加拿大最高法院關於權利與自由憲章第15條判決之分析—以實質平等的內涵與審查模式為中心

Abstract

「實質平等觀」是當前國內許多平等權研究者認為較符合當代政治、哲學平等理論的平等權內涵或價值，惟國內文獻對實質平等觀之說明或運用，多停留在批判層次，較難將其深刻的平等意涵轉化為平等權違憲審查上可操作的概念或模式，而這也是目前國內平等權研究面臨的挑戰。 本文藉由整理分析加拿大最高法院對於加拿大權利與自由憲章第15條平等權保障所做成之重要判決，首先從加拿大最高法院對平等權保障的宗旨及核心關懷、具體審查架構以及重要路線爭論等方面，釐清以實質平等觀作為解決平等權爭議基礎時，可能面臨的困難或質疑，續則挑選準嫌疑分類的界定、對優惠性差別待遇的態度與積極保障義務的發展等對我國平等權相關學說具有重要啟示之面向，呈現加拿大平等權保障體系更完整的實質平等圖像。 本文發現加拿大最高法院基於實質平等觀所展現的審查特色主要有三：結果取向、脈絡化審查、敏於壓迫。其所建立的平等權審查模式，透過憲章第15條與憲章第1條相分離的分析架構，能更清楚地凸顯實質平等重視族群分類（對族群身份與權力關係敏感）、重視歧視或壓迫效果（而非意圖）的特色，避免對於目的與手段的檢驗，模糊了平等權真正關心的重點，此點於本文第三章將加拿大最高法院平等權審查模式適用於本國案例的過程更為明顯。透過與加拿大審查模式的比較，會發現我國大法官對於平等權的理解不僅經常與實質平等觀相違，甚至可說是並未發展出真正獨立於自由權的思考，欠缺保障弱勢族群的價值觀與決心。 其次本文參考加拿大學者之見解，發現儘管加拿大最高法院努力發展基於實質平等觀的審查模式，但仍有未臻周全之處，不論是對於「刻板印象」概念或者「嫌疑/準嫌疑分類」概念的使用，都有未能落實實質平等觀針對「結果」（outcome、impact、effect）審查的問題，學者認為大法官還未能清楚地意識到「差異」本身即代表社會經濟權力結構對弱勢者的宰制與壓迫，對「多元交錯的壓迫」（intersectionality）也不夠敏感。這些針對加拿大最高法院的批評，對於本國平等權的研究而言，是比加拿大最高法院判決更為進步的觀點。 從加拿大的經驗可以看出，實質平等作為平等權保障內涵，並非只是批判性理論不切實際的美好想像，而是真實可能，但或許國內要能走到那一步，還差不止一哩路。

This thesis can be roughly dividied into two parts. In the first part, I review a series of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions on section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, includes Andrews, Law, Eldridge, Vriend, Lovelace, and Kapp. To clarify how the Supreme Court of Canada achieve the promise of substantive equality, my case review focuses on the judges’ explaination of the purpose of section 15, the definition of discrimination, the diverse approachs taken by different justices during the 1995 trilogy, and the analytical framework since Andrews, Law to Kapp. Then I reflect on the enumerated and analogous grouds approach, the court’s attitude toward amelioratve measures, and the opinion on the government positive obligations. Those are important issues that researchers in Taiwan mostly concern and the Canadian experience may give some inspirations. To sum up, the most significant features of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach are the emphasis on the impact of the distinction rather than the intent, contexualized methods, and concerns about disadvantages. In the second part, I employ the Supreme Court of Canada’s analytical framework developed in section 15 cases to review the judicial interpretation no. 584 and no. 649 of the Council of Grand Justices to show the differences of the approaches to solving cases on equality between the Supreme Court of Canada and the Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan. The couclusion is that the Council of Grand Justices failed realizing the promise of substantive equality and not yet develop an analysis for the equal protection clause distinct from the analysis for freedom-protecting clauses. Compared with the Supreme Court of Canada, the Concil of Grand Justices usually lays greater stress on the majority groups’ need in society and not sensitive to the subordinations or disadvantages experienced by minorities.