運用信用擔保機制於雙供應商下採購模式之研究

Abstract

中小企業的發展在開發中國家扮演著功不可沒的角色，由於中小企業在營運的過程中，常面臨資金不足的困境，使其無法順利運作，造成產業供應鏈運行困難，因此，如何幫助其資金融通將是中小企業一項重要議題。而以往討論信用交易大都由財務面的角度出發，本研究欲以供應鏈的角度來探討信用擔保機制。過去由政府及銀行共同捐助成立之中小企業信用保證基金會，就曾利用相對保證的方式，發展一套火金姑專案模式，期望能藉由信用擔保，結合產業上、下游廠商，共同分擔銀行授信風險。 本研究以火金姑專案模式為背景，以製造商為信用擔保機制的啟動者，在盡量滿足下游零售商的需求下，結合上游兩供應商及銀行等四個角色，基於供應商違約與否之各情境，決策出製造商最小化成本，並探討製造商最佳採購量以及兩供應商違約時，和銀行所應分攤的違約比例為何。 最後，將各參數帶入實際數字進行敏感度分析，藉由探討各參數變動對於最佳決策的影響，結果發現，於此信用擔保機制下，製造商為了降低和銀行的分攤比例，銀行會向供應商索取最高的貸款利率。且隨著供應商違約機率的提高，製造商將採購更多的需求，以規避支付下游零售商的違約成本。本研究藉由各輸入參數的調整，瞭解企業在運用信用擔保機制時，所考量的因素以及對企業成本的影響為何，提供企業未來在向上游廠商協商時，以及銀行授信予企業的過程中，作為一個重要的參考依據。

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) are playing an extremely important role in developing countries. Due to the shortage of capital, SMEs cannot operate effectively and efficiently to fulfill the order from downstream firms, resulting in poor performance of the supply chain. Therefore, how to help SMEs to get the financial support is quite a significant issue. In the past, numerous theories have been proposed to explain trade credit mainly from financial perspectives. This research attempts to examine the issue of trade guarantee mechanism from supply chain perspectives. Formerly, Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of Taiwan (Taiwan SMEG) which comes totally from donations made by the central government and financial institutions has developed a model of “Firefly Counterpart Guarantee.” Based on this model, government expects to combine upstream firms with downstream, sharing the risk of financial loan with the bank. This research cites the model of “Firefly Counterpart Guarantee” as background to develop a model of credit guarantee on dual sourcing. In this model, there are four roles, including manufacturer, supplier, retailer, and the bank. The manufacturer is a starter of the entire mechanism and it should fulfill the retailer’s demand as much as possible. Besides, in order to minimize its cost based on each default scenario, manufacturer should decide the optimal order with suppliers and negotiate what’s the shared proportion of default risk with bank. Finally, we use specific number to do sensitive analysis. Under this mechanism, the results show that the bank will charge two suppliers the highest loan interest rate when manufacturer tries to lower the shared proportion of default risk with bank. In addition, the higher suppliers’ default probability is, the more demand from manufacturer will be ordered. We could explain this situation that manufacturer tries to avoid paying the default cost to downstream retailers. This research adjusts each parameter to realize what factors will influence SMEs cost when using the trade guarantee mechanism. On the other hand, the result also provides an important reference for upstream firms if they negotiate what’s the shared proportion of default risk with bank.