九○年代的G7、IMF與金融危機管理

Abstract

權力是國際關係的主要研究課題，本文透過現實主義之角度與較為深刻的權力觀點，來看待G7會議在九○年代政治經濟秩序中的角色地位。固定匯率制在七○年代瓦解後，G5/G7會議取代美國來掌握國際政治經濟的發展，並且形成IMF內的權力核心。由於IMF的權力結構較偏向大國之利益，加上G7會議的逐漸制度化，使得G7能主導IMF的發展走向並透過IMF來治理國際貨幣金融事務。這樣的發展在九○年代特別明顯，IMF所進行的基金協定第三次修正、二次份額增資與調整、組織調整、以及新成立的金融援助辦法等，均可看到G7在後面主導的影子，甚至在處理金融危機時，G7不僅透過IMF來管理金融危機以穩定國際金融秩序，讓金融體系的混亂不至於擴大，更重要的是用有利於G7利益的方式來管理危機，讓國際政治經濟結構能繼續偏向大國之利益。本文認為G7會議與IMF在結構上已經形成上下的垂直分工關係，雖然開發中國家對此有許多不滿與批評，但是基於國際現實，此政治經濟結構仍然無可撼動。然而，G7內部存在彼此合作的障礙，若相互利益無法妥協則會讓轉動IMF所需的政治領導力生產不足。本文認為G7只要還能有效地展現其能力並維持國際金融秩序的穩定，則G7就能繼續主導國際金融制度；若是G7對維持秩序所負擔的成本感到吃力，並無力應付其他開發中國家經濟實力不斷上升的挑戰，則G7就要面臨正當性不足的批評並交出國際政治經濟發展的領導權，而國際政治經濟結構的系統性偏差也將會做出重大的修正。

The study of power has been the main focus for the students of international relations. The author, through the realist view and the inclusive concepts of power, reviews the role and the position of the G7 meeting in the international political economy(IPE) in the ‘90s. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the early ‘70s, the G5/G7 meeting began to steer the development of the IPE, which was dominated by the U.S. in the past, and form the exclusive center within the International Monetary Fund(IMF). In fact, the political bias in the IMF and the gradual institutionalization of the G7’s meetings enable the G7 to lead the development of the IMF and to govern the international monetary and financial affairs through the IMF. This is obviously true in the ‘90s when the IMF undertook the third amendment to Articles of Agreement, quota reviews, organizational adjustments, and the establishment of financing facilities. Even at the time of financial crises, the G7 not only delt with these crises through the IMF so as to stabilize the financial order and mitigate the chaos of financial system, but also managed them in favor of their national interests in order to maintain the current structure of the IPE which advatages the interests of powerful stataes. Therefore, the author argue that there is a structure in which the G7’s meeting and the IMF have formed a vertical division of labor in the financial affairs, and that the structure, in consideration of the international reality, is stable enough for the G7 to meet the criticism presented by the developing countries. However, a number of internal and external obstacles bother G7’s cooperation, and the political leadership that roll the IMF on may produce less than enough if the G7 cannot come to a compromise on certain issues. In conclusion, if the G7 can keep on demonstrating their power effectively and stabilizing the international financial order, they will keep their dominance in the current structure of the IPE; on the contrary, if the G7 are unable to bear the burden of maintaining the international order and to deal with the incessant challenges presented by the developing countries whose economic power continues growing, they will hardly meet the criticism of legitimate deficiency and hand over the leadership of the IPE to another leading body like U.S. did in the ‘70s. On that day, the systemic bias within the IPE will be very different from what it is today.