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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 柯承恩(Chen-en KO) | |
dc.contributor.author | Jih-Shyuan Lee | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李繼玄 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T17:05:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2005-02-04 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2005-02-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2005-01-28 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部分
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/39162 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 我國退休基金的發展相對歐美等先進國家落後,同時缺乏實質的治理政策,也無投資政策說明書。本人因工作關係,對此深有體會,故在為退休基金的下一步發展找尋方向的願景下,嘗試用公司治理的內涵要素,對退休基金作一縱切面的體檢。因此,以退休基金產業結構價值鏈為基礎,訂出使命政策、內部治理、誘因行動、價值創造,以及對公司治理的影響、對公司治理應有的作為等六個構面,在每個構面的討論與實證中,歸納出退休基金應有的方向、重點。茲對構面要點說明如下:
一、使命政策:先進國家退休基金的使命說明書、政策說明書對基金的發展、運作皆有明確的藍圖規劃,以讓工作人員有所依循,不會犯了「一朝天子一朝臣」、政策因人而異的窘境。 二、內部治理:退休基金的法理形式和參與類型雖有不同,但基本的治理結構─董事會的責任、角色與行為準則是雷同的,而獨立董事的參與也是共同的趨勢,在董事會下,掌握日常運作機制的管理單位則是運作成敗的關鍵所在。 三、誘因行動:誘因與代理問題不再隱晦不明,而是新近的熱門議題。薪酬是解決代理問題的關鍵因素之一,受託人行為的規範是因素之二,而利益衝突與政治干預也須挑明,尤其在國內,這個問題還處在非常敏感與困難的階段。 四、價值創造:資產配置、風險控管、資訊透明等「三位一體」是基金永續經營的基礎,無論在理論上或實證上皆已得到證實。 五、對公司治理的影響:退休基金作為機構投資人中新興的主力地位,其一舉一動在金融市場動見觀瞻,尤其公共退休基金是機構法人的典範,扮演著更重要的角色。退休基金在股東行動主義的實踐上,應起帶頭作用,以保護投資人的權益,也提升基金的經營績效。 六、對公司治理應有的作為:退休基金具雙重代理的角色,在自行經營方面,它是基金參與者的代理人;在委託經營方面,受託機構是基金的代理人。雙重代理皆須對投資標的公司的公司治理有所要求,退休基金本身亦應在公司治理上有所作為。 最後,本論文冀望於退休基金率先實行公司治理政策,發揮機構投資人的領導者角色,以市場機制驅動國內公司治理的進一步發展。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Corporate governance has become an issue of international concern and many countries are actively engaged in a reform program to ensure their practices meet international standards. In this the role of shareholders is considered critical, and much attention has been focused upon the international investors’ concerns. What is equally important is the role that domestic institutions can play in promoting corporate governance reform. In this study, I briefly map out the trends in pension fund asset growth which bring them to a potentially dominant position in ownership in many markets and playing an increasingly important role as both channels for retirement savings and as intermediaries in financial markets. This combined role makes them a prime concern of governments and regulators from a variety of perspectives. Considering recent developments in corporate governance reform relevant to developing countries, and how pension fund reform can promote corporate governance reform in a mutually reinforcing sets of initiatives.
But, it is clear that if pension fund are constrained by conflict of interest, and do not ensure professional competence in management, investment and administration, and operate without clear mechanisms of accountability, and transparency, the governance problems which undermine the corporate can undermine the effectiveness of the pension fund. Many of the same governance problems apply. Principal-agent problems, agency cost, asymmetry of information, conflicts of interest can equally apply to the governance of pension funds. The costs of this agency problems, the inefficiencies resulting from asymmetry, and potential conflict of interest can result in the pension fund allocating funds inefficiently, tolerating poor management performance, making inadequate provision for risk management and ultimately contributing to lower returns and poor reputation with the beneficiaries. These are all problems which have had to be faced in developed markets, with scandals, poor performance, and loss of confidence by the public and beneficiaries. Fortunately, the outpouring of pension fund activism-led largely by public pension funds in both the US and UK – has led to a vigorous debate on the role and responsibilities of institutional investors. The notion is that the character of pension fund investors can provide the role of ‘guardian’ in the private sector, where the state is unwilling and unable to provide effective oversight. The question now for policy maker establishing or reforming our own pension system is how to ensure that the government framework for pension funds fosters an active role in corporate governance. The results from this study would be develop recommendations on best practice in pension fund governance and basic requirements to ensure that pension funds are suited to play an active role in corporate governance. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T17:05:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-94-P91743007-1.pdf: 2159482 bytes, checksum: 736cca29d935fc3ad00afe32531e2caf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
頁數 第一章 緒論………………………………………………… 1 第一節 研究動機…………………………………………… 1 第二節 研究方法與範圍…………………………………… 2 第三節 研究架構…………………………………………… 3 第二章 相關文獻回顧…………………………………… 7 第一節 公司治理概述……………………………………… 7 第二節 退休基金內涵……………………………………… 24 第三節 退休基金的使命與政策…………………………… 28 第三章 退休基金的內部治理…………………………… 33 第一節 退休基金的治理形式與治理守則………………… 33 第二節 退休基金的董事會職責與角色…………………… 35 第三節 退休基金的獨立董事條件與功能………………… 41 第四章 退休基金的誘因與行動………………………… 47 第一節 退休基金的薪酬問題……………………………… 47 第二節 退休基金的代理問題……………………………… 51 第三節 退休基金的受託人謹慎原則與規範……………… 54 第四節 退休基金的利益衝突與政治干預………………… 58 第五章 退休基金的價值創造……………………………… 63 第一節 退休基金的資產配置……………………………… 63 第二節 退休基金的投資風險管理………………………… 67 第三節 退休基金的資訊透明……………………………… 73 第六章 退休基金對公司治理之影響…………………… 81 第一節 退休基金與機構投資人…………………………… 81 第二節 退休基金與股東行動主義………………………… 85 第三節 退休基金與投資人保護…………………………… 91 第七章 退休基金對公司治理的作為…………………… 97 第一節 退休基金的監督與退出…………………………… 97 第二節 公司治理的作為…………………………………… 104 第三節 退休基金的作為…………………………………… 110 第八章 結論與建議……………………………………… 115 第一節 結論………………………………………………… 115 第二節 建議………………………………………………… 118 【參考文獻】………………………………………………… 123 中文部分……………………………………………………… 123 英文部分……………………………………………………… 124 【附錄】 附錄一 BRF投資政策說明書……………………………… 129 附錄二 OECD國家退休金基本治理架構………………… 132 附錄三 OECD國家退休金專家體系……………………… 134 附錄四 董事會的獨立性與委員會設置─亞洲公司治理白皮書 135 附錄五 公務人員退休撫卹基金有關上市(上櫃)公司股權行使作業規定……………………………………………………… 136 【表次】 表一 退休基金產業結構價值鏈…………………………… 6 表二 CLSA , corporate governance in emerging markets……………………………………………………… 17 表三 S&P , 2001─亞太地區100大公司治理評等………… 18 表四 S&P , 2001─亞洲地區新興市場公司治理評等……… 18 表五 台灣公司治理評等系統之構面、變數與公司績效之關係 19 表六 台灣公司治理評等系統─第二代架構圖……………… 20 表七 公司治理評等系統與公司績效關係表………………… 21 表八 獨立董事制度在英美等先進國家採行狀況…………… 46 表九 獨立董事報酬實際個案範例…Inter公司…………… 50 表十 1022家公司統計樣本…………………………………… 51 表十一 公務人員退休撫卹基金運用概況表………………… 66 表十二 Summary Table of Country Rating 2003………… 77 表十三Fiscal Transparency : Rating Breakdown………… 79 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 退休基金與公司治理 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Pension Fund and Lorporate Governance | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 93-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蔡揚宗(Yang-Tzong Tsay),劉順仁(Shuen-jen Liu) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 退休基金與公司治理, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Pension Fund and Lorporate Governance, | en |
dc.relation.page | 136 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2005-01-28 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 高階公共管理組 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 高階公共管理組 |
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