後冷戰時期族群衝突與血緣國干涉

Abstract

後冷戰時期，族群衝突國際化的現象特別顯著。族群衝突的國際化有擴散與升高兩種方式，血緣國干涉便屬於族群衝突的升高。血緣國干涉的動機則決定其干涉方式與結果。本文從國內層次與國際層次探討血緣國進行干涉的可能性，干涉的動機包括國內層次的族群政治傾向，以及國際層次的族群連帶；干涉的限制包括國內層次的制度限制，以及國際層次的相對國力大小。 國內族群政治傾向高的國家，容易以族群因素作為對外政策的基準。族群連帶則提供其實踐干涉的理由，尤其當某族群在某國作為具有政治影響力之族群，但在另一國受到歧視待遇時，前者干涉後者的動機更高。但在行使干涉行為之前，國家必須考量國內制度限制與國家相對國力大小。在制度限制高的政體中，政治領導者的權力受到限縮，反之，在制度限制低的政體之中，政治領導者很有可能利用干涉作為提升支持率的手段，也更有可能為所欲為遂行己志。另外，國家作為理性的行為者，也需評估相對國力是否足以保證干涉的成功，因此制度限制與相對國力兩者侷限了干涉的可能性。 綜上所述，在存在族群連帶的狀況下，可以推導出血緣國干涉可能性最高的是「有族群連帶＋相對國力優勢＋族群政治傾向高＋制度限制低」，血緣國干涉可能性最低的是「有族群連帶＋相對國力非優勢＋族群政治傾向低＋制度限制高」。本文並選擇巴爾幹半島國家進行案例探討，以檢測這四個變項的有效性。

Internationalization of ethnic conflicts is quite noticeable in post-cold war era. Ways of internationalizing ethnic conflicts include diffusion and escalation. Kin state intervention is one form of escalation. The means and outcomes of intervening are decided by motives of kin states. This research is to assess the possibility of kin state to carry out intervening from international and domestic aspects. The motives of intervention include ethnic political inclination in domestic level, and ethnic ties in international level; the limitations of intervention include institutional restrictions in domestic level and comparative state power in international level. Countries with high inclination of ethnic politics are more possible to make foreign policies in accordance with ethnical factors. Ethnic ties may become the reason to intervene. The possibility of intervention is especially high when one certain ethnic group is dominating in one country, and its co-national is discriminated in another country. The former has a very high level of motivation to intervene the latter. However, domestic institutional restrictions and comparative state power must be considered before intervening. Political leaders are restricted in countries with high institutional restriction. In stead, political leaders may use intervention as means of enhancing public supporting, and it's more possible for them to do whatever they like to achieve their won purposes. As a rational actor, a state must estimate if its comparative power is strong enough to guarantee success before intervening. Therefore, institutional restrictions and comparative state power are two limitations of kin state intervention. To sum up, it may be deduced that kin state intervention is most possible for countries with “existing ethnic tie + advantageous comparative state power + high ethnic political inclination + low institutional restrictions.” On the contrary, kin state intervention is least possible for countries with 'existing ethnic tie + disadvantageous comparative state power + low ethnic political inclination + high institutional restrictions.” This research chooses the Balkan states as cases to examine validity and effectiveness of these four variables.