僱用人責任「僱用關係」要件之研究

Abstract

本篇論文之目的在於研究我國民法第188條僱用人責任「僱用關係」要件如何判斷的問題。在方法上，係從「僱用人責任的理論基礎」與「僱用人責任之相關制度」兩方面著手，探尋比較法與我國法的實務案例中，認定僱用關係之依據為何。 本文認為僱用人責任的理論基礎是在貫徹侵權責任制度的機能。詳言之，侵權責任法的功能主要有二：「填補損害」與「預防損害」，此二機能只有在侵權責任法所規範的行為人具備足夠的風險處理能力—包括「損害預防能力」與「損害填補能力」—之時，才能充分發揮。然而，在「僱用關係」之場合，僱用人係選擇風險處理能力較自己劣後之人，代自己從事活動。法律雖然不禁止從事該選擇，但卻會課以其人更高的義務與責任，以貫徹侵權責任之機能。因此，「僱用關係」的判斷，即在於視個案事實中，是否出現了此種「風險創造者」之「逆選擇」的現象。 然而，在觀察實務案例之後，發現僅以「風險創造者之逆選擇」作為課以僱用人責任之基礎，仍無法完滿處理所有個案。在參考比較法與我國法上僱用人責任之相關制度之後，本文主張應使僱用人責任兼負類似英美法上表見代理制度之「信賴保護」的功能，並善用我國民法第189條但書定作人責任之規定，在定作事項具有危險性、且在價值衡量上可認為「社會分工之經濟效益」應有所退讓之時，可藉由「危險防範義務之課與」以及「過失之推定」，根據民法第189條課以定作人較嚴格之責任，其法律效果類似於英美法上之不可授權義務，而非適用民法第188條僱用人責任，以獲致更合理的結果。

The purpose of this study is to find out how to define the “employer-employee relationship” as a prerequisite of employer’s liability provided in Article 188 of Civil Code. The approach is to search the basis of defing “employer-employee relationship” through comparative and domestic case law by considering the theoretical basis of employer’s liability as well as the relevant liability systems. The study finds that the theoretical basis of employer’s liability is to ensure the fuction of tort liability. The main fuctions of tort are compensation and deterrence, which can function well only when the actor has sufficient ability to manage the risk (i.e., the ability to prevent harm as well as to compensate loss).However, in employer-employee relationship, the employer choose those with inferior ability than himself to engage in activities on behalf of himself. The law does not prohibit this kind of choice, but would impose a higher obligation or duty on him to ensure the function of tort. Thus, the defing of “employer-employee relationship” would lie in wheather there is an “anti-selection of actors” in the present case. Nevertheless, it is found that the mere “anti-selection of actors” as the basis of imposing employer’s liability cannot satisfyingly resolve all the cases after the review of case law. Referring to the relative liability systems in comparative and domestic law, the study proposes that an extra “reliance protecting” fuction similar to that of apparent authority in Common Law be assigned to the employer’s liability. Moreover, the liability of employer for independent contractors provided in the proviso of Article 189 of Civil Code should be make good use of. Whenever the independent contractor engages in such dangerous activities that it is fair to think the value of economic benefit brought by division of labor should concede, stricter liabilities should be imposed on employers the effect of which similar to the non-delegable duties in Common Law through Article 189 by imposing risk-preventing duties and by means of presumption of negligence instead of applying Article 188 in order to achieve more reasonable results.