中國大陸省級領導人仕途發展的制度化，1993-2010：以個人特徵與經濟表現為焦點之分析

Abstract

本論文從菁英甄補制度化的角度切入，以個人特徵與經濟表現為焦點，探討中共十四大以來中國大陸省級領導人仕途發展的制度化特色。本研究以1993年至2010年間卸任的省級領導人—黨委書記、政府首長為研究對象，以結合職務行政級別與政治重要性的評價標準定義仕途發展結果並透過二元分對數模型，研究個人背景、專業條件、早期晉升、職務經歷、現職特徵等個人特徵與任職期間的經濟發展、政府財政、人民經濟生活等經濟表現對仕途發展結果的影響。主要結論為： 省級領導人的個人特徵對仕途發展具有解釋力，其中重要因素為年齡、任期、任職省份的既有社經條件。時間上由江時期至胡時期呈現制度化發展趨勢，一方面個人特徵的解釋能力提高，另一方面非正式政治的影響隨時間降低、年齡與仕途資歷成為晉升的主要標準。此外制度落實程度在省委書記與省長之間也有不同，雖然正省部級任職年齡65歲上限明確約束省委書記，但強調專業條件與仕途資歷的菁英轉型卻僅發生於省長群體。 經濟表現方面，地方經濟發展仍是決定省級領導人仕途發展的主要因素，並且中央採取與前任比較的相對績效考核方式，同時以獎勵（晉升）與懲罰（降職或退休）雙重策略激勵經濟表現。本論文也發現經濟表現與仕途發展之間並非單純線性，而是二次曲線關係—高於前任經濟成長率3-5%之後，經濟成長對仕途的影響便從有利轉為不利。改善地方經濟的適當成長區間的存在，反映中央在追求成長與維持經濟穩定雙重發展目標下的考量。此外，比較個人特徵與經濟表現的影響力，可知年齡已是省級領導人仕途發展的硬條件，一方面作為門檻條件排除年齡接近65歲者的晉升空間，另一方面具有愈年輕愈有利仕途的加分效果；經濟表現與任期的影響雖然不如年齡，但若能在相同年齡者間有較佳的經濟表現、或是獲得中央肯定持續任職至第二任都能有效提升仕途優勢。代表年輕化雖是中共菁英甄補的主軸，但任內治理實績尤其是經濟表現仍是中央人事安排著重的面向。

From the perspective of the institutionalization of elite recruitment, this thesis investigates the characteristics of institutionalization in the career development of provincial leaders in mainland China since the 14th Party Congress, using personal characteristics and economic performance as two key focus points. The thesis’s research subjects are provincial leaders—provincial party committee secretaries and provincial government senior officials—who left office between 1993 and 2010. The thesis employs both administrative position rank and an evaluation standard for political importance to reexamine their official career development. It uses the binary logit model statistical method to research how both personal characteristics such as personal background, professional specializations , early promotion, career experience, and current office conditions, and economic performance factors such as economic growth during the term of office, government finances, and common people’s economic livelihoods, influence provincial leaders’ career trajectories. The thesis’s main findings are: First, some personal characteristics of provincial leaders can explain their career development, particularly age, term of office, and the socioeconomic conditions in their province during their leadership term. Over time from the Jiang Zemin era through the Hu Jintao era, there appears a trend toward institutionalization, with an increase in the explanatory power of personal characteristics on one hand and a decrease in the impact of informal politics on the other. Age and career experience have become the primary indicators of promotion. Additionally, there is difference in the degree of implementation of institutionalization between provincial party committee secretaries and provincial governors. The upper age limit of 65 years-old for provincial leaders clearly restricts provincial party secretaries, while factors in elite transformation such as college major specialization and career experience appear only to occur in the promotion of provincial governors. In the area of economic performance, local economic growth is still a decisive factor in provincial leaders’ career development. In this area, the central government has adopted a performance review system that compares incumbent’s economic performance with his predecessor’s, and tries to stimulate economic performance by rewarding their good results with promotion and their bad results with demotion or retirement. Moreover, the thesis has discovered that there is not necessarily a direct correlation between economic performance and career development, but rather that they can also share an indirect relationship; economic growth rates that are three to five percent higher compared to the previous term are viewed favorably, while higher growth rates actually have a negative impact on career development. The presence of such a suitable growth interval for local economic improvement reflects the central government’s twin development pursuits of growth and maintaining economic stability. In addition, when the influence of personal characteristics and economic performance are compared, it can be seen that age has already become a firm condition for provincial leaders’ career advancement. Age both serves as a threshold that eliminates promotion opportunities for leaders close to 65 years-old, and works as an extra bonus that aids the promotion of younger leaders. Though economic performance and term of office are not as pivotal as age as conditions for promotion, economic performance can be important in determining promotion when possible contenders are of the same age, or in convincing the central government to assign a leader a second term in office, which gives him advantage in securing promotion later. The younger age of provincial leaders is a central feature of the CCP’s elite recruitment, but administrative accomplishments, especially economic performance, still receive significant weight in the Center’s personnel arrangements.