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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾智揚(Chih-Yang Tseng) | |
| dc.contributor.author | So-Hyun Son | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 孫所賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T01:54:09Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-07-03 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-07-03 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-06-30 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Buchholtz, A.K., Allen C. Amason, and Matthew A. Rutherford, 2005, “ The impact of board monitoring and involvement on top management team affective conflict”, Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. 17-4, pp. 405-422
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Larcker, 1999, “Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 371-406 COSO, 2004, “Enterprise Risk Management─Integrated Framework”, executive summary cat be found at: http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf Cumming, C.M. and B.J. Hirtle, 2001, ‘The challenges of risk management in diversified financial companies’, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, March, 1-17 Fama, E.F. (1980), “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”, Jounal of Political Economy, Vol. 88-2, pp. 288-307 Fama E.F., and Jensen M.C., 1983, “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-25 Fama, E.F., and K.R. 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P., Warner, J., 1997, “Measuring long-horizon security price performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.43, pp. 301-339 Kotz, R., 1998, “Technology company boards: a new model”, Directors and Boards, Vol. 22-3, pp. 26-8 Lam, J., 2003, “Enterprise risk management: From incentives to controls”, Wiley Finance Lambert, A.Richard, 2001, “Contracting theory and accounting”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 3-87 Lipton M and Lorsch J., 1992, A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, Bus Lawyer, Vol.48, pp. 59-77. London Stock Exchange, 2003, “The Combined Code on Corporate Governance”, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf Meulbroek, L.K., 2002, “Integrated risk management for the firm: A senior manager’s guide”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, pp. 56-70 Monks, R. and N. Minow, 2004, Corporate governance, Malden, MA:Black-well. 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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/43396 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis investigates the effect of board monitoring on firm performance among firms that implement Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). I propose three dimensions in board monitoring: monitoring motivations, monitoring capabilities, and monitoring efforts. Both accounting-based and market-based measures are considered for firm performance. Using a sample of 68 firms implementing ERM, I find that board monitoring affects firm performance at a significant level among ERM firms. The evidence also shows that the proposed three monitoring dimensions individually may or may not explain firm performance a significant level, but these three monitoring dimensions all together will have an impact on firm performance. Besides, through an additional test I find that corporate governance is industry specific, since the empirical results are sensitive to different industries. This suggests that corporate governance rules should include industry-specific considerations when requiring board of directors’ monitoring on a firm’s risk management. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T01:54:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96724078-1.pdf: 615184 bytes, checksum: 99b2075e4310a19f7c1648bac1d2aa6c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Table of Contents
Master Thesis Certification i Acknowledgement ii Abstract iii Table of Contents iv List of Appendix and Table vi Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Literature Review 5 2.1 ERM and Firm Performance 5 2.2 Corporate Governance Rules: Risk Management and Board Monitoring 8 2.3 Board Monitoring and Firm performance 11 Chapter 3 Hypotheses Development 15 Chapter 4 Empirical Design 18 4.1 Sample 18 4.2 Data 19 4.3 Measurement of variables 19 4.3.1 Monitoring Motivations 19 4.3.2 Monitoring Capabilities 20 4.3.3 Monitoring Efforts 21 4.3.4 Firm performance 22 4.3.5 Control variables 23 4.4 Empirical Model 24 Chapter 5 Empirical Results 26 5.1 Summary Statistics 26 5.2 Main results 27 Chapter 6 Additional Tests 30 6.1 Joint Tests 30 6.2 Board’s monitoring on ROE 31 6.3 Industry Analysis (Banking Vs. Insurance) 32 Chapter 7 Conclusion 35 References 37 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 監督 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 企業風險管理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | board of directors | en |
| dc.subject | Enterprise risk management | en |
| dc.subject | monitoring | en |
| dc.title | 企業風險管理: 董事會監督與公司績效關係之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Enterprise Risk Management:
Board Monitoring and Firm performance | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蔡揚宗(Yang-Tzong Tsay),許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 企業風險管理,董事會,監督, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Enterprise risk management,board of directors,monitoring, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 52 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-06-30 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 企業管理碩士專班 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 管理學院企業管理專班(Global MBA) | |
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