從公司法第178條表決權迴避論董事暨控制股東利益衝突的防免之道

Abstract

本文主要探討表決權迴避制度是否可作為董事暨控制股東利益衝突的防免之道，以及是否有其他方式更適合作為防免方法。首先探究表決權之性質，藉以批判存有利益衝突時，董事/股東表決權迴避制度是否各有其正當性。接著於整理實務最高法院關於表決權迴避制度之判決，瞭解實務現實上之運作後，再藉由觀察三個具有爭議性的併購案例，從中獲取教訓與啟發。 在面對董事與公司利益衝突時，我國現行法下股東或監察人，是否有獲取公司內部資訊管道，而得以介入的空間，恐怕存有疑問；又在我國法下，似乎認為表決權迴避即可解決問題，而忽視結構上偏差的問題；董事遵守表決權迴避後之責任為何，也欠缺討論。 另外，當控制股東與公司利益衝突時，我國係採影子董事之規範模式，而不同於美國直接課予控制股東忠實義務之作法。當控制股東與少數股東存有利益衝突時，其核心問題即在於我們要如何保護少數股東當初投資的合理期待，我國現行法下卻欠缺相關救濟管道。

This dissertation aims at discussing whether requirement of abstaining from voting rights could be taken as the solution to conflict of interests, and whether there are better solutions. First of all, this dissertation discusses the nature of voting rights to question justification of requirement of abtstaining from voting rights when there is conflict of interests. And then collect the related verdicts and observe three controversial M&A cases to learn a lesson and arouse some inspiration. Involving the conflict of interests between directors and the corporation, it’s doubtful whether the shareholders or supervisors could obtain the necessary information to intervene the suspicious transaction in Taiwan. Moreover, abstaining from voting rights could not remove the structural bias, but there’s no further resolution in Taiwan. And it’s not clear whether there lies responsibility after the directors follow requirement of abstaining from voting rights. When relating to conflict between controlling shareholders and the corporation, Taiwan adopts the legistlative patterns of shadow directors, unlike the US imposing fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders. With regard to conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, Taiwan does not provide relief and subsidies.