請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34445完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 劉啟群 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chiung-Yi Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王瓊儀 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T06:08:57Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-06-26 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2006-06-26 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2006-05-22 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bagwell, L. S, 1991. Share repurchase and takeover deterrence. RAND Journal of Economics 22, 72-88
Brav, A., Graham, J., Harvey, C., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483–527 Comment, R., Jarrell, G., 1991. The relative signaling power of dutch-auction and fixed-price self-tender offers and open-market share repurchases. Journal of Finance 46,1243-71 DeAngelo,H., DeAngelo, L., Skinner, D.J. 2003. Are dividends disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 425-456 Dittmar, A.K., 2000. Why do firms repurchase stocks? The Journal of Business 73, 331-356 Fenn,G.W., Liang, N., 2000. Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72 Grullon, G., Ikenberry, D., 2000. What do we know about stock repurchases? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 13, 31–51. Grullon, G., Michaely,R. 2002. Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution hypothesis. The Journal of Finance 57, 1649-1684 Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2004. The information content of share repurchase programs. The Journal of Finance 59, 651-680 Hirtle,B., 1998. Bank holding company capital ratios and shareholder payouts. Current issues in economics and finance 4, 1-6 Hirtle,B., 2001. How do stock repurchase affect bank holding company performance? Working Paper. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., Vermaelen, T., 1995. Market underreaction to open market share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181–209. Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76, 323–329. Jolls, C., 1998. Stock repurchases and incentive compensation. NBER Working Papers 6467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C.P., Weisbach, M.S., 2000, Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchase. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 355-384 Kahle, K.M., 2002. When a buyback isn’t a buyback: open market repurchases and employee options. Journal of Financial Economics 63, 235-261 Stephens, C.P., Weisbach, M.J., 1998. Actual share reacquisitions in open-market repurchase programs. The Journal of Finance 53, 313–334. Vermaelen, T., 1981. Common stock repurchases and market signaling. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 139–183. Weston, J., Siu, J.A., 2003. Changing motives for share repurchases. University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1036 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/34445 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 中文摘要
本研究探討美國銀行業庫藏股宣告規模如何受動機與管制因素之影響。庫藏股宣告的動機有股利替代、訊號假說、抵禦併購意圖、抵銷選擇權的稀釋效果、分派現金流量。而銀行在相關法令規範及證券化的活動之下，對庫藏股宣告規模的影響也是本研究欲探討的重點。 實證結果如下: 一. 銀行所支付股利的愈多，庫藏股宣告的規模越大 二. 銀行股價被低估的程度愈大，庫藏股宣告的規模越大 三. 銀行所擁有的現金愈多、投資機會愈少，庫藏股宣告的規模越大 四. 銀行面臨被併購的威脅時，庫藏股宣告的規模越大。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines how each motivation affects the magnitude of repurchase announcement by bank holding companies in the United States. There are several motivations which may impact the magnitude of share repurchase announcement: to substitute dividends; to signal to the market that the bank’s stock is undervalued; to deter the takeover threat; to undo the dilution effect of stock options and to payout free cash flows. The banking industry is of particular interest because banks are under strict monitoring and regulation. In addition, how specific activities such as securitizations influence bank share repurchase needs further discussion. The purpose of this study is to assess how motivations and regulation affect the magnitude of repurchase announcement by bank holding companies.
From the empirical result, we find that banks will announce greater stock repurchases when the dividends payout ratio is higher; when the banks are undervalued; when the banks have more cash in hand; when the investment opportunities are less and when the banks are under takeover threat. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T06:08:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-95-R93722006-1.pdf: 2130443 bytes, checksum: 248824fd3c3034a4ff1f63e046f66aea (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | I. Introduction 1
II. Literature & Hypothesis 2 III. Research Design 8 IV. Data source and descriptive statistics 11 V. Empirical Result 13 V.1 Result on Tobit model without SEC, from 1994~2004 14 V.2 Result on Tobit model with SEC, from 2001~2004 17 V.3 Result on Tobit model with year dummy 18 VI. Sensitivity analyses 18 VII. Conclusion 19 VIII. Reference 20 Tables Table 1-A Descriptive Statistics of all variables, without SEC, from 1994~2004 22 Table 1-B Descriptive Statistics of all variables, the amount of repurchase is not zero, without SEC, from 1994~2004 23 Table 1-C Descriptive Statistics of all variables, the amount of repurchase equal to zero, without SEC, from 1994~2004 24 Table 1-C Descriptive Statistics of all variables, the amount of repurchase equal to zero, without SEC, from 1994~2004 24 Table 2 Correlation of variables, without SEC, from 1994~2004 25 Table 3-A Descriptive Statistics of all variables, with SEC from 2001~2004 26 Table 3-B Descriptive Statistics of variables, the amount of repurchase is not zero, with SEC, from 2001~2004 27 Table 3-C Descriptive Statistics of variables, the amount of repurchase equal to zero, with SEC, from 2001~2004 28 Table 4 Correlation of variables, with SEC, from2001~2004 29 Table 5 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase 30 Table 6 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase, including SEC, from 2001~2004 32 Table 7 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase, without SEC, from 2001~2004 33 Table 8 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase with year dummys 34 Table 9 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase with year dummy, including SEC, from 2001~2004 35 Table 10 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase, REP = percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase 36 Table 11 Tobit model results of Stock Repurchase, including SEC, from 2001~2004, REP = percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase 37 Table 12 Tobit model results on magnitude of repurchase announcement, from 1994~2004, without SEC 38 Table 13 Tobit model results on magnitude of repurchase announcement, from 2001~2004, with SEC 39 Appendix A: Total tobit result, NA=0, no SEC, from 1994 to 2004, REP=the value announced to repurchase 41 B: Total tobit result, NA=0, with SEC, from 2001 to 2004, REP=the value announced to repurchase 49 C: Total Tobit result, NA=NA, no SEC, from 1994 to 2004, REP=the value announced to repurchase 57 D: Total Tobit result, NA=NA, with SEC, from 2001 to 2004, REP=the value announced to repurchase 66 E: Total Tobit result, NA=0, no SEC, from 1994 to 2004, REP=the percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase 74 F: Total Tobit result, NA=0, with SEC, from 2001 to 2004, REP=the percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase 82 G-1: Descriptive statistics of all variable, REP=percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase 90 G-2: Descriptive statistics of all variable, REP=percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase, the percentage of repurchase is not zero 91 G-3: Descriptive statistics of all variable, REP=percentage of share outstanding announced to repurchase, the percentage of repurchase equal to zero 92 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 資產證券化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 資本適足率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股票選擇權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 訊號假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 盈餘分派 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 庫藏股宣告規模 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 併購 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 自由現金流量 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Payout | en |
| dc.subject | Takeover deterrence | en |
| dc.subject | Free cash flow | en |
| dc.subject | Securitization | en |
| dc.subject | Capital adequacy regulation | en |
| dc.subject | Signaling | en |
| dc.subject | Stock options | en |
| dc.subject | Risk | en |
| dc.subject | Magnitude of repurchase announcement | en |
| dc.title | 動機與管制因素對美國銀行業庫藏股宣告規模之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A Study on Magnitude of U.S. Bank Holding Company Share Repurchase Announcement: Impact of Motives and Regulation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 94-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 許崇源,陳業寧 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 庫藏股宣告規模,盈餘分派,訊號假說,股票選擇權,資本適足率,資產證券化,風險,自由現金流量,併購, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Magnitude of repurchase announcement,Payout,Signaling,Stock options,Capital adequacy regulation,Securitization,Risk,Free cash flow,Takeover deterrence, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 92 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2006-05-23 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-95-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 2.08 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。