官僚自主性與金融改革表現—台灣金融自由化的歷史制度分析

Abstract

本研究嘗試建立官僚自主性與金融改革表現的因果關係，並找出影響官僚自主性的制度性因素，藉此對台灣金融自由化所面臨之危機提出整體一貫的解釋。 官僚體系經常必須解決自主性過強或太弱導致的危機，亦即「國家自主性的雙重面貌」，於是政經行為者如何處理官僚自主性內在矛盾將直接影響金融改革表現。追求官僚體系內部團結會降低金改政策執行的制衡力量，增加官僚獨斷濫權的風險；強化官僚體系內部制衡時，則相對減少官僚推動金改時面臨外來干預的抗衡力量，提高政策被滲透或扭曲的可能性。 1949年來台的國民黨政府疏離於本土社會，迅速國有化金融體系輔以專制暴力隔絕外在的尋租壓力；另方面則將分屬不同派系的黨籍官僚混編至重要金融及行庫要職，藉由派系相互監視的機制避免官僚濫權。這種利用非正式制度因素如派系關係、外來政權特性所構建的金融治理網絡，亦即「網絡化金融統御」，兼顧官僚體系的組織一致與內部制衡，於焉確保金融官僚既獨立又自律的統理金融改革。 隨著冷戰終結、威權轉型，國民黨政府內的主要統治派系在權力繼承鬥爭時，基於政權維繫而選擇鞏固網絡化金融統御的團結，以中常會/黨管會為樞紐凝聚黨、政、商三系一體主導1990年代的金融自由化。組織一致的黨籍金融官僚指揮金改時高度獨立自主，卻無可避免的籠罩於黨國濫權陰霾。 拜國民黨內部分裂而在2000年猝然執政的民進黨政府，缺乏駕馭官僚體制的經驗於是廣泛結盟外部政、商、學界力量，雖然意外的重現網絡化金融統御之派系制衡，卻沒有及時演化弭平政策衝突的機制。內部分歧的金融官僚在改革過程經常面臨政令不一致，因而傾向自我約束甚至放棄管理市場秩序，讓金融自由化不可或缺的再管制付之闕如，也就使兩次金改受迫於各方勢力的扭曲與滲透。

Why does the financial liberalization in Taiwan tend to engender crises? This thesis is an attempt at providing a coherent explanation by not only establishing a causal relationship between the bureaucratic autonomy and the performance of the financial reform but also by investigating the institutional factors that exert influence on the bureaucratic autonomy. All bureaucratic systems are confronted with an inherent tension between autonomy and accountability, namely the “Janus-faced State Autonomy”. The strategy that the political and economic actors choose to deal with this intrinsic dilemma determines the performance of financial reforms. Although emphasizing on the organizational cohesiveness of a bureaucratic system strengthens the bureaucratic autonomy of the system, it nevertheless weakens the power of check-and-balance on policymaking and therefore heightens the risk of power abuse. In contrast, laying stress on the internal checking mechanism, which erodes the countervailing power of the bureaucratic system that aims to protect the bureaucrats from the external intervention, may result in policy distortion or penetration by various social interest groups. Due to the alien nature of the émigré regime and the consequent (sub)ethnic cleavages between the settlers and the locals, the KMT regime, after arriving at Taiwan in 1949, did not hesitate to nationalize the financial system and to exert the despotic coercion power so as to avoid rent-seeking from the societal groups; on the other hand, the regime assigned the bureaucrats from different party factions to critical positions in the financial and banking systems, anticipating that the competition among factions would rule out the possibility of power abuse. This kind of financial governance, which is based on the informal institutional factors such as factionalism and the émigré regime characters, namely “Network-based Financial Discretion(NBFD)”, successfully retained both the organizational cohesiveness and the internal check-and-balance in the bureaucratic system and therefore guaranteed the bureaucratic independence and prudence in the process of financial reforms. After the end of the Cold War and with the loosening authoritarian rule in Taiwan, the ruling clique of the KMT regime, under the pressure of the political succession struggle, decided to improve the organizational cohesiveness of NBFD. With the Central Committee and Business Management Committee as the pivot, the KMT regime dictated the financial liberalization in 1990s by the “party-bureaucrat-business” trinity. However, while the highly cohesive bureaucratic system enjoyed high independence during the process of financial policymaking, it was haunted by the party-state corruption. Benefiting from the division within the KMT, DPP unexpectedly came into power in 2000. Without the experiences of running a country and coordinating with the bureaucratic elites, the DPP government widely formed alliances with politicians, business entrepreneurs and scholars outside of the bureaucratic system. Although such kind of coalition strategy brought about the unintentional side effect that recovered the internal check-and-balance of NBFD, the DPP government never made enough effort to devise proper mechanisms to solve the ideological differences, policy disputes and power struggles within the state apparatus. It is the internal conflicts and the inconsistent policies, which compelled the financial bureaucrats not only to be over- self-restraining but also to withdraw from performing the indispensable regulatory capacity required by the financial liberalization, that gave rise to the crises of policy distortion and penetration by external forces during the “Two Rounds of Financial Reforms”.