中國崛起與國際建制之規則變遷—世界貿易組織杜哈回合反傾銷規則與特別防衛機制的案例分析

Abstract

中國在1978年改革開放後，經濟快速發展，經貿實力受全球矚目。中國崛起後，有大量文獻討論中國在國際建制中的態度，對於反映美國利益的現行國際秩序，中國會是遵循國際建制的現狀國，或是轉變國際建制的挑戰者。 本文以比較案例研究法，討論中國在世界貿易組織此一重要經貿建制，就「反傾銷規則談判」與「特別防衛機制談判」兩個案例，分析比較（1）中國在世界貿易組織中的行為，其背後意圖與能力；（2）經貿利益對中國談判意圖的影響；（3）中國所屬集團或中國的同盟談判能力大小，對實際改變建制效果的影響。 本文引用權力轉移理論與經貿談判文獻之架構，以國內經濟結構與國際經貿規範定義中國的經貿利益；並根據同盟本身絕對經貿實力與對比於反對集團的相對經貿實力，界定同盟談判能力的大小，進一步提出兩項假說：一、經貿利益越大，中國在國際建制中，試圖改變規則的行為會顯現出愈高的積極程度；二、中國的聯盟談判能力愈大，對國際建制規則所帶來改變之效果也愈大、愈明顯。 觀察比較兩個案例後，本文得到以下結論：一、反傾銷措施對中國出口貿易看似威脅甚大，實際上影響出口額的比例很低，此外中國也是反傾銷措施的主要使用者，大幅修改現行《反傾銷協定》的誘因不高；反傾銷規則談判中的主要推動者——反傾銷談判之友，雖然談判能力很強，但由於持反對立場的美國立場強硬，反傾銷規則至今沒有明顯變遷。二、特別防衛機制是中國國內農業在缺乏有效貿易救濟機制下，降低進口激增造成之衝擊的有力工具，特別防衛機制的規則條件愈寬鬆，愈能增進中國的經貿利益，因此中國有動機推動條件寬鬆之特別防衛機制，挑戰主張嚴格限制的美國；中國所屬之三十三國集團為特別防衛機制主要提倡者，具備一定程度之談判能力，此外該談判中沒有強烈反對力量，目前特別防衛機制談判方向較傾向三十三國集團主張。 本論文研究發現：一、經貿利益越大，中國在國際建制中，試圖改變規則的行為會顯現出愈高的積極程度；二、中國的聯盟談判能力愈大，對國際建制規則所帶來改變之效果也愈大、愈明顯。假說一；假說二獲得印證。

Since the Chinese economic reform started in 1978, China’s economic power has attracted the world’s attention because of its rapid development. A lot of literatures have argued that is China proving to be a status quo power or a revisionist power, when she faces the current international order which reflected the interests of the United States? This thesis compared two cases, which are “Anti-dumping Rules” and “Special Safeguard Mechanism” during the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization, to analyze: (a) the intention and capability of the behavior of China in the WTO; (b) the impact of economic and trade interests on China’s intention in the negotiations; (c) the impact of the negotiation power on the result of changing the regime. This thesis borrowed the concept of the Power Transition Theory and the framework of the negotiation literatures to define China’s economic and trade interests according to the domestic economic structure and international rules on economic and trade, and to define the negotiation power of the coalition according to its relative economic and trade power compared with the rival coalition. Based on the concept and framework, this thesis proposed two hypotheses, which are: (a) the bigger the economic and trade interests of China are, China will be more active attempting to change the rules; (b) the bigger the negotiation power of China’s coalition has, the result of changing the rules is more obvious. After observing and comparing the two cases, this thesis found out that, (a) anti-dumping measures have little impact on export trade of China, otherwise China is one of the principal users of anti-dumping measures, therefore, China has little incentive to substantially modify the Anti-dumping Agreement. FANs as the main advocate of the negotiation on anti-dumping rules, has influential negotiation power though, the negotiation on anti-dumping rules has made little progress because of fierce opposition from the United States; (b) SSM is a useful remedy for China that could reduce the damage causing by import surges, hence China has enough incentive to opposite the proposal of the United States. In the meanwhile the negotiation power of the rival coalition is weaker, the current trend of the negotiation on SSM consequently is towards to the proposal of China’s coalition. Two hypotheses were both proved.