存款與貨幣國際化

Abstract

本文以具有貨幣和存款兩種資產的兩國貨幣搜尋模型分析存款對於貨幣國際化、社會福利和貨幣政策的影響。 模型中存款可同時具有價值儲藏功能和交易媒介功能, 而生產者欲接受外幣或存款作為支付工具需支付成本購買辨識技術。 存款是否作為國際支付工具視接受存款的效益和辨識成本大小而定。 本文以離岸存款政策作為延伸討論, 結果發現當辨識存款和貨幣的技術成本小於同時接受存款和貨幣作為支付工具的效益時, 離岸存款可促進開放他國轉存款國家的貨幣國際化。 他國將存款轉存國際通貨發行國銀行可增加國際通貨發行國的鑄幣稅收和利息收入, 但會使其交易利得下降; 將存款轉存他國銀行的國家的社會福利則受惠於轉存利息報酬。 在貨幣政策方面, 離岸存款政策使國際通貨發行國更容易因為通貨膨脹率過高而失去國際通貨地位, 所以限制了貨幣成長率政策可訂定範圍。

This paper develops a two-currency model with money and deposit to study the effect of offshore deposits policy on currency internationalization, welfare, and its monetary policy implication. Deposits in this paper may perform the role as a store of value and a medium of exchange. Whether deposits or foreign money will be accepted by sellers depends on the cost to recognize it and the expected gain from increased trade. We found that when the cost of recognizing both foreign currency and deposit is smaller than the benefit of accepting both as means of payment, offshore deposit can facilitate internationalization of a currency. Besides, offshore deposits policy can improve the welfare of the country issuing the international currency by increasing seignorage revenue and interest income, but has negative effect on trade surplus. The welfare of the country accepting the international currency may also be higher under policy because its citizens can receive interests. As for the threat of losing international status, under the offshore deposits policy an stricter inflation discipline is put on the issuing country.