特別股股東權利之理論與在台灣的適用

Abstract

儘管特別股的議題在德拉瓦州判決中具相當豐富之歷史，Bratton教授以及Wachter教授仍認為特別股之理論具一定之缺失。處於債與股間，特別股具此雙重特徵。但，若是強行將之以其一理解者，將帶來格格不入的結論。對台灣而言，近期的司法裁判亦將特別股帶入主流的討論之中。從而，特別股的討論是一個值得投入的研究。 首先從實然面下手，本文將嘗試檢驗德拉瓦州裁判之一致性，以及其論理之一貫性。其主要將從理論之延伸著手，探究上位原則之延伸是否可導出裁判中所見之結論。以目的而言，本文則希望透過此番檢驗推導出實然法不足之處，從而建立檢驗應然法則的必要性。此實然法之檢驗將回溯至1920年代之裁判，直至2010年後之裁判。以達拉瓦州通說之「公司契約說」（contractarian）為準，本文將據此檢驗公司內部成員間之權利義務關係，並探討股東享有強制受任人保障（fiduciary right or protection）之假說，從而建立特別股股東權利義務內涵之基礎。就結論而言，本文認為德拉瓦州的二分法應著眼於契約所欲處裡的特定交易範圍以劃分契約法理以及公司法理之區塊。在契約法理之外，公司法理依舊應以事後、公平之規則解決紛爭。 就台灣而言，特別股目前尚可區分為一般股份有限公司之特別股，以及閉鎖性股份有限公司之特別股。就前者而言，法院於有限之判決中乃單以契約之法理解決紛爭。而也因為台灣法下契約法理之強大，它足以妥善處理股東權益變更之問題。對於閉鎖性股份有限公司而言，契約之法理亦能作為規範之基礎。

Despite the rich history of Delaware case laws on the preferred stock topic, Professors Bratton and Wachter observed that preferred stock is undertheorized. Occupying a space between debt and equity, the device draws on characteristics of both, but never seemingly feels at home given any one of the two framework in its entirety. For Taiwan, a few limited cases had also brought preferred stocks into the spot light. Altogether, there appears to be much to be said on the topic of preferred stocks. Starting from a positive review, this Thesis explores critically the Delaware case laws for incongruities and inconsistencies. The focus is on the extrapolation or progression of logical reasoning from higher level principles. The goal is to demonstrate some dissatisfaction with what the law is now, and to hopefully in turn to pave the way for what the law should be. The review begins in the 1920s and carries all the way through the most recent ones after 2010. Relying on the same contractarian approach to read the corporate contracts among the relevant corporate constituents, this Thesis next engages in a fundamental review of some hypotheses of mandatory fiduciary protection as a basis for the preferred stockholders. Ultimately for Delaware, this Thesis finds that the bifurcating treatment should be handed out with a careful analysis of the transactional context that the preferred stockholders’ bargain sought to completely address. Outside that context, a fiduciary review of ex post fairness still governs. For Taiwan, the preferred stock law is divided between the Closed and non-Closed Corporation context. The extant non-Closed Corporation cases indicate a general tendency for the Taiwanese court to adopt a full contractual framework. And, given this further reaching contractual framework, the protection against ex post modification of the preferred stockholders’ stakes is adequate. Furthermore, as a natural extension into the Close Corporation context, a full contractual framework may suit Taiwan.