投資人保護制度之研究─以投資人團體訴訟為中心

Abstract

於商業活絡之今日，有價證券之募集與發行堪稱是公司最重要之籌資管道之一。然而，由於有價證券所表彰之股份價值隱而不顯，投資人無從由所持有股份具體判斷公司之營運狀況，再加上虛偽隱匿之情事層出不窮，投資人保護制度遂應運而生。加強公開發行公司之管理及公開發行之管制，以資訊揭露為核心之監督方式，被認為是最有效率之手段之一。 證券不法事件中，無論是證券詐欺、財報不實或公開說明書不實等，由於受損害之投資人動輒成千上萬，若個別訴訟，對投資人、對法院乃至於對被告都是沉重的負擔；且於因果關係之證明、損害賠償之計算等皆較一般民事案件為複雜，在個別投資人之損害賠償額多過於微小，欠缺起訴誘因之情形下，集結多數投資人共同起訴之團體訴訟（class action）遂應運而生。美國法之團體訴訟制度 可謂投資人團體訴訟之濫觴，更被視為是落實聯邦證券法之利器，然而濫訴（frivolous suits）情形嚴重亦為專家學者所詬病，如何於資本形成與投資人保護求取衡平遂成為一大難題。美國雖於一九九五年以降，針對投資人團體訴訟進行相關立法改革，但對於其成效及團體訴訟本身是否為落實投資人保護之最佳手段仍有爭論。 歐盟會員國近年證券詐欺舞弊事件層出不窮，由於缺乏團體訴訟之機制甚至須遠赴美國起訴，如何設計良好之投資人保護制度，落實證券違法行為之民事求償，實為全球證券市場發展之一大難題。 比較法上，為避免發生如同美國律師驅策，律師為收取高額之律師費用，無論案件之是非曲直與投資人之求償意願，一律加以起訴所衍生之濫訴問題，有以非營利組織（nonprofit organization）為投資人求償之立法模式，如南韓；亦有以獨特之民事訴訟程序作為相應之道者，如德國之投資人示範訴訟法（the Model Proceedings Act）。我國於一九九八年起，證券市場陸續爆發重大違法案件，但由於證券違法案件之受害人數眾多且個別受害金額微小，加以投資人多缺乏相關專業能力，鮮見投資人自行出面主張權利，證券主管機關乃於「財團法人證券暨期貨市場發展基金會」（下稱「證基會」）下成立了投資人保護的專責單位—「投資人服務與保護中心」（下稱「投服中心」），由該中心針對重大不法案件進行評估，認有損害投資人權益之情事時，即對外公告受理符合一定條件投資人之登記後，由證基會受任為共同訴訟代理人後進行訴訟，此即我國投資人團體訴訟之濫觴。另一方面則由專家學者研議我國之投資人求償途徑，並於二○○二年七月制定「證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法」（下稱「投保法」），該法係仿照消費者保護法中團體訴訟之設計，以投資人授與訴訟實施權予保護機構之方式為投資人提起團體訴訟。 依投保法所設立之保護機構「財團法人證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心」（下稱「保護機構」）係於二○○三年一月成立，除得依法接受投資人授權進行團體訴訟外，亦為投資人保護之專責機構。保護機構成立以來，至二○○八年六月底為止受理之團體訴訟案件共計有博達、太電、力霸集團等五十件，求償金額高達二百四十億餘元，登記求償的投資人達六萬四千多人，平均每名投資人受損金額高達三十七萬餘元。其中確定勝訴案件有八件，一審勝訴案件則有九件，勝訴類型包含財報不實、公開說明書不實、操縱市場、內線交易等，顯見保護機構為投資人所做之努力。為加強股東權益之保護，投保法修正草案並欲降低保護機構依法所應繳納之裁判費，並賦予保護機構為股東提起代表訴訟及向法院聲請裁判解任董監事之權限。 本文為探討我國投資人保護制度，乃以投資人團體訴訟為核心，於第二章討論我國投資人團體訴訟之立法模式，保護機構之進行業務與團體訴訟之受理方式。以此為延伸於第三章介紹投資人團體訴訟之比較法制，以進一步了解我國投資人團體訴訟之問題點。第四章則就我國投資人團體訴訟現行所面臨之困難與投保法之修正草案提出分析與建議。第五章則以保護機構之運作為核心，檢討現行保護機構之職權，及以非營利組織之營運方式所可能產生之利弊得失，就我國之投資人保護制度作一檢討。第六章則就我國投資人團體訴訟之特殊性、必要性及保護機構之功能發揮有助於投資人保護制度之建制提出結論。

With the rapid growth of financial business, securities markets not only serve the need for publicly-held corporation to raise capital but also provide invesotrs an alternative way to use capital. Since the securities are intangible property, how to prevent fraud and protect investors becomes an important issue for countries all over the world. Among all the supervisory methods, full-disclosure appears to be the most efficient way to prevent fraud. Securities fraud claims are especially suitable for class-action proceedings in that the costs of bringing securities fraud litigation are almost always greater than the losses to individual investors. Furthermore, the proof of transaction causation and loss causation and the assesment of damages are much more difficult than any other kind of law suits. The U.S.-style class action is a unique American procedural device. It allows plaintiffs to sue not only for injury them sustaine but on behalf of other persons similarly situated for injury done to them. It serves the interests of economy by not having to try the same issues again in separate cases. Also, it serves the interests of consistency and finality by avoiding the possibilities of inconsistent outcomes in separate trials of similar cases and resolving all claims in a single case that is binding on all class members. The U.S.-style class action is once considered the most powerful mechanism to enforce federal securities laws. However, the danger of vexatious litigation may also jeopardize the soundness of securities markets. In 1995, the U.S. Congress passed the Private Securites Litigation Reform Act （PSLRA）to address the concern for frivolous suits and the agency problem of plaintiff’s attorneys. Nevertheless, the scholars are still concerned about whether the class action is a good solution for securities fraud. Recent corporate scandals in Europe have affected individual investors on a large scale with similar injuries. This has led to a recent shift in the role of enforcement in several EU member states, from soley state and public consumer group enforcement mechanism to the inclusion of private enforcement. Consequently, there is a trend that more and more EU member states start to adopt the U.S.-style class action. There are other kinds of unique approach of private enforcement. Some countries use their traditional civil procedure to enforce securities fraud claims, such as Germany. The German Capital Investors Model Proceeding is said to be the express rejection of the adoption of U.S.-style class action. Still some other countries use the “nonprofit organization” to enforce securities law claims, such as South Korea and Taiwan. In Taiwan, the corporate scandals in 1998 revealed the demand for better investor protection and related law-enforcement system. Because the participants of the securities markets were mostly unsophisticated individual investors and the barrier to litigation often impeded them from entering lawsuits, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) established an Investor Services Center (ISC) under the Securities and Futures Institute to coordinate claims against public companies on behalf individual investors. Due to the court costs, the security-posting and the lack of discovery proceeding, there was still desparate need to establish the class action device in Taiwan. In 2002, the congress passed the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Act (hereinafter “SFIPA”) to establish our own securities class action device. The most unique feature of the securities class action in Taiwan is that it is not driven by attorneys but by the “Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center” (hereinafter “SFIPA”). According to the SFIPA, the SFIPC may bring an action or submit a matter to arbitration in its own name with respect to a single securities or futures matter injurious to a majority of securities investors or futures traders, after having been so empowered by not less than 20 securities investors or futures traders. The concept of this regulation is borrowed from the Consumer Protection Act, which authorizes the authority to represent class members in the court and seek compensation arising from defendants’ product liability. To date, the SFIPC has brought 50 securities class action on behalf of more than 64,000 investors, seeking more than NT$24 billion in civil damages. The SFIPC has won 9 final judgments, including securities fraud, false financial statement, false prospectus statement and insider trading. In order to strengthen investors protection, the draft of the modification of the SFIPA addresses the need for further exemption of court costs and the authority for the SFIPC to open the shareholder derivative suit and the judicial procedure to remove directors and supervisors. This thesis will first introduce the securities class action in Taiwan in chapter 2, and compare the model of the securities class action in Taiwan with other jurisdictions in chapter 3. After analyzing the main features of securities class action in different jurisdictions, this thesis will further examine that whether the securities class action in Taiwan does give investors easier access to litigation and discuss the pros and cons of the draft of modification of the SFIPC in chapter 4. Finally, this thesis will examine the overall investor protection system in chapter 5. Chapter 6 will point out the necessities of the securities class action in Taiwan and the importance of the SFIPC as the conclusion.