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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/4864完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾宛如 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yueh-Ling Chao | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 趙悅伶 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-14T17:49:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2015-12-01 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-14T17:49:05Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2015-12-01 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2015-09-22 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部分（按筆劃排列）
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Chiang, Hsian–tsai, Am Empirical Study of Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance (2005), Journal of American Academy of Business 6(1). Chou, Cheng-fong, Are Independent Directors Effective Monitors in Taiwan?—A theoretical analysis (2013), National Taiwan University Law Review 8(1). Claessens, S. et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations (2000). Connelly, Brian L. et al., Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2011), Journal of Management 37(1). Cornelius, Peter K. & Bruce Kogut, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (2003). Daily, Catherine M. et al., Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data (2003), The Academy of Management Review 28(3). Demsetz, H. & B. Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance (2001), Journal of Corporate Finance 7(3). Desender, Kurt A. et al., Board Characteristics and Audit Fees: Why Ownership Structure Matters? 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Jaggi, Bikki et al., Family Control, Board Independence and Earnings Management: Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms (2009), Journal of Accounting Public Policy 28. Jarva, H. & A. M. Lantto, Information Content of IFRS versus Domestic Accounting Standards: Evidence from Finland (2010), The Finnish Journal of Business Economics vol. 7. Jaweher, Bahloul & Ben Arab Mounira, The Effects Of Mandatory IAS/IFRS Regulation On The Properties Of Earnings’ Quality In Australia And Europe (2014), European Journal of Business and Management 6. Jensen, Michael C., Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and the Market for Takeovers (1988), American Economic Review 76. Kakabadse, Andrew et al., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO): that Sacred and Secret Relationship (2005), Journal of Management Development 25(2). Kang, David C., Transaction Costs and Crony Capitalism in East Asia (2003), Comparative Politics 35(4). 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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/4864 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 台灣的公司治理環境，相較於其他國家有其特殊之處，例如股權較為集中、且集中程度與公司營運年數之間有高度正相關、家族企業比例高、有一定比例的兼任公司等等。而於理論上，該等特殊情形均會影響相關公司治理制度的實際成效。經過本文實證分析發現，家族企業中，提高獨立董事的比例、資訊揭露品質等治理機制，確實對公司有正面影響；而在兼任公司方面，獨立董事比例則與公司營運績效脫鉤。至於審計委員會則無論無哪種情況下，對公司績效的正面影響均不顯著。
上述實證結果，可說明既有制度仍有改善的空間。透過與亞洲數十個國家進行比較後，本文揀擇與台灣治理環境較為相似的韓國，進行比較法的介紹，並特別著重於韓國近兩次的修法內容、以及強調該等法律與台灣法規的相異之處。文末並分就現行法下少數股東權行使門檻、投資人保護法第10條之一、獨立董事之職能、監察人與審計委員會之規定提出修改建議，期生拋磚引玉之效。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Compared with other countries’, corporate governance in Taiwan has some distinctive features such as its high ownership concentration, high positive correlation between concentration rate and years of operation, and the common phenomenon of CEO duality, etc. Theoretically, all these factors should have an impact on the performance of corporate governance, but the actual situation can only be concluded by empirical study. As shown by the empirical result in this thesis, given that the business is family-owned, the ratio increase of independent directors and the increase of information disclosure do have positive influence on the firm’s operating performance. However, in the case of CEO duality, there is no relation between the ration of independent directors and the firm’s operating performance. In addition, in either case, the audit committee has no significant positive influence on the firm’s performance.
The outcome of the above empirical study indicates that the governance regulation in Taiwan still has much room for improvement. Therefore, it is necessary to juxtapose other country’s governance framework to see if there is any experience we could learn from. After deliberately comparing the governance characters of Taiwan with many Asian countries, this thesis concludes that the governance feature in Korea is the most similar. Therefore, this thesis further introduces the regulations of Korea concerning corporate governance and its history of amendment, and emphasizes the differences between the regulation in Taiwan and the rule in Korea. In the end of this thesis, I conclude that it is imperative to amend relevant regulations to relax the minimum shareholding ratio to exercise shareholder’s rights, to modify Article 10-1 of Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, to enhance the function of independent director, and to increase the independence of auditor and audit committee. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-14T17:49:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-104-R01a21109-1.pdf: 1655921 bytes, checksum: 94607ce099b9f95b38f6b6722a7ed77a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究範圍與方法 2 第三節 論文架構 4 第四節 預期貢獻 6 第二章 基本理論 7 第一節 概說 7 （一）代理理論、經營所有分離及交易成本理論 7 （二）利害關係人理論 8 （三）現代管家理論 8 第二節 公司治理之基本規範原則 8 （一）董事會之組成與議事規範 9 （二）若干委員會的設置要求 10 （三）財務、業務及股權變動之資訊公開 11 第三節 公司治理之評估與影響 11 （一）跨國的治理評鑑機制 11 （二）台灣的資訊揭露評鑑系統 12 （三）台灣的公司治理評鑑系統 12 第四節 亞洲地區的特殊現象 13 （一）OECD之公司治理圓桌論壇 13 （二）持股結構的特殊性 14 （三）普遍存在的關係人交易 14 （四）董事提名與選舉制度的特殊性 14 第五節 台灣之特殊現象 15 （一） 家族企業之比例極高 15 （二） 董事長兼任總經理職位 17 （三） 審計委員會與監察人擇一 19 第一節 研究假說 21 第二節 實證模型與變數 22 （一） 應變數：總資產報酬率（Return on Asset, ROA） 24 （二） 自變數 24 （三） 控制變數 28 第三節 資料來源與樣本選擇 30 第四節 實證結果 31 （一） 敘述性分析 31 （二） 相關性分析 32 （三） 迴歸分析 34 第五節 研究結論 39 （一） 兼任公司：以資訊揭露為導向 39 （二） 家族企業：以引入外部人為導向 40 （三） 審計委員會：未具有正面效益 40 第四章 研究結果之理論建構 42 第一節 概論 42 第二節 兼任公司結果之理論詮釋 42 （一）治理因素相互影響論 (Influence by Governance Bundles) 42 （二）組織理論 (Organization Theory) 45 （三）代理理論 (Agency Theory) 47 第三節 家族企業結果之理論詮釋 48 （一）治理因素相互影響論 (Influence by Governance Bundles) 48 （二）降低代理成本的壓力 (pressures to lower agency cost) 50 （三）釋放訊息理論 (Signaling Theory) 52 （四）維護自身利益 (interest of controlling family) 52 （五）倚賴資源理論 (Resource Dependence Theory) 53 第五章 東亞國家之制度介紹 55 第一節 亞洲國家的經營與所有分離形態研究 55 （一）亞洲國家共通現象之研究 55 （二）控制權集中與公司營運年數之關聯 57 （三）控制權集中與公司規模之關聯 58 （四）家族企業與公司規模之關聯 58 （五）綜合比較 60 第二節 OECD改善報告之修法建議 60 第三節 韓國立法例 62 （一）背景介紹 62 （二）第一次修法內容 67 （三）第一次修法評析 75 （四）第二次修法內容 77 （五）第二次修法評析 81 第六章 結論與建議 82 第一節 股東權行使之檢討 82 （一）行使門檻過高 82 （二）提高代位訴訟之實質誘因 84 （三）投資人保護法第10條之一之檢討 86 第二節 董事會功能之再強化 88 （一）強化獨立董事之職能 88 （二）兼任形態禁止之必要 92 （三）關係人交易規範之健全化 95 第三節 監察人與審計委員會功能之再思考 96 （一）監察人實際功能之省思 96 （二）選舉制度之表決權迴避設計 97 第四節 資訊揭露品質的提升 98 參考文獻 101 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 審計委員會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 計量統計學 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 多元線性迴歸方程式 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獨立董事 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 家族企業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 資訊揭露 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | econometrics | en |
| dc.subject | family-owned business | en |
| dc.subject | independent director | en |
| dc.subject | multiple linear regression model | en |
| dc.subject | corporate governance | en |
| dc.subject | audit committee | en |
| dc.subject | information disclosure | en |
| dc.title | 台灣公司治理之實際成效：以家族企業 、獨立董事、審計委員會為軸 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Taiwan: Focus on Family-owned Business, Independent Director, and Audit Committee | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 104-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉啟群,朱德芳 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,計量統計學,多元線性迴歸方程式,獨立董事,家族企業,資訊揭露,審計委員會, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance,econometrics,multiple linear regression model,independent director,family-owned business,information disclosure,audit committee, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 109 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2015-09-23 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 法律學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-104-1.pdf | 1.62 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。