併購對象之特性對營收風險的影響

Abstract

在2008年金融海嘯過後，許多企業受創嚴重，但2009年的併購案仍與往年相當，甚至還出現許多大型併購案。但依過去的學術文獻指出，併購會使主併者的績效受到負面影響，如以股價報酬為衡量指標的研究指出，主併者在併購後有負向或不顯著為負的長期股價報酬，而以會計績效指標為主的研究則未有一致結論。但為何併購案仍層出不窮地出現？是否經營者還有其他考量是過去文獻所沒有提及的？ 相較於公司自行研究發展，併購能幫助公司更快速地達到其策略目標，如提高市占率、取得關鍵技術等。然而併購雖替企業帶來快速成長的機會，卻也同時為企業帶來了各方面的風險威脅。在企業面臨的各種風險中，本研究認為營收風險應是對公司經營良窳最為攸關的風險，也是資本市場關注的焦點，因此本研究著重於營收風險，並將其進一步劃分為市占風險及營收規模風險做討論。 為健全資本市場發展，證管機關要求公開發行公司必須有完整的內部控制制度，公司亦因此必須建立風險管理政策，以降低公司所面臨的風險，而併購就是風險管理的一環，旨在降低營收風險。而在企業進行併購決策時，可能同時有數十家、甚至數百家被併者供選擇，管理者在挑選購併對象時可能有諸多考量。但是如果從幫助公司降低營收風險的角度來看，究竟應選擇何者進行購併呢? 本研究採實證方式，分析被併者的特性對購併前後營收風險的影響，以提供主併者在購併決策中選擇被併者之參考依據。本研究以台灣2000年至2004年間的34件上市櫃併購案為樣本。在營收風險的衡量方面，採取Zhang (2009)的研究方法，以市占率變化及營收規模變化對股價報酬的影響，分別作為市占風險及營收規模風險的衡量指標。再進一步分析被併者的特性如何影響併購前後之市占風險及營收規模風險。 根據實證結果，本研究有三點發現：第一、若購併型態採垂直合併，且被併者的經營效率愈好時，相較於購併前，主併者愈能顯著地降低市占風險。該結果建議主併者之管理階層在考慮垂直合併之對象時，若選擇經營效率較好者，可能幫助合併後的公司盡快進入量產階段，以生產足夠產品供應市場需求，因此可降低市占風險。第二、若採用水平合併的方式合併，主併者能顯著地降低市占風險。該實證結果支持市場綜效理論(當市場上的競爭對手越少時，廠商對市場越有控制力)，亦支持營運綜效理論(規模經濟的效果，使得每單位產品成本降低)。第三、若被併者的營運槓桿度愈高，則主併者的營收規模風險愈高。有可能是因為當被併者的營運槓桿度越大，其固定成本占比較高，造成合併後的公司若在整體市場營收規模下滑時，越容易受營收規模變動的影響，遭受較大的營收規模風險。

Many companies were influenced substantially during the financial crisis in 2008. But curiously, the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in 2009 was as high as that in 2008. However, according to prior research, acquirers might suffer from negative long-term performance after M&A. Take stock return for example, acquirers went through negative or not significantly negative stock return after M&A. As for accounting index, there is no consistent result. But why do companies still merge with other companies regardless of the fact that they might experience negative performance? Do they have distinct concerns other than stock return and accounting index? Compared with internal expansion, growth through M&A may be a much more rapid way, like increasing market share or obtaining key patents. Although M&A provides a shortcut to growing markedly, it also provides various risks at the same time. These risks might vary from operating risk to strategic risk. Among these risks, I think sales risk should be listed as one of the most essential risks, given the importance of sales revenue to companies. Moreover, the data is publicly obtainable to an outsider. Therefore, I focus on sales risk and separate it into two parts, market share risk and market size risk. I anticipate that every company has its own risk management system. The goal is to control its own risks. And M&A is part of the risk management system, aiming to reduce sales risk. When a company decides to merge with one another, there might be tens or hundreds of potential targets for it to choose. Whether the target is appropriate for the acquirer or not will impact the integration of post acquisition, which plays a crucial role to achieve its strategy and reduce its risks. That’s why choosing an adequate target matters in M&A. Varied from previous research, this thesis evaluates M&A from a management- accounting point of view. I analyze how the characteristics of targets influence sales risk, which might provide some useful criteria for acquirers. I include those publicly traded Taiwan companies undergoing M&A during 2000 to 2004 in my sample. Following the approach in previous research (Zhang, 2009), I evaluate the impact of change in market share and change in market size on stock return. Besides, I define the difference of change in market share(CMS) and change in market size (CS) before and after acquisition as market share risk (MSR) and market size risk (SR) respectively. Furthermore, I test various types of characteristics of targets, in order to decide which characteristics of targets impact these two risks most significantly. The main empirical findings are summarized as follows: Firstly, under vertical merger, if ROA of targets is better, it can reduce MSR more significantly. The evidence suggests that a target with better ROA under vertical merger might assist the acquirer to integrate quickly, so that it can go into production as soon as possible to fulfill the need of the market. Therefore, it decreases MSR. Secondly, horizontal merger facilitates MSR reducing. It supports market synergy theory, which suggests that when there are a few competitors in the market, the rest have more control over the market, thus reducing MSR. Besides, operating synergy also makes sense, which creates economies of scale and decreases cost per unit, thus reducing MSR. Thirdly, a target with higher DOL will increase SR significantly. The evidence suggests that while DOL of a target is higher, its fixed cost is higher as well. When total revenues of the entire industry decline, the acquirer is more vulnerable to the change, thus facing higher SR.