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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chih-Wei Lo | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 駱芷葳 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-15T01:52:37Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-07-30 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2009-07-30 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009-07-02 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Abdel-Khalik, A.R., Wong, K.A., Wu, A. (1999) The information environment of China‘s A and B shares: Can we make sense of numbers. The International Journal of Accounting, 34, 467–489.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/43372 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本論文研究投資複雜度對會計盈餘反應訊息時效性之不對稱的影響。多數的研究採用Basu之定義，將盈餘反應壞消息較好消息快速視為公司是否採用保守會計之指標；除了藉經濟利益與損失認列速度之不一致以證實會計穩健的存在，很多的研究發現會計上的保守可抵消經理人高估公司績效的動機，進而減輕管理階層與股東間之代理問題。本研究預期在某些情況下之投資的特性可能會影響會計穩健原則所扮演之效率角色。因此，在本研究中投資複雜度以三個面向來表示，分別是：(1)以交叉持股或金字塔方式之投資 (2)是否投資於中國大陸 (3)投資多角化之程度；從此三方向調查對盈餘品質的影響，換言之，即探討投資複雜之程度愈高會否使得會計上更及時地認列經濟損失。本實證結果發現，控制公司成長性、財務風險與公司治理之後，擁有較高投資複雜度之公司，其在會計上顯得更加地保守。此結果與保守會計一致，可協助與公司相關的個體減少其代理成本。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis would like to address whether firms with more complex investments exhibit higher conservatism than firms without. Applying Basu‘s definition, most studies regard 'earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good news' as an indicator of conservatism. A lot of researches have found that conservatism manifested by the differential speed in the recognition of economic gains and losses could counteract managers‘ incentives to overstate firm performance and mitigate the agency problem between management and shareholders. This study predicts that complex investments are highly associated with agency costs and investors/creditors would require higher conservatism to reduce the costs. In this research, complex investments are explored across three dimensions: (1) Investments in firms with cross-holding or pyramid structure (2) Investment in China (3) Diversification level of investment, and this paper explores the association between the investment complexity and the quality of earnings – timely recognition of economic losses. Findings are that firms with higher investment complexity are associated with more conservative earnings. The results hold after controlling for firm growth, financial risk and corporate governance structure. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-15T01:52:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-98-R96722042-1.pdf: 1307978 bytes, checksum: d3b33669938edb074f2fb13ce07c6a3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
1. Introduction 1 2. Literature review 7 2.1 Asymmetric timeliness and conservatism 7 2.2 Contracting theory and asymmetric timeliness 8 2.2.1 Mitigate information asymmetry between shareholders and managers 9 2.2.2 Mitigate information asymmetry between debtholders and managers 11 2.3 Corporate governance and asymmetric timeliness 13 2.4 Information asymmetry and conservatism 16 3. Hypothesis developments 17 3.1 Investment magnitude in firms with cross-holding or pyramid structure and asymmetric timeliness 18 3.2 Investment in China and asymmetric timeliness 21 3.3 Diversification level of investment and asymmetric timeliness 24 4. Research design 27 4.1 Proxies for complex investment 27 4.2 Proxies for conservatism 29 4.3 Empirical model for tests using the asymmetric timeliness measure 30 4.4 Empirical model controlling for opening net assets 31 4.5 Empirical model controlling for level of debt financing 32 4.6 Empirical model controlling for corporate governance mechanism 33 5. Empirical results 34 5.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 34 5.2 Regression analyses 37 5.2.1 The asymmetric timeliness of earnings and investments through cross-holding or pyramid structure 37 5.2.2 The asymmetric timeliness of earnings and investment in China 40 5.2.3 The asymmetric timeliness of earnings and diversification level of investment 44 6. Conclusions 48 7. References 50 Table TABLE 1 Sample Collection ............................... 58 TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics .......................... 60 TABLE 3 Correlation Matrix............................... 61 TABLE 4 Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and investment magnitude ....................................... 62 TABLE 5 Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and investment magnitude with different cross holding structures ................................................. 64 TABLE 6 Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and investment magnitude with different pyramid structures ..... 65 TABLE 7 Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and extent of Investment in China.............................. 66 TABLE 8 Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and diversification level of investment ............. 70 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 投資中國大陸 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 會計盈餘及時性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投資複雜度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 多角化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 會計穩健保守原則 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | diversification | en |
| dc.subject | investment in China | en |
| dc.subject | complex investments | en |
| dc.subject | asymmetric timeliness | en |
| dc.subject | accounting conservatism | en |
| dc.title | 會計盈餘反應訊息時效性之不對稱與投資複雜度之關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings and Complex Investments | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 97-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 曾智揚(Chih-Yang Tseng),詹凌菁(Ling-Ching Chan) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 會計盈餘及時性,會計穩健保守原則,投資複雜度,投資中國大陸,多角化, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | accounting conservatism,asymmetric timeliness,complex investments,investment in China,diversification, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 75 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2009-07-02 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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