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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 洪一薰 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bo-Han Chi | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 紀博瀚 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T02:33:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-07-30 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-07-30 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-07-28 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bansal, S., & Gangopadhyay, S. (2003). Tax/subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45(2), 333-355.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/53907 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We propose an incentive mechanism to increase the demand quantities of green products and present two Stackelberg models to describe two different policy instruments, i.e. a condition that the government compensates green firms with subsidy fees and a condition that the government compensates green customers with subsidy fees. Moreover, we consider two probability distributions of customers’ taste parameters in each model. We examine the results of two models with two different probability distributions to find a suitable model to predict actual demand quantities in our experiment.
In the subsidy-to-customer condition, customers buying green products, called green customers, receive subsidy fees from the government. We add a behavioral parameter for non-green customers to describe a loss that they do not receive subsidy fees like green customers. In addition, we conduct a validation experiment to show that the model with the behavioral parameter captures the behaviors of customers. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T02:33:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R02546024-1.pdf: 991625 bytes, checksum: d2294ee8ace4774129af77d328394057 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i
Abstract ii Contents iii List of Figures iv List if Tables v Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Triangular Model 6 2.1 Standard Model 7 2.1.1 Utility Function 7 2.1.2 Demand Function 9 2.1.3 Profit Functions of Firms 10 2.1.4 Objective Function of the Government 13 2.2 Subsidy-to-firm Model 15 2.3 Subsidy-to-customer Model 20 2.4 Result Comparisons 26 Chapter 3 Uniform Model 28 3.1 Subsidy-to-firm Model 28 3.2 Subsidy-to-customer Model 31 Chapter 4 Experimental Test 35 4.1 Design and Procedure 35 4.2 Results 39 Chapter 5 Conclusions 44 References 46 Appendix A 49 Appendix B 58 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 實驗經濟 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 機制設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 綠色設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 賽局理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 行為理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | game theory | en |
| dc.subject | experimental economics | en |
| dc.subject | behavioral operations management | en |
| dc.subject | incentive mechanism | en |
| dc.subject | green design | en |
| dc.title | 消費者行為理論於綠色設計生產之誘因機制研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Incentive Mechanism for Green Design with Consideration of Consumer Behaviors | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃奎隆,余峻瑜,丁慶榮 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 機制設計,綠色設計,賽局理論,行為理論,實驗經濟, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | incentive mechanism,green design,game theory,behavioral operations management,experimental economics, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 60 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-07-29 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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