「斷腕」與「劫掠」：能力落差下的戰略抉擇──以日俄戰爭為實證案例

Abstract

本文在「權力不對稱」這個結構之下，重新檢視「權力」的概念，並將其二分為「可用能力」與「綜合國力」。根據這種分類，本文進一步提出了「能力落差」的概念，認為在存在能力落差的情境下，會出現綜合國力較高的大國反而可用能力相對較少，反之綜合國力較低的小國卻在可用能力上佔據優勢的情況。 與此同時，本文還提出了「能力雙層影響」的假設，認為綜合國力在長時間維度上決定行為者的總體戰略趨勢，而可用能力則影響行為者在現實條件限制下的具體戰略。也就是說，情境對身處其中的行為者所產生的結構壓力在這兩個層次上都會得到體現，而當存在能力落差時，行為者的回應方式便會因為受到這兩個層次的影響而具有某種「內在矛盾性」。 這種長程與短程，總體與具體之間的「內在矛盾性」，使行為者對能力落差情境的回應具備了與眾不同的特質。本文認為這種獨特性足夠支撐其成為戰略理想型，因而將劣勢大國的行為模式命名為「斷腕」，將優勢小國的行為模式命名為「劫掠」，並且進一步推演出這兩種戰略類型的內在邏輯與基本特徵，從而建立起一個「斷腕﹣劫掠」分析模型。 本文嘗試用這個模型對符合能力落差假設的日俄戰爭進行了重新的解讀，認為這是日本成功劫掠，沙俄斷腕失敗的經典案例。在日俄戰爭中，作為綜合國力明顯佔優一方的沙俄苦於遠東戰力不足，但國力遠遜於沙俄的日本卻因為地緣的優勢而擁有較多的可用能力。由於日本準確地把握住能力落差的結構特徵，積極推行劫掠戰略，最終在戰略的兩個階段上都獲得了成功；相反地，沙俄違背能力落差的內在邏輯消極斷腕，最後也只能流於失敗。

Based on the structure of Power Asymmetry, this paper is going to re-examine the concept of “Power” and divide it into “Available Capabilities” and the “Comprehensive Capabilities”. According to this classification, this paper further puts forward the concept of “Power Parochial Disparity”, which believes that under the situation of power parochial disparity, big power who owns higher comprehensive capabilities may relatively has less available capabilities, however, a small power who has lower comprehensive capabilities can be in an advantaged position of more available capabilities. In the meantime, this paper puts forward hypothesis about “two-level-impact system”, which believes under long time dimension, comprehensive capabilities determines the overall trend of strategy of actors, and available capabilities can affect actors’ concrete strategy under realistic conditions. In other words, pressure of the structure to actors produced by situation will be reflected on these two levels. When there is power parochial disparity situation, actors’ response patterns will affect by these two levels and possess some kind of “inherent contradiction”. This inherent contradiction attributes special peculiarities to the two behaviors of actors in power parochial disparity. We named the behaviors after “Amputation” and “Plundering”, and further, clarify the inherent logic and basic features of the two and finally construct the “Amputation-Plundering” analytical model. After that, we try to use this model to reinterpret the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, which is a classic case of power parochial disparity. In this case, Russia, the actor with much more comprehensive capabilities, had less available capabilities in East Asia. On the contrary, the other actor, Japan, had less comprehensive capabilities and more available capabilities, due to its geographic advantages. However, Japan realized the basic logic of power parochial disparity and executed its Amputation strategy positively therefore became the winner of the war, and contrarily, Russia finally failed for the reason of its violation of the power parochial disparity.