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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 李怡庭 | |
dc.contributor.author | Te-Tsun Chang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 張德存 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T15:22:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-07-23 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2008-07-23 | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-07-23 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Chapter 2
Acemoglu, Daron (1995) ‘Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent,’ European Economic Review 39 , 17-33. Acemoglu, Daron and Verdier, Thierry (1998) ‘Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talents: A General Equilibrium Approach,’ The Economic Journal 108 , 1384-1403. Acemoglu, Daron and Verdier, Thierry (2000), ‘The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption,’ American Economic Review 90 , pp. 194-211. Barreto, Raul (2000), ‘Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth,’ European Economic Review 44 , pp. 35-60. Baumol, William (1990), ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive,’ Journal of Political Economy 98 , pp. S270-93. Burdett, Kenneth, Lagos, Ricardo and Wright, Randall (2003), ‘Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment,’ American Economic Review 93, pp. 1764-1777. Cooper, Russell and John, Andrew (1988), ‘Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, pp. 441-463. Diamond, Peter (1982), ‘Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,’ Journal of Political Economy 90 , pp. 881-894 Ennis, Huberto, and Keister, Todd (2005), ‘Optimal Fiscal Policy under Multiple Equilibria,’ Journal of Monetary Economics 52, pp. 1359-1377. Friedman, Milton (1962), Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hall, Robert E. and Jones, Charles I. (1999), ‘Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, pp. 83-116. Li, Yiting and Wright, Randall (1998), ‘Government Transaction Policy, the Media of Exchange and Prices,’ Journal of Economic Theory 81, pp. 290- 313. Murphy, Kevin M., Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1991), ‘The Allocation of Talent:Implications for Growth,’Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, pp. 503-530. —, — and — (1993), ‘Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? ’ American Economic Review 83 , pp. 409-14. Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York : Basic Books 1974. La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. (1999), ‘The Quality of Government,’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15, pp. 222-279. Shi, Shouyong and Temzelides, Ted (2004), ‘A Model of Bureaucracy and Corruption,’ International Economic Review 45, pp. 873-908. Slemrod, Joel and Bakija, Ron (1996), Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen’s Guide to the Great Debate over Tax Reform. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Chapter 3&4 Alvarez, F, R. Lucas and W. Weber (2001). “Interest Rates and Inflation.” American Economic Review, 91, 219-225. Berentsen, A., G. Camera and C. Waller (2006). “Money, Credit and Banking.” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming. Berentsen, A., and C.Waller (2005). “Optimal Stabilization Policy with Flexible Prices.” working paper. Christiano, L (1991). “Modelling the Liquidity Effect of a Monetary Shock.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. He, P, L. Huang and R. Wright (2005). “Money and Banking in Fuerst, T. (1992). “Liquidity, Loanable funds and Real activity.” Journal of Monetary Economics 29 (1), 3-24. Fuerst, T. (1994). “Monetary Policy and Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26, pp. 362-376. Grossman S., and L.Weiss (1983). “A Transactions-Based Model of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” American Economic Review , 73, 871-80. Lagos, R and R, Wright (2005). “A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy, 113, 463-84. Kocherlakota, N. (1998). “Money is memory.” Journal of Economic Theory , 81, 232-251. Lucas, R. (1990). “Liquidity and the Interest Rates.” Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 237-264. Rotemberg, J. (1984). “A Monetary Equilibrium Model with Transactions Costs.” Journal of Political Economy, 92, 40-58. Taylor, J (1993). “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice.” Carnegie- Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39 (0), pp. 195-214. S. Williamson (2006). “Search, Limited Participation, and Monetary Policy.” International Economic Review, 47, 107-128. 82 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/37253 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本論文包含兩部份。第二章中, 在一全面均衡架構下,
決定生產者,官僚及私部門競租者的相對報酬與人才的分配。 非生產者的活動對於生產來說具有外部性, 因此模型具有多重均衡, 每個均衡的政府規模大小也不同。 如果私部門競租者占總人口數的比例是固定的話, 較小的政府規模確有較高的社會福利。 如果私部門競租者占總人口數的比例是內生決定的話, 外部性效果會加大, 但較大的政府規模確有較高的社會福利。我們的分析支持政府規模大小並不重要; 重要的是政府品質。 在第三章和第四章中我們根據 Lagos and Wright (2005)的模型並加入金融中介部門來探討短期的貨幣傳遞機制。 在完美的信用市場架構下, 貨幣注入只會影響通貨膨脹率但不會影響實質面。 若處在不完美的信用市場, 銀行因考慮貸款人不履行契約之情形而會產生借貸限制的情形, 進而造成金融中介的成本。 此時貨幣注入銀行體系會減少資金成本而使利率下降, 進而增加消費, 亦即有流動性效果(Liquidity Effect)的產生。 如果考慮使用支票交易的經濟體系, 貨幣注入銀行體系依舊會使利率下降, 但可能使消費減少, 因為利率下降亦會產生負的財富效果。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The thesis consists of two parts. We first determine the relative rewards to and allocation of talent between producers, private rent-seekers and bureaucrats in a general equilibrium model.Unproductive activity creates a negative externality on the relative rewards to producers. Multiple equilibria exist that differ in the size of bureaucracy. If private rent-seeking is exogenously given,the equilibrium with a smaller bureaucracy
yields higher welfare. If private rent-seeking is endogenously determined, the externality is strengthened, necessitating a larger bureaucracy. The size of government and economic performance are jointly determined, and their relationship is not necessarily negative. Our result supports the view that the size of government does not matter much; what is important is the quality of government. In next two chapters, we construct a model based on Lagos and Wright (2005) by incorporating financial intermediation to study the monetary transmission mechanism. With full enforcement, money injections only affects inflation but not real course of economy. With limited enforcement, there is a loan constraint, a cost on the intermediation process. Monetary injections through banks reduce the cost and thus induce a liquidity effect. If agents can use checks as a means of payment, however, the consumption may fall: since consumption depends on the total value of portfolio, which decreases as interest rates do. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T15:22:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-D91323004-1.pdf: 815564 bytes, checksum: 944449d3bd84e8e1cf3a51517daa0074 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書i
誌謝ii 摘要iii Abstract iv Lists of Figures vi Lists of Tables vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 Quality of Government and Economic Performance 6 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3 Exogenous Private Rent-seeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.1 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.2 Government Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.4 Endogenous Private Rent-seeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.4.1 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.4.2 The Size of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.6 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3 Bank Lending, Liquidity and Monetary Policy 37 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.2 The environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.3.1 Equilibrium with Full Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.3.2 Equilibrium with Limited Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3.4 Liquidity Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.5 Taylor Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.6 Equilibrium Without Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 3.8 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4 Multiple Means of Payment and Monetary Transmission Mechanism 73 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 4.3 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5 Conclusion 85 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 政府品質,金融中介與貨幣政策 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Three Essays on Quality of Government,
Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 毛慶生,江永裕,洪福聲,陳南光,賴景昌 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 競租,政府品質,政府大小,流動性效果,泰勒法則,支付工具, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Rent-seeking,Quality of Government,Size of Government,Liquidity effect,Taylor Rule,means of payment, | en |
dc.relation.page | 86 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2008-07-23 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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