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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 陳忠仁(Chung-Jen Chen) | |
dc.contributor.author | Chia-Fang Lin | en |
dc.contributor.author | 林佳芳 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T03:54:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-15 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2010-07-15 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2010-06-28 | |
dc.identifier.citation | REFERENCES
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/44767 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 隨著現代企業所有權和管理權分離概念的發展,公司治理一直廣受學術界以及學術界之重視,股權結構更是當中一重要但複雜的議題。然而,過去的文獻大多在探討股權集中程度與公司績效之間的關係;對於「集中程度變動」則鮮少提及。為了彌補此學術面上的不足,本研究由延續過去代理理論之觀點,主要探討公司績效與股權集中變動劇烈程度之間的關係。有鑑於中國近年來以「新興經濟體」之姿大放異彩,為深入了解之,故以中國大陸上市公司之資料做為主要分析主體。本研究由國泰安資料庫擷取344間上市公司2003至2007年間,共1376個樣本數做為資料分析基礎,嘗試透過實證研究的討論和分析,釐清關於公司的股權集中變動劇烈程度與財務績效間之直接關係,以及寬裕資源和國有持股可能為前述主效果帶來之調和影響。
研究結果大致與我們從過去文獻和理論所做出的推論假說相同。公司績效與股權集中變動劇烈程度間存在一倒U型關係;而各公司間寬裕資源與國有持股差異之調和角色,實證結果在統計上亦獲得證實。本研究承繼過去學者對於股權結構、股權集中程度等相關研究,嘗試拓展學術上相關議題的全面性與發展性,同時希望提供上市公司之業界經理人於面對公司股權結構時,一些關於最佳股權集中程度以及股東關係管理上可能的建議和做法。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Ownership structure is always regarded as an important yet complicated issue when considering corporate governance. In an attempt to solve the gap of literatures that from the view of dynamic ownership concentration was less paid attention, this research focus upon listed corporations’ relationship between variation of stock ownership concentration and firm performance based on agency theory. Moreover, for understanding China as a case of powerful emerging economy, the research is conducted in China context. Data used in this research covers 344 firms from 2003 to 2007 collected from CSMAR database, 1376 sample size in total. Through empirical analyses, the relationship between variation of ownership concentration and firm performance, and the moderating role of organizational slack as well as that of state ownership have been examined.
Complying with agency theory and several literatures about ownership structure, the main effect of variation of ownership concentration on firm performance and the effects of two firm-level moderating variables are statistically supported. The stream of research on ownership structure is therefore inherited. We finally gain more understanding about variation of ownership concentration’s impact on firm performance from the dynamic perspective, and also acquire practical guidance for corporations which are searching for optimal degree of variation of ownership concentration, or are hesitating over how to manage shareholders relationship. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T03:54:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-99-R97741042-1.pdf: 797935 bytes, checksum: bc99922ddcf7395efe9b71b4968aa2b3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | CONTENTS
CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Research Background 1 1.2 Research Objective 4 1.3 Research Procedure 5 CHAPTER2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 8 2.1 Stock Ownership Concentration 8 2.2 Theoretical Background – Agency Theory 10 2.3 Hypotheses 14 2.3.1 Variation of ownership concentration and firm performance 14 2.3.2 The moderating role of organizational slack 18 2.3.3 The moderating role of state ownership 21 CHAPTER3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 24 3.1 Research Framework 24 3.2 Variable Measurement 25 3.2.1 Dependent variable 25 3.2.2 Independent variable 26 3.2.3 Moderating variable 28 3.2.4 Control variable 29 3.3 DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE 33 3.4 Statistical Method 34 3.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 34 3.4.2 Regression analysis 35 CHAPTER4 RESEARCH RESULT 37 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 37 4.2 Regression Analysis 40 4.2.1 Direct effect of variation of ownership concentration 40 4.2.2 Moderating effect of organizational slack 41 4.2.3 Moderating effect of state ownership 41 CHAPTER5 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 47 5.1 Research Conclusion 47 5.2 Managerial Implication 49 5.3 Limitation and Future Research Direction 53 REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………..56 TABLE LIST Table 3 1 Summary of Variables 32 Table 4 1 Correlation and Descriptive Statistics 39 Table 4 2 Results of Regression Analysis 43 FIGURE LIST Figure 1 1 Research Flow 7 Figure 3 1 Research Framework 24 Figure 4 1 Moderating Effect of Organizational Slack on the Relationship between Variation of Ownerhsip Concentration and Firm Performance 46 Figure 4 2 Moderating Effect of State Ownership on the Relationship between Variation of Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 46 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 中國上市公司股權之集中程度變動--寬裕資源與國有持股之調和效果 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Variation of Ownership Concentration in China Context- Organizational Slack and State Ownership as Moderators | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 98-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 許煙明,張紹基,林博文 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 中國大陸,股權集中度,變動程度,寬裕資源,國有持股, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | China context,Ownership concentration,Variation,Organizational slack,State ownership, | en |
dc.relation.page | 65 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2010-06-29 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 |
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