請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/37899完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林嬋娟 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hong-Da Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王泓達 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T15:50:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-06-26 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2008-07-03 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2008-06-26 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ahmed, A., Billings, B., Morton, R., Stanford-Harris, M., 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77 (4), 867-890.
Ali, A., Chen, T., Radhakrishnan, S., 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44, 238-286. Almeida, H., Wolfenzon, D., 2006a. Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets.” Journal of Financial Economics 79(1), 99–144. Almeida, H., Wolfenzon, D., 2006b. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. Journal of Finance 61 (6), 2637-2680. Anderson, R., Reeb, D., 2003a. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1328. Anderson, R., Reeb, D., 2003b. Founding-family ownership, corporate diversification, and leverage. Journal of Law and Economics, 653-684. Anderson, R., Mansi, S., Reeb, D., 2003. Founding-family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 263-285. Bae, K., Jeong, S., 2007. The value-relevance of earnings and book values, ownership structure, and business group affiliation: evidence from Korean business groups. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 34, 740-766. Bae, K., Kang, J., Kim.J., 2002. Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups. Journal of Finance 57(6), 2695–2740. Baek, J., Kang, J., Park, K., 2004. Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from the Korean financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 71(2), 265–313. Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2006. The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (2), 207-242. Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 3-37. Becker, C., Defond, M., Jiambalvo, J., Subramanyam, K., 1998. “The effect of audit quality on earnings management.” Contemporary Accounting Research 15, 1–24. Berle, A., Means, G., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: The McMillan Company. Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S., 2002. Ferreting out tunneling: An application to Indian business groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 121–48. Bushman, R., Smith, A., 2001. Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32, 237-333. Bushman, R., Smith, A., 2003. Transparency, financial accounting information, and corporate governance. FEBNY Economic Policy Review, forthcoming. Carey, P., Simnett, R., 2006. Audit partner tenure and audit quality. The Accounting Review 81 (3), 653-676. Chan, S., Kensinger, J., Keown, A., Martin, J., 1997. Do strategic alliances create value? Journal of Financial Economics 46, 199-221. Chang, S., Choi, U., 1988. Strategy, structure and performance of Korean business groups: A transactions cost approach. Journal of Industrial Economics 37(2): 141–58. Chang, S., Chung, C., Mashmood, I., 2006. When and how does business group affiliation promote firm innovation? A tale of two emerging economies. Organization Science 17, 637-656. Chen, T., 2005. Executive compensation contracts of family firms. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas. Cheng, S., 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1), 157-176. Cheng, Q., Warfield, T., 2005. “Equity incentives and earnings management.” The Accounting Review 80, 441–76. Chi, W., Hsu, C., Lin, W., 2007. Board effectiveness: Investigating payment asymmetry between board members and shareholders. Working Paper. Chin, C., Lu, C., Su, S., 2007. The association between family firms and earnings quality: Ownership, management and control. 21th Century Accounting Profession, Accounting Industry and Accounting Disclosure Conference. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L., 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 1999. Expropriation of minority shareholders in East Asia. Working Paper. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57 (6), 2741-2771. Claessens, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2006. The benefits and costs of group affiliation: Evidence from East Asia. Emerging Market Review 7, 1-26. CommonWealth, 2004. Large 50 business groups. July. Cronqvist, H., Nilsson, M., 2003. Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (4), 695-719. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., 2000. Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: A study of the Times Mirror company. Journal of Financial Economics 56(2), 153-207. Dechow, P., Dichev, I., 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77, 35-59. DeFond, M.L., Jiambalvo, J., 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17, 145–176. Defond, M., Hung, M., Trezevant, R., 2007. Investor protection and the information content of annual earnings announcements: International evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 37-67. Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93,1155-1177. Faccio, M., Lang, L., 2002. The ultimate ownership in Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 65(3), 365-395. Fama, E., Jensen, M., 1985. Organizational forms and investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 101-119. Fama, E., Macbeth, J., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 71, 607-636. Fan, J., Wong, T., 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 401-425. Ferris, S., Kim, K., Kitsabunnarat, P., 2003. The costs (and benefits?) of diversified business groups: The case of Korean chaebols. Journal of Banking and Finance 27(2), 251–73. Francis, J., Schipper, K., Vincent, L., 2005. Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 329-360. Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Mitton, T., 2003. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics 31(4), 732–50. García Lara, J., García Osma, B., Mora, A., 2005. The effect of earnings management on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 32 (3) & (4), 691-726. Ghatak, M., Kali, R., 2001. Financially interlinked business groups. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10(4), 591–619. Gilson, R., Gordon, J., 2003. Controlling controlling shareholders. Working Paper # 228, Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, New York. Gopalan, R., Nanda, V., Seru, A., 2007. Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups. Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3), 759-795. Haw, I., Hu, B., Hwang, L., Wu, W., 2004. Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (2), 423-462. Healy, P., 1985. The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 85–107. Healy, P.M., Wahlen, J.M., 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting, paper prepared for discussion at the 1998 AAA/FASB Financial Reporting Issues Conference, Accounting Horizons 13, 365–384. James, H., 1999. Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International Journal of the Economics of Business 6, 41-56. Joh, S., 2003. Corporate governance and firm profitability: Evidence from Korea before the economic crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 68(2), 287–322. Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., Friedman, E., 2000. Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-186 Kali, R., 2003. Business groups, the financial market and modernization.” Economics of Transition 11(4), 671–96. Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance 55(2), 867–91. Khanna, T., Rivkin, J., 2001. Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal 22, 45-74. Khanna, T., Yafeh, Y., 2007. Business groups in emerging markets: Paragons or Parasites? Journal of Economic Literature 45, 33 1-372. Kim, J., Yi, C., 2006. Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing status, and earnings management: Evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research 23, 427-464. Kim, S., 2004. Bailout and conglomeration. Journal of Financial Economics 71(2), 315–47. Klein, A., 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 375-400 LaFond, R., Roychowdhury, S., 2008. Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (1), 101-135. LaFond, R., Watts, R., 2008. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review 83 (2), 447-478. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54, 471-518. Leuz, C., Nanda, D., Wysocki, P., 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 505-527. Lins, K.V., 2003. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 159–184. Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., Yeung, B., 2005. Corporate governance, economic entrenchment and growth. Morck, R.K., Yeung, B., 2003. Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 27, 367-382. Pagano, M., Panetta, F. & Zingales, L., 1998. Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance, 53 (1), 27-64. Peek, E., Cuijpers, R., Buijink, W., 2007. Creditors’ and shareholders’ demands in public versus private firms: Evidence from Europe. http://ssrn.com/abstract=511822. Reynolds, J., Francis, J., 2000. “Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions.” Journal of Accounting & Economics 30, 375–400. Sah, R. K., Stiglitz, J., 1986. The architecture of economic systems: hierarchies and ployarchies. American Economic Review 76, 716-727. Sah, R. K., Stiglitz, J., 1991. The quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized organizations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 289-295. Shen, C., Wang, C., 2000. Whether financing constraint affects investment decisions: Evidence from Taiwan panel data. Academia Economic Papers 28, 67-95. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737-783. Stein, J., 1998. Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy 96, 61-80. Sweeney, A.P., 1994. Debt-covenant violations and managers accounting responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17, 281–308. Villalonga, B., Amit, R., 2006. How do family ownership, control, and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 80, 385-417. Wang, Dechun, 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research 44, 619-656. Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting Review 53, 112–134. Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Xie, B., Davidson III, W., DaDalt, P., 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 295-316. Yeh, Y., 2003. Corporate ownership and control: New evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Ownership and Control 1, 87-101. Yeh, Y., 2005. Do controlling shareholders enhance corporate value? Corporate Governance: An International Review 13, 313-325. Yeh, Y., Lee, T., Woidtke, T., 2001. Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2, 21-48. Zhang, J., 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 27-54. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/37899 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Pyramiding and cross shareholdings, among the most common mechanisms adopted by family businesses or business groups for control-enhancing, are deemed as expropriation tools over minority shareholders, and thus blamed for lower level of earnings quality. In this study I try to investigate if the utilization of pyramiding and (or) cross shareholdings (measured by the deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights) could also serve as a tool to mitigate earnings management due to slack in debt contracting.
Empirical analyses show that good or bad family firms, from the perspectives of earnings quality, can be derived by separating family firms based on the degree of deviation of control from ownership, Moreover, despite that the deviation is positively related to abnormal accruals over a deviation threshold, the deviation is negatively associated with the extent of earnings management in family or group firms with low deviation, indicating the dominance of internal capital market below a deviation threshold. Additional analyses show that family and group firms are less conservative in the extent to which loss and gain are asymmetrically recognized. Besides, investors are sensitive to the board representation of controlling shareholders, thus demanding more conservatism when controlling shareholders occupy more board seats. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T15:50:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-D91722001-1.pdf: 650094 bytes, checksum: eee7b7c686b9ee39efdb2a356b3415c5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書i
謝 辭 ii 摘 要 iv Abstract v 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 11 2.1 Family firms and agency problems 11 2.1.1 Plus to firm value and performance 11 2.1.2 Minus to firm value and performance 12 2.1.3 Summary: Two contrasting forces of agency problems on family firms 13 2.2 family firms and earnings quality 14 2.2.1 Two agency problems on earnings quality 14 2.2.2 Entrenchment mechanisms by family firms on earnings quality 17 2.2.3 Divergence of control from ownership: only negative side on earnings quality? 20 2.3 Business groups and earnings quality 23 2.3.1 Business groups: paragons or parasites in earnings quality? 23 2.3.2 Divergence of control from ownership in business groups 26 2.3.3 Deviation in business groups: any positive side? 27 2.4 Summary of research hypotheses 28 3. Data and Methodology 29 3.1 Data 29 3.2 Measures of main variables 29 3.3 Empirical Models 32 4. Empirical Results 38 4.1 Descriptive statistics 38 4.2 Regression analyses 40 4.2.1 Family firms and earnings management 40 4.2.2 Group-affiliated firms and earnings management 43 4.2.3 Family firms, business groups and earnings conservatism 44 4.3 Summary of empirical findings 46 4.4 Sensitivity analyses 47 5. Conclusion 49 Appendix: Variable Definitions 52 References 54 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 盈餘品質 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 控制權與所有權偏離 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 金字塔結構 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 家族企業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 集團企業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 交叉持股 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 內部資本市場 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | earnings quality | en |
| dc.subject | family firms | en |
| dc.subject | business groups | en |
| dc.subject | pyramidal groups | en |
| dc.subject | cross shareholdings | en |
| dc.subject | internal capital market | en |
| dc.subject | deviation of control from ownership | en |
| dc.title | 控制權與所有權之偏離只存在侵略效果？來自擴增控制權組織與盈餘品質間關連性之證據 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Is the control-ownership deviation always “parasites”? Evidence from control-enhancing organizations and earnings quality | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王泰昌,沈中華,戚務君,劉啟群 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 家族企業,集團企業,金字塔結構,交叉持股,內部資本市場,控制權與所有權偏離,盈餘品質, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | family firms,business groups,pyramidal groups,cross shareholdings,internal capital market,deviation of control from ownership,earnings quality, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 92 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2008-06-26 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-97-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 634.86 kB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。