交響樂團長聘與甄選制度之經濟分析

Abstract

學術界中，長聘制度的採用除了保障教授的工作權益之外，還讓現有教授有誘因去聘任較優秀的新進教授，進而提高甄選時的效率性。交響樂團中，團員同樣也有長聘制度的保障，而且團員也能夠參與新進團員的甄選。雖然上述制度是由團員組成的工會與樂團抗爭而來的，但是本文相信上述制度的採用和學術界一樣，能夠提高甄選時的效率性。 本文首先由實證分析驗證長聘制度的採用確實保障團員的工作權益，讓團員不必擔心有被新進團員取代的可能。本文並試圖驗證交響樂團在長聘制度的採用之下，讓現有團員參與甄選是否會讓新進團員的水準提高。然而，由實證分析無法得到一致的結果，也就是各樂團在採用團員甄選之後，有些會甄選出較好的團員，有些則會甄選出較差的團員，其他則是沒有足夠證據說明甄選出的團員水準有顯著差異。

In academics, the adoption of tenure system not only protects the work rights of the professors, but also makes them have the incentives to recruit the new members with better performance so that it can improve the recruiting efficiency. In symphony orchestras, the members’ work rights are also under the protection by the dismissal procedure, and they can also participate in recruiting new members by the audition procedure. Although the procedures are result from the negotiation between the union consisted of the members and the orchestra, we believe that the adoption of the procedures in symphony orchestras, just as in academics, can improve the recruiting efficiency. We first verify that the adoption of dismissal procedure can accurately protect the work rights of members by empirical evidence so that they do not have to worry about the possibility of being replaced by new members. We also want to verify that, under the adoption of dismissal procedure, whether the participation of the members in audition procedure can improve the level of new members. However, we cannot obtain the consistent outcomes by empirical evidence, that is, after the adoption of the audition procedure in which the members can participate, some orchestras will recruit the better members, some will recruit the worse ones and the others are without enough evidence to say that whether the level of members is significant different or not.