《清邁倡議》對東亞金融整合之影響：日本與中國於《清邁倡議》前後政策的關鍵時點分析

Abstract

東亞的經濟整合自1980年代起，藉由日本帶動的產品網絡而起飛，此後無論是東亞各國之發展模式、貿易結構等都有所整合。然而東亞的金融整合卻一直裹足不前，直到1997年爆發金融危機後，東亞國家才決定將金融議題置於區域整合之核心，東協加三與《清邁倡議》因而誕生，東亞的金融整合進程自此便依附於東協加三逐步往前。 經過每年東協加三會議的討論，成員國將《清邁倡議》多邊化的輪廓描繪地愈來愈清晰，2007年京都的東協加三財長會議中，成員國決定多邊化的形式為「外匯儲備池協議」；不過，此後金融整合的腳步卻因為成員國無法就出資份額達成共識而停滯。2008年底，美國次貸危機所引發的全球金融危機蔓延至東亞，東亞國家並沒有因為《清邁倡議》中的換匯網絡而倖免，再度衰退的結果促使各國加快《清邁倡議》多邊化的討論，終於在2009年兩次東協加三財長會議後確定了多邊化的內容，將外匯儲備池規模定為1200億美元，同年底成員國完成簽署，並於2010年3月生效。 檢視東亞金融整合之發展歷史，不難發現「危機」在發展過程中的角色，即危機觸動了整合，故本研究將引用歷史制度主義中的「關鍵時點」架構來分析東亞的金融整合，筆者欲說明東亞因為二戰以來的歷史記憶、地緣戰略等因素而無法順利整合，只有在重大的危機出現後，各國才會開始思考以集體行動解決問題，其中，危機就是關鍵時點，合作（整合）則是集體行動最具體的形式。 一般相信，整合將因為有區域大國的領導而更加順利，然而東亞擁有日本與中國兩個區域兼世界大國，由誰領導則是整合的關鍵。故本文的另一重點為日本、中國的區域整合政策，以及雙方在整合領導權上的競逐對東亞金融整合之影響。 本研究先簡述區域整合之經濟與政治文獻，再把焦點置於東亞整合的文獻與歷史之上。1997年金融危機前，日本與中國整合政策的演變為東亞金融整合的背景脈絡，筆者也將於文中一併彙整。再者，2000年的《清邁倡議》與2009年的《清邁倡議》多邊化為關鍵時點後的整合成果，日本、中國於其間的角力則是影響整合形式的關鍵，此乃本研究之分析核心。文末則為結論並提出東亞金融整合之展望。

From 1980s, economic integration of East Asia took off via Japanese production network. The developmental patter, trade structure of East Asia also got integrated from that time. However, in financial area, the integration process still stagnated till 1997 East Asian financial crisis. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) came into existence after the crisis, East Asian financial integration process move forward through APT, and APT stepped the process up steadily. APT member states (East Asian states) decided to multilateralize CMI into a “reserve pooling arrangement” during Kyoto APT Finance Ministers’ Meeting in 2007. Even so, integration process didn’t advance since member states could not have consensus on the proportion of contribution of the pool. At the end of 2008, East Asia ran into another financial crisis which caused by the U.S. subprime crisis. Another depression spurred member states to finalize the canvass of mulilateralization of CMI. After the two APT Finance Ministers’ Meetings in 2009, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) came into being, and the amount of the reserve pool was set at 120 billion U.S. dollars. CMIM has entered into force since March 2010. Surveying the history of East Asian financial integration, it’s not difficult to find that “crisis” has been the center of integration process; hence, I apply one of historical institutionalism concept which is called “critical juncture” to analyze East Asian financial integration. The historical memories and geostrategic considerations had been the main obstacles of progress on integration; therefore, only after huge crises caused catastrophes to East Asian states, they started to think of that to solve problems through collective actions. Crises are critical junctures on one hand, and on the other, cooperation (integration) is the form of collective actions. It’s believed that integration will become easier if there is a regional hegemon state leads the way. In East Asia, Japan and China are the two regional (and global) powers, the key of integration is that who can possess the leadership. For this reason, this research will focus on Japan and China’s regional integration policy and the competition between the two powers on leadership as well. I will make a brief economic and political literature review of regional integration, and then will turn the focal point to literature of East Asian integration. Besides, I portray the evolution of Japan and China’s regional integration policy before 1997 as the background of East Asian financial integration. Furthermore, CMI and CMIM are results of critical junctures (crises), and competition between Japan and China is the crucial factor which influenced the form of integration. They are the core of this research. The final part is my conclusion and prospect of this research.