請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/52132完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 邵慶平(Ching-Ping Shao) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ching-Yin Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃敬穎 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T16:08:26Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-21 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-21 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-11 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/52132 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 近來加密貨幣交易所的倒閉事件顯示使用者在交易所受到駭客攻擊、存在詐騙事件以及管理不當等資訊流出時，會爭先恐後地撤出資金——撤出對象並及於實際上體質健全的交易所。蓋使用者預期並害怕在未來交易所的一系列破產或清算過程中將受到資產不流動或貶值的風險。此顯示加密貨幣交易所的易擠兌性，特別是集中式交易所。實則，集中式交易所涉及類似銀行的營運模式：其為使用者資金提供存儲服務，同時擁有事實上權限去自由運用該等存儲資金。若監管者持續忽略此等議題，加密貨幣交易所可能在其能茁壯並嘉惠於人類社會之前便因大規模擠兌事件而出現系統性的倒閉現象。 本文主要聚焦在提供一個可行的監管框架來處理加密貨幣交易所中潛在的系統性風險，至少是加密系統性風險。在加密貨幣活動越趨頻繁之際，應是監管者開始關注加密系統性風險的時刻。本文經由對影子銀行的反思，進一步針對加密擠兌、加密系統性風險、甚而由加密貨幣交易所可能引起的宏觀經濟危機等議題提出一個解決方案：特殊加密銀行（Narrow Crypto Bank）的智慧監理框架。特殊加密銀行的設置目的在集中處理集中式加密貨幣交易所的系統性風險、課予特殊加密銀行一定額度的資本適足率義務、類似存款保險的備置義務、或清算計劃的提出責任等宏觀審慎監管的措施，同時分散監管風險在各集中式交易所之間，以降低個別交易所負擔。在本文所建議的監理框架中，除非集中式加密貨幣交易所能提出一個使特殊加密銀行對使用者的存儲資產有更多控制力的營運方式，否則集中式加密貨幣交易所將被要求移轉加密資產私鑰之一部給特殊加密銀行，同時配合多方簽名智慧合約來執行使用者的下單交易。本文以為，此特殊加密銀行模式結合監管者欲採的宏觀審慎監管策略與智慧監理脈絡，使得監管者與事業營運者均得獲益，而能達到雙贏局面。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The recent cryptocurrency exchange shut-down events showed how users scrambled to withdraw funds deposited in exchanges, including healthy exchanges, after information concerning hacking, scams, and mismanagement spilled over into the market. Users feared illiquidity or devaluation of assets in further bankruptcy or insolvency procedures. This illustrates the run-prone characteristics of cryptocurrency exchange, especially centralized exchange. Centralized exchange engages in bank-like activity: it acts as a custodian for users’ funds with the de facto discretion of utilizing those funds. If regulators continue to disregard the issue, the cryptocurrency exchange industry will be systematically dragged down by crypto run before it can be of benefit to human beings. This article aims to offer a feasible framework for addressing potential systemic risk, at least crypto-systemic risk, posed by centralized cryptocurrency exchange. This is the right time to materialize centralized exchange. This paper proposes a smart-regulatory framework of Narrow Crypto Bank licensing by employing the shadow banking theory. A centralized cryptocurrency exchange will be required to transfer systemic risk to the Narrow Crypto Bank in an economical manner. The centralized exchanges will transfer one of the splited private keys to a Narrow Crypto Bank equipped with the Multi-signature Smart Contract technology, unless another method guarantees more effective control over the stored crypto assets of the Narrow Crypto Bank. The Narrow Crypto Bank approach combines attempted macroprudential regulation and the smart regulation mindset, which can be beneficial for regulators and business operators. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T16:08:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-0708202014163700.pdf: 3806245 bytes, checksum: f7babc9993ff3d73fb932796d0a15d12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I CHINESE ABSTRACT IV ENGLISH ABSTRACT V TABLE OF CONTENT VII TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES X CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 1 1.2 AIMS OF THE STUDY 10 1.3 METHODOLOGY 11 1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 11 1.5 LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 13 CHAPTER 2: SYSTEMIC RISK IN CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGES 17 2.1 ALERT: THE BANK-LIKE BUSINESS MODEL 17 2.2 CONCEPT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 22 2.2.1 Systemic Risk 22 A. Three Main Determinants of Systemic Risk 22 B. Three Main Forms of Systemic Risk 25 2.2.2 Contagion 28 A. Concept 28 B. Bank Run Behavior 30 2.3 SYSTEMIC RISK IN CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGES 35 2.3.1 Systemic Risk Posted by the Fintech World 36 2.3.2 Gradually Changing Attitude from the International Organizations 40 2.3.3 The at Least in Existence of Crypto Systemic Risk 44 2.4 BANK RUNS IN CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGE 46 2.4.1 Past Exchange Shut-Down Events 46 A. Become Insolvent and the Risk of Users’ Asset: Gatecoin 47 B. Run from the Collapse: Mt. Gox 50 2.4.2 Run-Prone Cryptocurrency Exchanges 55 A. The Essence of the Run-Prone Institution of the Cryptocurrency Exchanges 56 B. The Route for Crypto Run 65 CHAPTER 3: CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGE 70 3.1 CRYPTOCURRENCY 71 3.1.1 Taxonomy 71 3.1.2 Token 76 3.2 BLOCKCHAIN 87 3.2.1 Cryptography 88 3.2.2 Consensus 91 3.2.3 Wallet 93 3.3 CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGE 95 3.3.1 The Service Offered 95 3.3.2 The Business Model 98 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND PRIORITIES TO PREVENT BANK-RUN BEHAVIOR IN CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGE 111 4.1 FINANCIAL SAFETY NET 112 4.1.1 Deposit Insurance 113 4.1.2 Resolution Regime 120 4.1.3 Lender of Last Resort 136 4.2 SHADOW BANKING THEORY 143 4.2.1 Conceptualizing the Shadow Banking System 144 4.2.2 Regulating Shadow Banking: The Narrow Bank Theory 149 4.3 CRUCIAL ELEMENTS FOR CURBING BANK-RUN BEHAVIOR IN CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGE 156 4.3.1 Can the Narrow Bank Theory Apply to Cryptocurrency Exchanges? 157 4.3.2 The Process of Realizing Systemic Risk in Cryptocurrency Exchanges 159 4.3.3 The Priorities for the Regulatory Approach 166 CHAPTER 5: CURRENT LEGAL REGIMES IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 168 5.1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 169 5.1.1 New York BitLicense 173 A. Custody and Protection of Consumer Assets 181 B. Cyber Security Program 182 C. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery 184 D. Consumer Protection 186 5.1.2 Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act 188 A. Disclosure Requirement 194 B. Custody Reserve and Property Interest 196 C. Information Security and Operational-Security Program 201 D. Disaster-Recovery Program 203 5.2 JAPAN PAYMENT SERVICE ACT 205 5.2.1 Information Security Management 213 5.2.2 Measures for Customer Protection 215 5.2.3 Management of Users’ Property 217 5.2.4 Performance Bond Crypto-Assets 223 5.2.5 Payment of the Objective Crypto-Assets 226 CHAPTER 6: POSSIBILITY TO REGULATE THE SYSTEMIC RISK POSED BY CENTRALIZED CRYPTO CURRENCY EXCHANGES 233 6.1 OTHER ALTERNATIVES? 234 6.1.1 Requiring to Have a Third Party as a Trustee? 234 6.1.2 A Full-Reserved Cryptocurrency Exchange? 237 6.2 NARROW CRYPTO BANK: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 240 6.2.1 How Multi-Signature Smart Contract works 241 6.2.2 Link Every Centralized Exchange with Narrow Crypto Bank 245 6.2.3 The Entity Taking Responsibility of Narrow Crypto Bank 258 6.3 CONCLUSION 260 LIST OF REFERENCES 263 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 多方簽名智慧合約 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 加密貨幣 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 加密貨幣交易所 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 系統性風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 影子銀行 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Cryptocurrency | en |
| dc.subject | Multi-Signature Smart Contract | en |
| dc.subject | Shadow Banking | en |
| dc.subject | Systemic Risk | en |
| dc.subject | Cryptocurrency Exchange | en |
| dc.title | 加密貨幣交易所之監理法制——以系統性風險為中心 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Regulating the Systemic Risk Posed by Centralized Cryptocurrency Exchanges | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 楊岳平(Yueh-Ping Yang),蔡昌憲(Chang-Hsien Tsai) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 加密貨幣,加密貨幣交易所,系統性風險,影子銀行,多方簽名智慧合約, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Cryptocurrency,Cryptocurrency Exchange,Systemic Risk,Shadow Banking,Multi-Signature Smart Contract, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 289 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202002629 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-11 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 法律學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| U0001-0708202014163700.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 3.72 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。