證券交易法之實質所有規範——以申報義務與戒絕交易為對象

Abstract

我國證券交易法第22條之2第3項可以被稱為證交法中之實質所有規範，其規定內部人之配偶、未成年子女、利用他人名義之持股應包括於內部人之股份中。探究此規範，又可區分為配偶、未成年子女因身分關係而認定者（擬制型態）以及利用他人名義以實際證明利用關係者（支配型態）。本文建議針對「擬制型態」修法增訂內部人舉反證推翻之設計，針對「支配型態」則建議參考比較法，改以享有表決權或投資決定權與否為判斷。此外，針對本條之定位，本文認為首先應肯認展現於「持股超過10%股東」身分之計算層面。 除了第22條之2第3項內部人持股轉讓申報規範外，第25條內部人持股申報以及第43條之1第1項大量持股申報、第157條短線交易以及第157條之1內線交易規範皆有運用第22條之2第3項之實質所有概念。 在內部人持股轉讓申報與內部人持股申報規範中，本文建議此實質所有規範之股份範圍應修訂以「直接或間接享有金錢利益」為判斷標準，亦即董監事、經理人、大股東應申報其具有金錢利益之持股。 在大量持股申報制度中，與內部人持股申報不同之處在於其著重於對公司經營權之潛在影響，故在持股超過10%股東應申報之持股範圍，將不同於內部人持股申報之標準。本文認為，仍應採取以「享有表決權或投資決定權」為判斷，亦即持股超過10%股東應申報之持股範圍除自己及共同持有人之持股外，尚需包含其享有表決權或投資決定權之股份。 在短線交易制度中，應採以「直接或間接享有金錢利益」為實質所有之判斷標準，亦即董監事、經理人、大股東自己持股不得短線交易外，其等亦不得利用具有金錢利益之股份為短線交易，否則由內部人負返還責任。此外，針對短線交易利益如何計算及利益如何返還，原則應由具主體身分之人負返還之責，且利益計算基礎為合計其本身即實質所有股份之買賣而配對計算。 在內線交易制度中，亦應採以「直接或間接享有金錢利益」為實質所有之判斷標準，蓋內線交易、短線交易、內部人持股申報為環環相扣之制度，採取相同標準方為合理。亦即董監事、經理人、大股東等人之自己股票不得為內線交易外，其等亦不得以其所能享有金錢利益之股份為內線交易，否則由內部人負相關責任。此外，關於損害賠償，原則上應由內部人就本身及其實質所有人之持股為計算基礎。惟，在多個內部人互具實質所有關係之情況下，現行法下之不真正連帶債務似乎稍有不公，故本文建議明定此種情況應使多人負連帶賠償之責。

Article 22-2 section 3 of Securities and Exchange Act in Taiwan stipulates that the shares held by insiders’ spouse, minor children, or in the name of others shall be calculated and included in the insiders’ shares. This regulation could be divided into two types: the fictitious type (spouse and minor children, who are identified due to their identity relationship status) and the dominant type (the use of others’ names). This article proposes adding an insider’s rebuttal mechanism to “the fictitious type”. Regarding the 'dominant type', this article proposes taking the approach of judging base on “voting or investment decision rights”. In addition, with respect to the positioning of this provision, this article believes that it should first be recognized at the calculation level of the identity of 'shareholders holding more than 10%'. In addition to the insider shareholding transferring reporting rule (Article 22-2 section 3), the insider shareholding reporting rule (Article 25), the large shareholding reporting rule (Article 43-1 section1), the short-swing trading rule (Article 157) and the insider trading rules (Article 157-1) have all been using the concepts of beneficial ownership in Article 22-2 section 3. In the insider shareholding transferring reporting rule and the insider shareholding reporting rule (Article 22-2 section 3 and Article 25), this article proposes that the criterion of “having a direct or indirect pecuniary interest” should be adopted, in determining what shares should be subject to these regulations. In the large shareholding reporting rule, this article proposes that the criterion of” having voting or investment decision rights” should be adopted, that is, a shareholder who holds more than 10% of the shares should report not only the shares he/she holds but the shares in which he/she has voting or investment decision rights. In the short swing trading regulation, this article proposes that the criterion of “having a direct or indirect pecuniary interest” should be adopted when identifying beneficial ownership. In other words, the directors, supervisors, managers, and major shareholders are not allowed to use the shares with pecuniary interests for short swing trading, otherwise, the insiders will be responsible for the return of the interest. In addition, concerning the calculation and return of interest from short-swing trading, the person with the identity should be responsible for the return, and the calculation of interest should be based on the aggregation of his/her substantive shares. In the insider trading regulation, this article also proposes that the criterion of “having a direct or indirect pecuniary interest” should be adopted in identifying beneficial ownership. In other words, the directors, supervisors, managers, and major shareholders are not allowed to use the shares with pecuniary interests for insider trading, otherwise, the insiders should be responsible for relevant responsibilities.