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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 楊金穆 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chien-Ting Ko | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 柯建廷 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T06:19:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-08-20 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2010-08-20 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2010-08-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Albert, D. 1994. “Bohm’s Alternative to Quantum Mechanics.” Scientific American. Vol.270, p.58-67.
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Field, H. 1998. “Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects.” In Field 2001. Field, H. 2001. Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fogelin, R. 1997. “Quine’s limited naturalism.” Journal of philosophy. Vol 94, pp.543-563. Frege, G. 1879. Begriffsschift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle a. Saale: Verlag von Louis Nebert. Frege, G.. 1959. The Foundation of Arithmetic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Frege, G.. 1970. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (ed. by Geach, p. & Black, M.). Cambridge: Blackwell. Hart, W.D. 1979. “Access and inference.” Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 53, pp. 153-65. Hart, W.D. 1996. The Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hellman, G. 1999. Some Ins and Outs of Indispensability: A Modal-Structural Perspective. Logic in Florence, 1995. (ed. Cantini, A., Casari, E., and Minari, P.),: 25-40. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Hempel, C. 1964. “On the Nature of Mathematical Truth.” Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, (ed. By Benacerraf, P. and Putnam, H.) pp. 366-81. Irvine, A.D. 1990. Physicalism in Mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Liston, M. 1993. “Reliability in Mathematical Physics.” Philosophy of Science. Vol.60, p.1-21. Maddy, P. 1990a. Realism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press Maddy, P. 1990b. “Mathematics and Oliver Twist.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Vol.71, p.189-205. Maddy, P. 1995. “Naturalism and Ontology.” Philosophia Mathematica. Vol.3 (3), p.248-270. Maddy, P. 1997. Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Maddy, p. 1998. “Naturalizing Mathematical Methodology.” The Philosophy of Mathematics today. (ed. by Schirn, M.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maddy, P., 2005. “Naturalizing Mathematical Methodology.” The Philosophy of Mathematics today 175-194, Oxford Maddy, P. 2005. “Three Forms of Naturalism.” Oxford Handbook of Mathematics and Logic: 437-60. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maddy, P. 2007. Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Malament, D. 1982. “Review of Field’s Science Without Numbers.” Journal of Philosophy. Vol.79, p.523-534. Paseau, A. 2008. “Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Putnam, H. 1975. “Philosophy of Logic.” Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press. P.323-357. Putnam, H. 1979. “What is Mathematical Truth?” Mathematics, Matter and Method, 60-78. Quine, W.V. 1948. “On What There Is.” In Quine 1980. Quine, W.V. 1961. “Two Dogma of Empiricism.” From a Logical Point of View. p. 20-46. New York: Harper. Quine, W.V. 1966a. “The Scope and Language of Science.” The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, 215-32. New York: Random House. Quine, W.V. 1966b. “Posits and Reality.” The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, 233-41. New York: Random House. Quine, W.V. 1969a. “Epistemology Naturalized.” Ontological Relativity and Other Essays: 69-90. New York: Columbia University Press. Quine, W.V. 1969b. “Existence and Quantification.” Ontological Relativity and Other Essays: 91-113. New York: Columbia University Press. Quine, W.V. 1980. From A Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press, 4th ed. Quine, W.V. 1981. Theories and Things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Resnik, M.D. 1985. “Ontology and Logic: Remarks on Hartry Field’s Antiplatonist Philosophy of Mathematics.” History and Philosophy of Logic. Vol.6, p.191-209. Resnik, M.D. 1995. “Scientific and Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Arguments.” Philosophia Mathematica 3: 166-74 Resnik, M.D. 1997. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Resnik, M. D. 2005. “Holistic Mathematics.” The Philosophy of Mathematics today ed. Oxford Resnik, M.D. 2005. “Quine and The Web of Belief.” Oxford Handbook of Mathematics and Logic: 412-36, Oxford Shapiro, S. 1983. “Conservativeness and Incompleteness.” In Hart 1996. Shapiro, S. 1993. “Modality and Ontology.” Mind. Vol.102, p.455-481. Shapiro, S. 2000. Thinking about mathematics – The philosophy of mathematics. Oxford University Press Sober, E. 1993. “Mathematics and Indispensability.” Philosophical Review 102:35-57. Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Urquart, A. 1988. The Logic of Physical Theory. In Irvine, A.D. 1990. Yablo, S. 1998. “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol.72, p.229-261. Yablo, S. 2001. “Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol.25, p.72-102. Yablo, S. 2002. “Abstract Objects: A Case Study.” Philosophical Issues. Vol.12, p.220-240. van Fraassen, B.C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press Vineberg, S. 1998. “Indispensability Argument and Scientific Reasoning.” Taiwanese Journal for Philosophy and History of Science, 10:117-40. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/47796 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 奎因(W. V. Quine)的不可或缺論證(indispensability argument)在數學實在論與唯名論的論爭裡，占有重要的地位。此論證被廣泛地視為是支持數學實在論最重要的論證之一，但也因此受到相當多不同的反對意見。
雖然奎因本人並未很清楚地以嚴格的論證形式表達此論證，但藉由他主要的哲學思想一般哲學界普遍認為，奎因的不可或缺論證(QIA)至少包含三個前提：(一)不可或缺論點─數學對於自然科學是不可或缺的、(二)自然主義─並沒有第一哲學，哲學是科學的延續、(三)確認的整體主義─在對於一個科學理論確認時，不僅確認著理論裡的物裡部分，也同時確認了理論裡的數學部分。 在第一章裡，根據奎因的哲學看法及當代哲學家普遍的意見，我嘗試對於不可或缺論證構作一完整的論證形式，並討論每個前提與奎因哲學看法間的關係。第二章則討論菲爾德(H. Field)對於不可或缺的挑戰，並結論出菲爾德的唯名論計劃很可能是失敗的，或至少只能獲致部分的成功。第三章討論梅蒂(P. Maddy)與索柏(E. Sober)各自針對自然主義與確認的整體主義的反對意見。並結論出在第一章裡所提出當代哲學家普遍認定的不可或缺論證形式過強，並提出一個無須基於確認整體主義的不可或缺論證(RQIA)。第四章裡則討論RQIA如何面對分離假說的相關問題。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In the debate between mathematical realism and nominalism, Quine’s indispensability argument maintains an important status. It is widely regarded as the most potent argument supporting mathematical realism. However, it also faces various nominalists’ challenges.
Although it has never been explicitly formulated by Quine himself, Quine’s indispensability argument is often assumed to include three main premises: (1) indispensability thesis – mathematics is indispensable to natural science; (2) naturalism – there is no first philosophy and philosophy is continuous to science; (3) confirmational holism – the confirmation of scientific theories confirms not only its physical but also its mathematical components. In chapter one, I try to give a preliminary form of QIA and discuss each premise in light of Quine’s general philosophical views. In chapter two, I consider Field’s challenge to the indispensability thesis and conclude that it is most likely Field’s nominalistic program is deemed to fail, or at least not completely successful. Chapter three discusses naturalism and confirmational holism theses in QIA, by reviewing Maddy’s view on naturalism and Sober’s objection to confirmational holism, I conclude that the preliminary version of QIA introduced in the beginning is too strong to be an ontological argument and an adequate version of QIA is put forward – RQIA (a version of QIA without confirmational holism). In chapter four, I try to give a way to deal with a variety of separation objections, which may be a challenge to RQIA. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T06:19:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R95124008-1.pdf: 439495 bytes, checksum: 84f5f61132cff5c4a912500ce973c119 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
Introduction 1 1Quine’s Indispensability Argument, Preliminary Remarks 5 1.1 Premises of QIA 5 1.2 Some remarks of QIA 16 2Field’s Objections to Quine’s Indispensability Argument 19 2.1 Conservativeness of Mathematics 20 2.2 Field’s Representation Theorems 25 2.3 Metalogic and Modality in Field’s Program 28 2.4 Objections from Extending Field’s Program and Remnant of Mathematics 30 3Maddy and Sobers’ Objections to Quine’s Indispensability Argument 33 3.1 Quine’s Naturalism versus Maddy’s Naturalism 33 3.2 Maddy’s Objections to Quine’s Indispensability Argument 40 3.3 Sober’s Contrastive Empiricism and his objection 49 4Other Objections to Quine’s Indispensability Argument 55 4.1 Separation Assumptions and QIA 55 4.2 Tracking Assumption and Reliability Explanation 58 Conclusion 63 References 65 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 確認的整體主義 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 不可或缺論證 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 奎因 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 數學實在論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 唯名論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 自然主義 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | indispensability argument | en |
| dc.subject | confirmational holism | en |
| dc.subject | naturalism | en |
| dc.subject | nominalism | en |
| dc.subject | mathematical realism | en |
| dc.subject | Quine | en |
| dc.title | 不可或缺論證的合理性 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | In Defense of Indispensability Argument | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 98-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 董世平,蔡行健 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 不可或缺論證,奎因,數學實在論,唯名論,自然主義,確認的整體主義, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | indispensability argument,Quine,mathematical realism,nominalism,naturalism,confirmational holism, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 68 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2010-08-11 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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