企業社會責任與社會福利之關係

Abstract

本篇論文研究公司的企業社會責任決策，對整體社會福利的影響。論文中將企業道德品質納入考量，並且將CSR視為是企業傳遞自身道德品質的管道，透過一個資訊不對稱的賽局模型，來探討不同道德品質公司的策略行為，以及不同均衡結果下的社會福利大小。 透過此模型，我們可以發現，當好廠商以利潤極大化為目標做決策時，經常陷入無法達成均衡、或是雙方皆不進行CSR計畫的結果，此時的社會福利較其他可能均衡下為低。要改善這個狀況，政府可以進行CSR的補助計畫，來改變廠商的均衡條件，好廠商也可以改變決策函數，以CSR計畫的NPV作為決策衡量，透過這兩種方法，可以有效改善均衡結果，進而增加整體社會福利。

This thesis studies the social welfare effect of corporation social responsibility policy. In this thesis, we put the corporations’ morality as a factor in our model, and we consider CSR as a conduit sending the message of its own morality type. We set up an information asymmetric game model, to investigate that what’s the CSR actions of different types of corporations, and to investigate the social welfares of different equilibriums. In this model, we can discover that: when the goal of the good type corporation is maximizing profit, it often leads to a condition without equilibrium, or a condition that neither good nor bad type corporation do the CSR activity. In this condition, the social welfare is less than the other possible equilibriums. To improve this condition, the government can offer a CSR subsidy to change the equilibrium conditions, or the good type corporation can change its objective function, which means to make CSR decisions by the CSR project’s NPV. By these two method, we can improve the equilibrium, and therefore increase the social welfare.