過失侵害債權之研究

Abstract

向來國內通說在操作一般侵權責任法時，以我國民法第一百八十四條之規範模式乃繼受德國法之區別保護規範模式，分就不同保護客體而異其歸責要件，故區分「權利」或「利益」而異其保護之方式，此等方式固然可以減輕操作法律者適用上之負擔。然而，本論文認為在沒有正當理由之情形下，將利益明文限於故意責任，不僅造成了適用上的錯亂，更造成了保護上的漏洞。蓋權利與利益並非截然可分之概念，彼此間的流動性提高了吾人對於權利與利益判斷上之困難度。通說上長久以來採取區別保護方式，我國法院實務卻未曾形塑出一貫而穩定之見解，是否此種方式確實是一種最適當的處理途徑，仍有更進一步思考的必要。特別是債權此一雖有權利之名，而其內容相當抽象概括，有時其內容為權利，有時其內容則屬利益，造成的結果是在我國學說上對於「第三人過失侵害債權」是否成立侵權責任一事存在著相當分歧之見解，益證此種以法律規定嚴格區分權利—利益之保護方式仍有檢討的必要。 本論文認為，從我國學說、實務見解及比較法上之觀察，將債權劃歸為利益而適用民法第一百八十四條第一項後段規定之故意責任，對於債權之保護顯然不足。論者雖有以民法第一百八十四條第二項規定作為補救規定之倡，惟特別規定之肥大化更加顯示出吾人對於一般規定操作上不妥之處，且推定過失之設計反將破壞立法者對於該等特別法之既有法律政策。透過引入附保護第三人效力之契約責任理論亦有窒礙難行之處。此外，比較法上亦出現擴張過失責任保護客體之趨勢。因此解決之道乃在於乃將債權回歸民法第一百八十四條第一項前段之保護，使其得受過失責任原則之保護。 本論文認為，向來學說以「加害人無從預見債權，將使其責任過重，過度侵害利益」、「為維護自由、公平競爭之利益，不應以過失責任相繩」及「兼顧行為人之活動自由」等語，尚不足正當化吾人改變過失責任原則此一初衷之理由。蓋所謂行為人無從預見，當可從過失要件達到限制責任成立之目的。至於損害賠償責任過重，則是因果關係上可以控制處理之問題。更重要的是，如果加害人足可預見該等損害之發生，吾人亦不應以其責任過重為由而限制被害人尋求救濟之機會。此觀諸吾人對於所有權之侵害，不論其造成之損害賠償責任有多大，亦未曾限於故意責任可證。 至於「自由競爭」之價值，當然是吾人應予尊重者。問題是，對於被害人財產權侵害之保護，亦為侵權責任法之重大任務。因此在處理上，應在過失責任之體系下，放在天平上與被害人之損害進行衡量，以認定其行為是否具備不法性。學說上所謂「債權不可侵」之爭議，事實上僅代表侵害債權行為並不當然顯示不法性而已。更重要的是，過失責任原則本來就是法律在長久的發展結果之下，選擇出最能兼顧「被害人損害保護」及「加害人活動自由」之制度，故而本論文認為，侵權責任法乃具有一高度政策性之制度，其每一項要件均負擔政策實現之任務，不應使其中某項要件承擔過重之任務；同樣地，亦不能使某些要件遭到邊緣化、漠視化的對待。 因此，本論文乃從侵害行為之態樣出發，重新檢視各種侵害債權行為之不法性，以建立一操作標準供適用法律者之參考，並提供一般人民在從事該等行為時之行為義務準則。而在概念之建構上，或可參考民法或公平交易法、會計師法等特別法中立法者所顯示出之價值判斷及欲實現之政策，以避免本論文提出之標準與其他法律有所扞挌，反而造成了制度上的矛盾與衝突。

Article 184 I paragraph 1st of the Civil Code (Taiwan) provides that any one who, by his own fault, intentional or unintentional, infringes upon other 'right' is liable for the damage caused to the victim. The principle set by the provision leaves doubts about whether 'interests' enter into the range of protection of this general clause of the law of delict. The core of the problem is whether an unintentional infringement upon an so-called 'interest', especially claims arising from the law of obligations, possession, enterprise interest or pure economic interest etc., would be sufficient to establish a liability for the damage caused to the victim. However, the academic writers have controversy on the range of protection of article 184 I paragraph 1st. For example, the majority of them considers that unintentional infringement upon ‘obligatory rights’ should be excluded from the application of the above provision. Nevertheless, the courts, especially the Supreme court, hesitate since longtime to take a clear position on this problem. This study takes a different position. It argues that the ‘obligatory rights’ has the same nature as other rights. The other provisions of the existing delictual liability and contractual liability are not the most appropriate means for the protection of the constantly increasing ‘interests’ in the modern society. The only way is to have recourse to the general clause of the law of delict and extend the its range of protection to ‘interests’, especially ‘obligatory rights’. Consequently, there is no legitimacy on the distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ neither for contractual liability nor for delictual liability. At least, we have to admit that obligatory rights, of course, should enter into the range of protection of this general clause of the law of delict. Under the application of article 184 I paragraph 1st of the Civil Code, any unintentional infringement upon either a ‘right’ or an ‘interest’ would make the author liable for the compensation of the damage caused to the victim. If, taking account of the ‘uncertainty’ and the ‘unforseeability’ of the obligatory rights, the legal policy necessitates some limitation of liability, it is by way of the legal techniques such as damage, unlawfulness, fault, causation etc. that the courts can also control the liability to its reasonable measure.