡教育程度、以及投資人的投資金額皆會永遠偏離社會最適。而在嚴厲法律責任之下，雖然在未考慮投資之前，會計師投入的努力及接受的教育程度皆可達成社會最適，但最後仍會因為超額投資而超過社會最適的水準。研究結果可提供法律制定者做為改善法律制度之參考。

Following the framework in Schwartz (1997), this study examines the effect of accounting education on the audit market and the level of investment conducted under different legal regimes by an analytical model. Since the level of education is observable to the investor, this model shows that it will affect both the investor’s and the auditor’s decision making through audit fee. Under vague negligence liability rule, the equilibrium combination of audit effort, education, and investment will never achieve social optimum. Although under strict liability rule the audit effort and the education may have a chance to be socially desired, they are still upwardly distorted by excessive investment. These results can be served as reference for law makers to improve the design of auditor liability.