民、刑事法上強制道歉合憲性之研究

Abstract

強制道歉是否合憲，向來未受學者關注，相關文獻亦僅集中討論民事法上強制道歉的合憲性，未就刑事法上強制道歉之合憲性深入討論。司法院於98年4月3日，針對民法第195條第1項後段判決公開道歉作出釋字第656號解釋後，學界雖然陸續有就該號解釋為文評釋者，但仍未清楚說明不表意自由與思想良心自由的關係，以及強制道歉究竟是否侵害加害人的不表意自由或思想良心自由。本篇論文將以該號解釋為出發點，釐清相關的爭點，再從憲法的角度釐清民、刑事法上強制道歉的規定是否合憲。 本文以為，所謂的「強制道歉」僅要求加害人為「形式意義的道歉」，不要求加害人真心誠意感到抱歉。但無論是採取真摯道歉或形式意義道歉的定義，道歉的核心內涵均為「承認錯誤」，是登報道歉、於媒體播送道歉啟事、書立道歉書，為民事法上之強制道歉方式，口頭道歉、書立道歉信、登報道歉及立悔過書，則為刑事法上之強制道歉方式。此外，參酌美國刑事法學關於羞辱性制裁的討論，可知釋字第656號解釋區分羞辱性與非羞辱性強制道歉，並認為前者違憲，後者合憲，應係誤解外國法，況且實際上亦無區分羞辱性與非羞辱性強制道歉的可能及必要。 強制犯錯的加害人道歉，係強制加害人「說抱歉」及「承認錯誤」，因而可能會同時侵害加害人的「不表意自由」及對於事物是非道德判斷的「思想良心自由」。然因不表意自由的基礎為思想良心自由，在侵害加害人的不表意自由時，必然會同時侵害加害人的思想良心自由，且依釋字第567號解釋，思想良心自由與人性尊嚴相同，受到憲法絕對保障，不容國家以任何理由侵犯，因此，應認不表意自由係思想良心自由的特別法，應優先於思想良心自由而適用，無必要審查憲法既未規定、內涵又不明確的思想良心自由。至在審查標準的採擇上，因強制道歉是強制加害人說出承認自我錯誤的價值判斷，故屬於「主觀意見表達的強迫」，對於加害人內在思想良心的戕害甚大，應採取「嚴格審查標準」。 具體適用上，民事法上強制加害人私下道歉，目的不在回復被害人名譽，僅係被害人為了報復加害人所為的應報手段，與回復被害人名譽的目的間，連合理關連都無；而民事法上強制加害人公開道歉，其「回復被害人名譽」之立法目的，是否屬於重大迫切的政府利益，則有疑問。縱使肯認其目的合憲性，因仍有其他諸如刊登更正啟事、澄清聲明或刊登判決書等較小侵害之手段，是強制加害人公開道歉與回復被害人名譽間不具有嚴密剪裁關係，應屬違憲。雖然我國民事法上並無強制道歉的明文，但立法者既已將國家強制加害人道歉預設為回復被害人名譽之適當處分，因此，相關條文有「涵蓋過廣」之嫌，應採合憲解釋原則，排除強制加害人道歉作為民事法上回復被害人名譽之適當手段。 至刑事法上強制道歉的「修復性司法」目的，固然係重大迫切的政府利益，但因強制道歉係指形式意義的道歉，非真摯的道歉，並無法回復或修補加害人與被害人間之關係，社會也不會因為加害人所為的虛假性道歉即認為加害人真心悔改，願意重新接納加害人，是手段與目的間不具有緊密剪裁關係，應屬違憲。最後，本文則從政治哲學的角度，分析自由主義與共和主義對於強制道歉的態度，惟囿於筆者能力及時間之不足，未來仍有待學界更深入討論。

Most Scholars take no notice of the constitutionality of compulsory apology, although some have discussed this issue, but they focus on nothing but the constitutionality of compulsory apology in the civil law, rather than in the criminal law. Although Judicial Yuan (hereinafter J.Y) Interpretation No. 656 which released on April 3rd, 2009 have raised many discussions, but those related essays still do not figure out the relationship between freedom not to speak and freedom of conscience, and whether compulsory apology really infringe offender’s freedom not to speak or freedom of conscience. In this thesis, I will first analyze J.Y. Interpretation No. 656 and find out the controversies over the Honorable Justices of J.Y. Sebsequently, I will review the constitutionality of compulsory apology in the civil and criminal laws. In my opinion, “compulsory apology” only ask offender to apologize for ritual, not for wholehearted. But no matter how we define apology, the core meaning of apology is “to admit mistakes”. Therefore, ask an offender to publish apology on the newspaper, broadcast apology through the media, and write a letter of apology are types of compulsory apology in the civil law; a verbal apology, write a letter of apology or confession and publish apology on the newspaper are types of compulsory apology in the criminal law. In addition, the opinion of J.Y. Interpretation No. 656 which distinguish “shaming compulsory apology” from “non-shaming compulsory apology”, and believed that the former is unconstitutional, and the latter is not, seems misunderstand the discussions about “shaming sanctions” in the U.S. criminal law. Besides, it’s impossible and unnecessary to tell the difference. I believed that compel an offender to apologize is to force him to “say sorry” and “admit mistakes”, therefore, it might infringe his freedom not to speak and freedom of conscience. But since the foundation of freedom not to speak is freedom of conscience, it is obvious that a government action which infringes people’s freedom not to speak simultaneously infringe his freedom of conscience. Therefore, when a government action infringes one’s freedom not to speak and freedom of conscience, there is no reason to review freedom of conscience which is fuzzy and not written in our constitution. Besides, J.Y. Interpretation No. 567 believed that freedom of conscience should be protected absolutely, the same as how human dignity is protected. That is to say, the government cannot infringe freedom of conscience on any grounds. Therefore, civil rights which are written in our constitution should be applied prior to freedom of conscience. Thus, in my point of view, a compulsory apology is to force someone to admit that his judgment was incorrect, which is a kind of compulsion of opinions. Therefore, we should adopt “strict scrutiny test” when examining a compulsory apology which is forced by the state. The purpose of compulsory private apology in civil law is not to repair victim’s reputation, but to revenge offender. Thus, there are no any relationship between means and goal. Furthermore, repair victim’s reputation do not seems like a compelling interest for compulsory apology in the civil law. Even if we admit it is constitutional on the review of goal, we still can find less restrictive means to achieve the goal, for instance, publish correction announcement or verdict in the media. But because legislators suppose that compulsory apology is an equitable measure to repair victim’s reputation, therefore, related provisions are over-inclusive. In my opinion, we should exclude compulsory apology as an equitable means to repair victim’s reputation in civil law. On the other hand, the purpose of compulsory apology in criminal law is “restorative justice”, it’s truly a compelling interest, but because compulsory apology does not need wholeheartedness, it could not repair the relationship between victim and offender. Thus, the relationship between means and goal, do not fit the goal-and-means analysis. At last, I will talk about liberalism and republicanism’ attitude towards compulsory apology, but because of the lack of time and energy doing this research, further discussion about this part have to wait until the future.