跨區經營與向下分組可否誘發兩小區獨佔有線電視業者間之競爭？

Abstract

在小區獨占的有線電視市場中，是否可藉由開放跨區經營且要求增加向下分組頻道組合而引進系統業者間競爭並提高消費者剩餘？本論文研究在給予跨區經營及於現行頻道包套增加價格頻道縮減(Price-Channel-Downscaled, PCD)組合的新策略選項下，兩獨占系統業者的互動情形。 除了兩業者間的策略賽局，建立消費者對業者策略的反應模型亦是本文分析重點。相較於簡單的需求函數，此研究運用實證資料模擬及領導者追隨者模型描述系統業者及消費者間的互動，並以Nash 賽局模型分析兩系統業者決策。依據台灣永康經營區資料所做的模擬分析發現，若攤銷進入成本大於現有利潤的2.58%，兩獨占且對稱的系統業者將避免擴大經營區但會增加PCD組合。詳細的分析顯示因市場擴張而增加的收入不一定足以支付進入成本，但增加一個仔細設計的PCD組合可增加既有系統業者的利潤並因而提高進入障礙。此經營區調整激勵政策最終對打破獨占效果有限，但卻誘使系統業者增加向下分組頻道組合並因此增加消費者剩餘。 本論文也對增加進階頻道組合(advanced channel bundle, ACB)是否能增加業者收入並引進競爭做初步的研究。透過允許系統業者在增加PCD組合的同時增加ACB組合，PCD組合的縮減幅度能夠進一步增加，且消費者和系統業者剩餘皆會因消費量增加而提高。因此透過合適的PCD及ACB組合設計，管制者不但可透過分組付費增進消費者剩餘，亦可因增加的收益促進兩業者間競爭。

In a cable TV market of monopolistic cable system operators (SOs) over small areas, would a policy induce competition among SOs and raise consumer surplus by allowing service area expansion while requiring addition of a downward pricing package? This thesis studies the case of two monopolistic SOs given a new strategy option of service area expansion and addition of a Price-Channel-Downscaled (PCD) package to the existing flat rate (FR) package. Besides the peer-to-peer strategic game between two SOs, modeling consumers’ response to SO strategies is critical to the analysis. Instead of using simple demand functions, this study approach adopts empirical data based simulation and a leader-follower model for interactions between consumers and SO and a Nash game theoretic model between the two SOs. Simulation study based on data of Yong Kang franchise area in Taiwan shows that SOs in two symmetric monopolistic markets will not expand service area but add a PCD package if the amortized entry cost is higher than 2.58% of the current profits. Detailed analysis indicates that the revenue created from market expansion may not necessarily to cover the entry cost, but the addition of a carefully designed PCD package can increase profits of incumbent SO and thus raise the entry barrier. The franchise reform incentive policy ends up having limited effect on breaking monopoly, but it induces SOs to add a downward pricing package and thus increases consumer surplus. This thesis research also report a preliminary study of whether the addition of an advanced channel bundle (ACB) package may increase revenues and induce competition. By allowing SOs to add an optional ACB package while adding a PCD package, the downward scale of PCD package can be further increased, and surplus of consumers and SOs will both be improved due to the increased amount of consumption. Therefore, with appropriate designed PCD and ACB package, regulator can not only increase consumer surplus by tiered charging mode, but also facilitate competition between SOs due to the total revenues increased.