Neil MacCormick的後實證主義法理論

Abstract

在過去數十年裡，蘇格蘭法理學家Neil MacCormick是當代分析法理學的代表人物。相對於對他早期制度法實證主義的討論熱度，他在學術生涯後期提出的「後實證主義法理論」則較少為人熟知。特別是過去他曾被視為哈特的理論傳人，但現在他的後實證主義法概念「法作為制度性規範秩序」出乎意料地主張法與道德的必然關連，這完全是與法實證主義背道而馳的理論命題。因此他的後實證主義論述裡有著法實證主義與自然法論之間的內在緊張。 本文首先探討的是他的法律思想軌跡，並試圖彰顯「後實證主義」在法理學中的理論意義。簡言之，本文想檢驗的是在法理學的當代爭論中「後實證主義」立場是否能夠站得住腳。透過文本分析，本文深入研究他的實踐哲學，並開展一套對於「後實證主義」的適當詮釋，以呈現他論證後實證主義命題的方式。 本文認為 「後實證主義」的核心論點可以成立，因為「後」一詞不僅意味著對於「人是規範運用者」的肯定，此一主體能力也是使得制度化為可能。此外，透過實定法所實現的文明脈絡，道德自主與自我控制能力也能在其中維持並逐步成長。據此，「後實證主義法理論」是一種法治理論，而法作為制度性規範秩序，其必須以法治的理想價值為基礎，也就是取向以道德自主為核心的社群價值。

In the last few decades Neil MacCormick has been one of the leading figures in contemporary analytical legal positivism. While there has been a wealth of review on his institutional legal positivism in the early stage, study on his legal theory of self-labelled “post-positivism” in the late stage can scarcely be found. In particular, though he has been treated as a torch-bearer of Hartian tradition, his post-positivistic conception of law “law as institutional normative order” surprisingly present the necessary connection between law and morality, which by no means fits the label of legal positivism. In so doing the tension between legal positivism and natural law theory underlies in his arguments of “post-positivism”. The present paper investigates the trajectory of his thought, and seeks to maintain the significance of “post-positivism” in terms of jurisprudence. In short, the present paper examines if “post-positivism” is promising in the contemporary debate of jurisprudence. By means of textual analysis, the present paper has probed into his practical philosophy, developed a proper interpretation of “post-positivism”, which enables to show how he justifies his thesis. In conclusion, the central tenet of “post-positivism” holds because the term “post-” not only shows the affirmation of the norm-using capacity, which make institutionalization possible, but also shows that the very capacity in the sense of moral autonomy and self-control can be maintained and flourished in the context of civility which positive law can bring about. It follows that law as institutional normative order must be grounded in the aspirational value of legality, namely the communal value of moral autonomy.