請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/48846
標題: | 以歐盟併購管制實質審核探討歐盟之競爭政策 Substantial Research regarding Competition Policy of European Union in Merger Regulation |
作者: | Jou-Yu Chen 陳柔諭 |
指導教授: | 王文宇(Wen-Yeu Wang) |
關鍵字: | 併購管制,歐盟,歐盟執行委員會,併購政策,競爭政策,競爭法, Merger Regulation,European Commission,Merger Control, |
出版年 : | 2016 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本文透過歐盟執行法院的併購管制案件中,從幾個主題去探討歐盟併購管制的競爭政策。從併購案件中的集中化效應、是否有歐盟管轄適用的共同體意義、歐盟競爭委員會從會員國接手的併購管制案件,在水平、垂直和整合性併購案件中的實案探討,以及在補救措施中歐盟競爭委員會所扮演的角色。從併購管制的設計和通知主管機關的程序,從壟斷市場地位的考量和併購後對競爭市場的影響效力之兩大主要考量,以及以此兩大要點為出發點的研究和分析。
針對國際市場之錯綜複雜的商業組織,歐盟的競爭法利用履行地原則和效果原則的適用將國際企業之商業併購案件納入歐盟的競爭法政策管理中,此為以保護主義控制歐盟地區之商業市場及活動,並且利用是否具備「共同體意義」的概念和年營業額的數量劃下歐盟競爭法中關於併購管制的圈選範圍。 在併購管制案件的分析上,歐盟執行委員會利用對共同體競爭市場的影響和具備或可能形成、加深壟斷地位或是利用其地位進行市場壟斷的商業濫用,以實質對市場上可能影響的方式分析,准許或否決企業併購的結果。無論是歐盟地區為主的併購案件,或是跨國、甚至主要併購之企業並非歐盟本身的企業,歐盟的競爭政策在其執行委員會官員再三在公開場合及透過各級文宣表示,歐盟的併購管制只是一項程序而非一個結局,並且併購管制並非一項用以打擊國際其他企業的政治或經濟手段,而是為了維護競爭市場中的競爭性。 本文亦涉及併購管制政策的實質影響,也包含了歐盟執行委員會與各國競爭法主管機關的合作,以及實質上的併購管制,例如程序上與時間金錢上的花費,對於企業界的影響。而最終,這些併購管制的政策也可以歸因於緣由主為歐盟地區經濟政策上建設和考量,並且在商業併購管制的情形下,利用補償的措施開放給企業併購的空間,以及企業併購申請程序上保障的兩相平衡。 This analysis of European merger regulation provides a brief history and an overview of the three types of mergers. Mergers that concern competition authorities can be classified by the market relationship a merger creates, namely horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers. Horizontal mergers traditionally are of the greatest concerns for competition authorities, as they are most likely to create overriding market share or concentration of market power by reducing the number of competitors on a relevant market. Examples of horizontal mergers include Gencor v Commission [1999], Ryanair Holdings plc v Commission, and Sun Chemical Group BV and others v Commission. Vertical mergers are activities between firms that operate on different levels that lead to the completion of the same products. Anti-competition effects of vertical mergers are mostly noted when one of the participants have dominating horizontal market power on one or more levels. A merged entity then can in turn foreclose competition on various levels. Examples of vertical mergers include, most notedly, in space alliance formed in Thales/ Finmeccanica/ Alcatel Alenia Space/ Telespazio, and AOL/ Time Warner. Conglomerate mergers are transactions completed by two companies who, individually, are active in unrelated industries but whose products form portfolios that may affect the same customers. Compared to horizontal or vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers used to give rise to competitive concerns in 'limited cases,” and 'whether conglomerate mergers should be controlled at all is a matter of controversy.” Conglomerate mergers may trigger competitive concerns if the merged entity could achieve dominance or foreclosure of competition in a target market through tying and bundling of their existing products. In GE/ Amsham for example, the European Commission examined, firstly whether the proposed merger of the two companies could result in 'ability to foreclose' existing competitors, and secondly, whether possible bundling or tying of the two companies' products could exclude competition. The Commission's challenge was not successful, as the result of findings by the Commission found that existing competitors would have sufficient market power and counter-strategies to respond to the merger. For many, European merger regulation could be a weapon used against American corporates and entities. This article specifically interprets and seek the nature of European Merger Regulation, the organization behind it - European Commission, and the cases of merger control behind such regulations. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/48846 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201603625 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 科際整合法律學研究所 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-105-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 979.92 kB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。