考慮綠色市場規模及消費者對再製品評價下政府最適補貼政策之研究

Abstract

隨著綠色供應鏈受到越來越多的關注，政府也開始推行政策以促進綠色供應鏈的發展。然而，政府制定相關政策時，多針對回收商、再製商進行補貼或是課稅，往往忽略了購買再製品的消費者，也就是再製品的市場。因此，本研究欲探討綠色市場規模與消費者對再製品的評價考量之下，政府涉入綠色供應鏈的最適補貼政策。 本研究從政府的角度出發，目標為最大化社會福利，運用補貼工具，對廠商及消費者雙方進行補貼，達到推拉政策的效果：推式政策利用補貼金將廠商推向生產再製品的進行，拉式政策則透過再製品的現金回饋方式，吸引消費者購買再製品，透過推拉並行以促進再製品的發展。研究模型乃運用兩階段的賽局模型，在雙頭寡佔、價格競爭的情境下，考慮政府與製造商、再製商決策互動的情形，根據賽局理論及逆向回歸法找出政府之最適補貼政策，以供政府立法之參考。除了製造端的考量，我們也關注到市場需求的議題，像是綠色市場規模的大小、消費者對再製品之評價，透過數值分析觀察這些因素對於最適補貼金、社會福利以及綠色供應鏈整體利潤產生的影響。 本研究分析結果顯示出較大的綠色市場規模將對政府補貼所提升的社會總福利產生加分的效果，因此，政府可從增加綠色消費者的數量著手，以期達到更佳的補貼效果；另外，本研究也發現政府最適補貼政策將隨著消費者對再製品的評價有所變動，說明了政府決定補貼金時，將消費者納入考量的重要性；最後，本研究提出之雙方補貼方式，經由數值分析發現其確實能提升消費者剩餘，說明了該補貼方式能避免生產者將補貼金全面吸收。本研究根據分析結果提出相關的建議，期望有助於政府制定更完善之補貼政策，並進一步促進綠色供應鏈之發展。

As Green Supply Chain (GSC) has been given great attention and concerns, governments also start to implement policies for encouraging GSC to develop. However, governments usually ignore those consumers who buy remanufactured products while instituting a policy to subsidize or levy a tax on recyclers/remanufacturers. In view of this, the study investigates an optimal subsidy policy with governmental involvement in GSC that takes the green market size and consumer valuations for remanufactured goods into consideration. For the government, the goal is to maximize social welfare. The government use subsidy tools to subsidize both producers and consumers in order to achieve push pull effect, which pushes producers to do the remanufacturing because of subsidies and pulls consumers back to buy remanufactured goods owing to cash rebates; in this way, the promotion of GSC is reached. This research builds two-stage game model under Bertrand duopoly, considering interaction between government and GSC members, to find the optimal subsidy policy through game theory and backward induction for government's reference. In addition to producers, we are concerned with the demand issues such as green market and consumer valuation for remanufactured goods, thus investigating the effect of those factors on the optimal subsidy policy, social welfare, and total profits of GSC by numerical analysis. The results show that the larger green market size is beneficial to the increase in social welfare, so government could obtain the better outcome of subsidizing from growing the number of green consumers; besides, this study finds that the optimal subsidy policy varies with consumer valuations, which reveals the importance of taking consumer valuations into account. In the end, the numerical analysis also shows that subsidizing both producers and consumers increases consumer surplus, which could avoid the whole amount of subsidy going to producers. It is expected that this study will help government implement better policies and further stimulate the development of GSC.