考量公平偏好的供應鏈契約協調研究

Abstract

近年來，公平偏好的意識逐漸出現在企業之中，若想要讓自身所處之供應鏈更具有競爭力，勢必得與供應鏈其他成員互相合作，考量自身利潤的同時，也需考量他人之利益，以符合公平性。本文研究一個製造商與一個零售商的 Stackelberg模型，製造商為領導者，零售商為追隨者，零售商面對的消費者需求為不確定，並將公平偏好的考量納入此供應鏈中，首先利用 Nash 協商模型算出製造商與零售商之公平報酬，並加入效用函數的計算當中，之後便討論了當雙方均考慮公平偏好時的模型與當雙方均不考慮公平偏好時的模型，而當雙方均不考慮公平偏好時的模型又有兩種特殊情況可以討論：只有製造商考量公平偏好與只有零售商考量公平偏好。討論完傳統的供應鏈模型，之後試著將供應鏈契約加入該供應鏈並協調之，本研究採用了製造商會向零售商買回未銷售完產品的回購契約，及對於每一單位銷售出去的產品收益有著利益分享的收益分享契約。且運用數值分析，給予不確定的消費者需求一連續分配，歸納整理出供應鏈成員與供應鏈整體的最適當決策，並探討參數的變化會怎麼影響到利潤函數、效用函數、以及供應鏈契約的選擇。

“We don’t compete as individual businesses any more; we compete as supply chains,” says Martin Christopher, emeritus professor of marketing and logistics, indicating that members in a certain supply chain should no longer seek profit maximization of their own, instead, they should work together to coordinate the supply chain. That’s why we should incorporate the concept of fairness preference. Research in behavioral economics has shown that individuals are motivated by concerns of fairness. Therefore, we incorporate this concept in a conventional channel which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer should decide the wholesale price while the retailer should decide the quantity to order. In this research, we also propose supply chain contracts such as buy back contract and revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain with fairness concerns. Then we conduct the numerical analysis to observe the supply chain members’ strategy and eventually confirm that supply chain contracts is efficient enough even the supply chain is in its fairness condition.