中國對於國際典則的非線性遵循：參與裁軍、智慧財產權與維和行動的案例研究

Abstract

本文的問題意識為在改革開放30餘年後，隨著中國和國際典則的互動增加，中國是否曾因互動經驗而再定義政策利益與價值？在回顧諸多探討合作的國際關係理論之基礎上，本文嘗試建構四個模型以解釋中國1978年迄今對國際典則的政策，特別是對裁軍、智慧財產權與維和行動等三個不同的典則。在理論的回顧與假說的設計中，藉著現實主義、自由制度主義與新自由主義的「簡單學習」，本文推演了內生戰略型與調適對抗型等兩組假說以推論中國的遵循程度為何較低。而藉著自由制度主義、新自由主義的「複雜學習」與社會建構主義的回顧，本文推演了利益順從型與價值順從型，嘗試解釋中國在不同時期的遵循程度為何較高。 本文部分補充了現有文獻的三個不足之處，鮮少針對單一個案進行長時序的研究、未關注國家利益的排序及較缺乏第一手的資料來源。本文以中國在1978年到2014年間對裁軍典則、智慧財產權典則及維和行動的參與為例進行長時序的個案研究。本文發現中國對裁軍典則和維和行動的參與為非線性，除未同意可能造成實質限制的典則規範外，中國於2007年後的第三階段中對典則的遵循程度也下降，實際利得的大小及是否有助於滿足政策目標為影響中國參與與否的關鍵。另一方面，中國對智慧財產權典則的參與政策雖為線性，但觀察政策細節仍可發現中國仍希望避免做出過多承諾，仍存在著可能導致遵循程度下降的因素，故其對智財權典則的遵循仍存在不確定性。 本文最重要的發現可分為實際案例與理論評估等兩面向，在實際案例的研究發現共有三點，可將之歸納為中國參與政策的層級性，依序考慮參與是否有助於達成政策目標、是否造成實質約束及價值觀的異同：參與是否有利於達成政策目標或滿足國家利益為影響中國是否參與的關鍵，例如在第一與第二階段中，參與是否有助於經濟發展為中國考量的重點，而在第三階段中，參與是否有助於經濟轉型及確保大國地位則為其重點。其二，典則的規範是否將實際限制中國在相關領域的政策選擇範圍將影響其參與程度，面對可能造成實際限制的條文或價值，在不存在其他變數的影響下，中國可能選擇不參與或忽視；在尚不清楚規範內容與可能影響的情形下，中國傾向保有參與政策的階段性與可逆性。其三，價值觀的異同則將影響中國順從或抵抗國際規範的程度，具體反應在中國國內法規的調整程度，價值觀的差異程度越大，中國法制化的程度越低。 而本文在理論評估面向的研究發現則有三點，這三點均呼應學界對中國外交政策的評估，亦即典型的現實主義與務實主義信徒：其一，現實主義的調適概念對中國參與政策的解釋能力較高，此概念可同時解釋中國在裁軍典則、智財權典則及維和行動的參與政策，而如同理論的預期，符合此概念的現象僅發生在中國對物質利益的再界定過程。其二，當參與有助於滿足政策目標或國家利益內涵時，新自由主義的「簡單學習」便可能發生；複雜學習與社會建構主義推論的社會化則以不造成安全威脅與違背政策目標為必要前提。其三，從中國對裁軍典則和智財權典則的參與過程來看，社會建構主義主張的社會影響對中國政策的衝擊高於說服與模仿兩項，「胡蘿蔔式」的利誘影響中國改變的可能性及效果又高於「大棒式」的懲罰。 最後，身為崛起強權，中國相當歡迎現存典則與其制度，此或因其過去受益極大之故，例如國際經貿典則對中國經濟成長的幫助、化學武器裁軍條約有助中國清除日軍遺留在陸的老舊化學武器。但正由於崛起的現狀，中國對現存典則的運作結果不滿，認為典則的某些運作將戕害其利益，例如在2007年後數度在聯合國安理會中否決維和議案的動機。而在崛起的背景下，前述兩者的交織影響促使中國找到應對現有典則的第三條路，移植現有典則的制度但稍做調整，使其更符合中國的國家利益。

To what extent has China redefined its interests and values that underpin its policy toward international regimes, while the interactions between China and international regimes have intensified since 1978? Drawing on international relations theory, the author constructs four models to explain China’s policy toward the international regimes in disarmament (DA), intellectual property rights (IPR) and peacekeeping operation (PKO). In order to explain the causes that make China’s compliance relatively low, the author tests two sets of hypothesis, including inner-based strategy and optimized confrontation models, according to the theoretical arguments related to cooperation through the lens of realism, liberal institutionalism and neo-liberalism (particularly on “simple learning”). In order to explore the factors leading to relatively high level of compliance by China, the author tests two sets of hypothesis, including value-oriented and interest-oriented models, through reviewing the ideas about cooperation in liberal institutionalism, neo-liberalism (particularly on “complex learning”) and social constructivism. The major empirical finding is that China’s policy toward DA and PKO regimes has been non-linear; China’s compliance has in general been rolling back since 2007. On the other hand, although China’s policy toward IPR regime is by and large linear, there are still several factors that may bring down China’s compliance level. Hence China’s compliance toward IPR regime is still uncertain in the long run. In the case of DA and PKO, China has never participated in those regimes or treaties which may impose substantive restrictions on China, while he expected gains in China’s national interest is the crucial variable influencing China’s decisions and behaviors. In the case of IPR, even though China’s compliance has been growing since 1978, China still tends to make as less commitment as possible, as revealed by this dissertation’s scrutiny of the nuances of China’s behaviors and policies. For those parts, a sound explanation of China’s policies revolves around the concept of adaptation, a notion grounded in realism. Simple learning argued by neo-liberalist may take place if China’s participation fits in its national interest. Yet this may not be the case for complex learning, unless China can ensure that security threat will not arise and that it is helpful to achieve its policy goals. Furthermore, the impact caused by “social influence” is greater than that of persuasion and mimicking, two concepts often cited in exploring the interaction between nation-states and international regimes. Finally, three points stand out from a synthesis of this dissertation’s myriad findings. First, if the choice of cooperation would help to achieve its policy objectives, China will be more likely to cooperate. Second, if signing treaties or participating in regimes would restrict its choices in other issue areas, China will consider its participating context more carefully. Third, the value differences between China and a given regime will dictate how to what degree China would internalize the related norms and rules into its domestic laws. On the other hand, as an emerging power at the global level, China often welcomes existing institutions and rules in the international society, because more often than not China earns vast benefits from those regimes. However, precisely because it is a rising power, China is not fully satisfied with the overall pattern of allocation of rights/benefits and obligations/duties by many existing regimes. As a result, China has found a third way, beyond total compliance or rejection, to deal with the current regimes, chiefly by making necessary modifications to the existing rules from the extant regimes which serve as the basis to create new ones that fit more squarely with its national interests.