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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 黃志典(Jyh-Dean Hwang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Syun Li | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 李宜訓 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T02:55:52Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2016-07-20 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-07-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-07-08 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中文部分
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/54420 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文主要探討現金股利在公司治理的價值效應中是否具有中介效果。採用Panel Data的分析模型和Baron and Kenny (1986)對中介變數的檢驗方式，使用2009年至2013年之臺灣上市公司為研究樣本，以公司內部管理型態、外部監督機制和關係人交易資訊等三個構面，建立一套適用於本文的公司治理評等指標，藉以研究公司治理與公司價值之關聯性。在納入現金股利與融資限制條件後，檢驗在未考慮融資限制之全體樣本和兩類融資限制樣本下，現金股利在公司治理的價值效應中是否具有中介效果。研究結果顯示：(1) 本研究所建立的公司治理綜合得分在所有樣本中，皆與公司價值呈現顯著的正相關，代表公司治理越好，公司的價值越高。(2) 在兩類融資限制的樣本中，現金股利發放率與公司價值呈現顯著的正相關。其中，公司治理與現金股利發放率為正相關，支持La Porta et al.(2000)的結果模型。(3) 現金股利在公司治理的價值效應中具有中介效果，意即公司治理能透過現金股利影響公司的價值。此結果指出公司治理影響公司價值的路徑與過程，亦說明了良善的公司治理若搭配合適的現金股利政策，公司治理將更能發揮提升公司價值的效果。本文的發現可以使公司治理的理論更趨於完整與合理。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the mediation effect of cash dividend on the valuation effect of corporate governance by using panel data analysis and the test of mediator variable proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). We construct a corporate governance index (“CG”) which includes managerial configurations, external monitoring mechanisms and information of related party transaction for Taiwan’s listed firms during the period of 2009 to 2013. We find a positive and significant relationship between CG and firm value in all samples. Furthermore, there is a positive relationship among dividend payout ratio, CG and firm value when firms face both agency problems and financial constraints. This evidence is consistent with the Outcome Model proposed by La Porta et al. (2000). Last but not least, we empirically demonstrate the mediation effect of cash dividend on the valuation effect of corporate governance. To the best of our knowledge, this effect has not been fully investigated. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T02:55:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02724072-1.pdf: 1371302 bytes, checksum: 88d3d6ff7b8444d1dc5e2e1efc72fe31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
誌謝……………………………………………………………………………. ii 中文摘要………………………………………………………………………. iii 英文摘要………………………………………………………………………. iv 目錄……………………………………………………………………………. v 圖目錄…………………………………………………………………………. vii 表目錄…………………………………………………………………………. viii 第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………. 1 第一節 研究動機……………………………………………………. 1 第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………. 3 第三節 研究流程……………………………………………………. 3 第二章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………………. 4 第一節 公司治理與公司價值………………………………………. 4 第二節 現金股利與公司價值……………………………….……… 6 第三節 現金股利與公司治理………………………………………. 8 第三章 研究設計……………………………………………………………. 10 第一節 研究假說……………………………………………………. 10 第二節 資料來源、變數定義及預期方向…………………………. 12 第三節 研究方法……………………………………………………. 22 第四節 研究模型之建構……………………………………………. 28 第四章 實證結果……………………………………………………………. 30 第一節 公司治理綜合得分…………………………………………. 30 第二節 Panel Data迴歸結果………………………………………... 33 第三節 中介效果之檢定……………………………………………. 42 第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………. 47 第一節 研究結論……………………………………………………. 47 第二節 研究建議……………………………………………………. 49 參考文獻………………………………………………………………………. 50 附錄……………………………………………………………………………. 56 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 公司價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 現金股利 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 中介效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司價值 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 現金股利 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 中介效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Mediation effect. | en |
| dc.subject | Cash dividend | en |
| dc.subject | Agency problem | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | en |
| dc.subject | Firm value | en |
| dc.subject | Cash dividend | en |
| dc.subject | Agency problem | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | en |
| dc.subject | Firm value | en |
| dc.subject | Mediation effect. | en |
| dc.title | 現金股利在公司治理的價值效應中是否具有中介效果─以臺灣上市公司為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A Study on the Valuation Effect of Corporate Governance in Taiwan: Is There a Mediation Effect of Cash Dividend? | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林世銘(Suming Lin),廖咸興(Hsien-Hsing Liao) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 現金股利,代理問題,公司治理,公司價值,中介效果, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Cash dividend,Agency problem,Corporate governance,Firm value,Mediation effect., | en |
| dc.relation.page | 64 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-07-09 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 國際企業學系 | |
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