我國檢察機關組織改革之研究

Abstract

當前我國檢察機關飽受政治不當干涉、濫權追訴和消極怠惰等沉重批判，這三個負面形象實係體制設計偏差所致。本研究指出，檢察機關組織改革應從組織法、職務法及訴訟法完整配套進行，並提出強化檢察獨立、提高監督問責與提升檢察效能等三項改革方向，從法律規範面及政治權力面規劃整體方案。 本研究論文引介Mirjan R. Damaska國家任務與司法機能論，釐清我國檢察機關係屬於主動型國家之政策實施型司法體制光譜，及依此建構之科層式組織；此與美國傾向為回應型國家及紛爭解決型司法體制光譜，呈現分散協作式司法機構之設計迥然有別，因之我國體制不宜輕率嫁接美國機制。本研究並從科層體制之原型即韋伯官僚制度理論出發，援引新公共管理之理論脈絡，認為我國檢察機關組織改革之思維，宜採取多元複合與回應民意之公共網絡治理型態，作為強化檢察獨立、提高監督問責與提升檢察效能等三項改革方向之指引。 強化檢察獨立方面，本研究在考察我國現行機制後，認為檢察官人事晉升制度係長期侵蝕檢察獨立之病根。經權衡檢察獨立、民主問責、檢察一體及檢察官自治等四項檢察體系重要價值後，本研究建議徹底改革檢察官人事晉升制度，基層檢察官晉升主任宜仿效地方法院審判長由各法院法官群體選舉產生之模式，改由各地檢署自行辦理檢察官直選；高檢署精簡縮編員額，且採取完整之輪替歷練制度；至於檢察長之任免仍由法務部長進行人事圈選，俾使檢察獨立與民主問責兼容並蓄且相互制衡。 提高監督問責方面，本研究在考察美國、德國及日本法制後，認為我國監督機制尚屬完備，僅刑事訴訟再議機制設計不良，應予廢除。另經考察日本檢察審查會制度運作後，認為適可取代我國再議制度，除能提高監督作用，更可提高我國人民對於檢察機關之參與及信賴。 提升檢察效能方面，本研究發現檢察官工作量超過負荷是影響偵查品質之原因，增加檢察機關輔助人力刻不容緩。本研究建議引進日本副檢察官職務，並盡速增加檢察事務官員額，達到檢察官與檢察事務官一比一配股比例，且仿效日本檢察事務官、副檢察官至檢察官可透過特任考試制度向上晉升，使我國檢察機關內部人事暢通，能拔擢基層優秀人才並激發檢察效能。

The public prosecutors’ office in Taiwan has been heavily criticized for improper political interference, abuse of prosecutorial discretion, and inefficiency. The above-mentioned negative images come from the deficiency in the prosecutorial system design. This study points out that the public prosecutors’ office shall be reformed on the basis of the laws governing prosecutorial organization, prosecutorial functions and criminal procedure. Also, this study, based on normative and political perspectives, offers three reformative initiatives to reinforce prosecutorial independence, accountability, and efficiency. By introducing Mirjan R. Damaska’s theory of state assignment and judicial function, this study suggests that the public prosecutors’ office in Taiwan is a hierarchical archetype constructed on the basis of the activist state policy-implementing ideology. It differs from the U.S. prosecutorial system, inclining to a reactive state conflict-solving ideology and accordingly reveals a coordinating archetype of organizational design. As a result, the prosecutorial organization reform in Taiwan shall not embrace the U.S. system without due consideration. Moreover, based on Weber’s theory of bureaucratic management and theory of new public management, this study contends that the organizational reform of the public prosecutors’ office in Taiwan shall take a pluralistic public management model as a guideline to reinforce the prosecutorial independence, accountability and efficiency. With respect to prosecutorial independence, this study, after reviewing current prosecutorial system in Taiwan, finds that current prosecutorial promotion system is the primary factor to erode the prosecutorial independence. By weighing and balancing four critical prosecutorial values, prosecutorial independence, accountability, prosecutorial integration, and prosecutorial autonomy, this study presents several proposals of prosecutorial promotion system reform. First, the promotion of lower level prosecutors shall, as that of all district court judges in Taiwan, be based on election by all eligible prosecutors. Second, the Taiwan high prosecutors’ office shall downsize; positions there shall also be set based on the ideology of gaining experience. Third, after considering check-and-balance of two opposing values, prosecutorial independence and democratic accountability, this study contends that appointment of chief prosecutors in all district prosecutors’ office shall still be under the discretion of Minister of Justice. Regarding prosecutorial accountability and supervision, this study suggests that the status quo of prosecutorial supervision system in Taiwan is overall adequate and appropriate; however, the Second-Level Reconsideration system shall be abolished. This study also suggests that Taiwan shall adopt Japanese Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution to replace current Second-Level Reconsideration system, and that may effectively reinforce prosecutorial supervision as well as improve public trust in prosecutors in Taiwan. As to increasing prosecutorial efficiency, the study first indicates that current prosecutorial inefficiency in Taiwan shall be attributed to the overwhelming workload for individual prosecutors. Increasing positions of prosecutors is accordingly of great urgency. This study then suggests the adoption of Japanese Assistant Prosecutor (AP) system as well as increasing positions of Public Prosecuting Affairs Official (PAO), and to have each prosecutor be assisted by one PAO. Besides, all APs and PAOs are entitled to be promoted to prosecutors by way of passing certain examinations, which keep lines of promotion open and transparent as well as facilitate the promotion of outstanding lower level prosecutors and, most important of all, improves prosecutorial efficiency.