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標題: | 管理階層召開法人說明會因素之探究 Why Do Managers Hold Conference Calls? |
作者: | Yu-Ting Lin 林毓亭 |
指導教授: | 王泰昌(Taychang Wang),劉嘉雯(Chiawen Liu) |
關鍵字: | 法人說明會,自願性揭露,賀希曼-赫芬多指數, conference call,voluntary disclosure,Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), |
出版年 : | 2010 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 近年來,公司通常會透過各種自願性揭露的機制傳達額外的資訊予投資大眾,設法與投資大眾更進一步地直接進行有效的溝通,藉以降低彼此資訊不對稱(information asymmetry)之程度。法人說明會在我國已逐漸成為管理當局揭露公司資訊重要管道之一,但我國未有法律規定公司必頇召開法人說明會,故本論文針對管理當局召開法人說明會之動機加以探究。
本研究以我國2005年至2009年之上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,排除金融業、油電燃氣業以及其他產業,並且採用邏輯斯迴歸模型分析,將法人說明會是否召開作為應變數,而主要變數為董監事持股比率、公司股價與市場預期差距高低以及產業競爭程度。 本研究之結果顯示: 董監事持股質押比例與管理當局召開法人說明會意願間呈正相關,表示董監事持股質押比例之檢定結果較符合由利益收斂假說所推論之結果。 當公司股價被市場高估時,公司較沒有意願召開法人說明會;當公司股價被市場低估時,管理當局為了避免自身利益之減損,將有召開法人說明會之誘因,符合信號假說及預期調整假說。最後,公司所屬產業之產業競爭程度與管理當局召開法人說明會之意願呈正相關,換言之,當公司所處之產業競爭越激烈,管理當局召開法人說明會之意願越高。 另外,當公司規模越大、總資產報酬率越高、機構投資人持股比例越高、管理者持股比例越低、長期負債占普通股權益市值之比例越高以及屬於電子產業,則公司有較大的意願召開法人說明會。 Managers of firms communicate to investors through many kinds of voluntary disclosure methods. They try to communicate to investors more directly and efficiently to mitigate the degree of information asymmetry. In Taiwan, conference calls have become an important channel for firms to disclose information gradually. This study contains companies listed on TSE and OTC from 2005 to 2009, excluding financial industries, utilities and other industries. Logistic regression model were used in this study to analysis the factors of managers’ decisions to hold conference calls. The results of this study: The higher the stock pledge percentage of board of director, the higher the managers’ tendency to hold conference calls. This result conforms to convergence-of-interest hypothesis. When firm’s stock price is overvalued by the market, the managers’ have lower tendency to hold conference calls. On the other hand, when firm’s stock price is undervalued by the market, managers are more willing to hold conference calls in order to avoid sacrificing their own benefit. This result conforms to signaling hypothesis and expectation adjustment hypothesis. Also, the higher degree of market competition, the more inclination to hold conference calls. In addition, the larger the firm size, the higher the ROA, the higher the percentage of stocks held by institutional investors, the lower the percentage of stocks held by the managers and board of director, the higher the percentage of long term debt to market value of common stock equity and when firm belongs to electronic industry, the higher the inclination for managers to hold conference calls. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/44652 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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