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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/32578完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 黃鴻(Hong Hwang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Su-Ying Hsu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 許淑媖 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T04:11:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2007-07-26 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2006-07-26 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2006-07-25 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
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C., 1995, “Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model,” American Economic Review 85, 956-963. Ye, M. and M. Yezer, 1992, “Voting, Spatial Monopoly, and Spatial Price Regulation,” Economic Inquiry 30, 29-39. Yeats, A., 1997, “Does Mercosure’s Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements,” Policy Research Working Paper 1729. Zhou, D., B. Spencer and I. Vertinsky, 2002, “Strategic Trade Policy with Endogenous Choice of Quality and Asymmetric Costs,” Journal of International Economics 56, 205-232. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/32578 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 第二章中，我們利用一個兩國兩廠商的雙佔模型來討論廠商的均衡遊說行為、遊說活動下之最適關稅以及此遊說活動對廠商利潤與社會福利之影響。本章發現：廠商是否會進行遊說活動端視下列兩項因素而定： ( 1 )本國政府重視本國廠商的程度，( 2 )廠商的遊說支出會移轉至本國福利的比例。一般而言，本國政府愈重視本國廠商的利潤，本國廠商愈會進行遊說活動；而廠商的遊說支出移轉至本國福利的比例愈大，外國廠商也愈會進行遊說活動。此外，外國廠商的跨國遊說會導致本國社會福利的提高。此一結論與一般人認為開放跨國遊說會損害本國福利的認知不同。
在第三章中，我們建立一個寡佔模型來討論外國廠商捐獻政治獻金給本國政府對本國差別性進口關稅政策之影響。本章發現：（1）當需求曲線為線性時，若本國政府較關心社會福利（政治獻金），則本國最適關稅政策是對廠商課徵關稅（補貼）。（2）有兩項因素會影響差別性關稅稅率的距離，其一是本國對社會福利的關心程度，其二是兩類廠商的平均成本。當政府愈關心社會福利時，本國應對平均成本較低（較高）的廠商課徵較高（較低）的關稅。相反地，當本國愈關心政治獻金時，本國則應對平均成本較低（較高）的廠商給予較高（較低）的補貼。 在第四章中，我們以一個產品具有垂直差異的模型，來討論四種決策機制對最低品質標準之影響，此四種決策機制分別為自由經濟、社會福利、公民投票與代議制度，我們並將這些結果一一作比較。本章以自由經濟為基準，得到下列結論。( 1 ) 當政府以社會福利為中心時，社會福利下的品質標準必然會高於自由經濟體下的品質。( 2 ) 代議制度下的品質會高於社會福利下的品質。( 3 ) 代議制度下可能會有策略性授權行為，即當選的代議士與中間選民的偏好並不一致，此一可能性隨著參選成本增加而提高。( 4 )公民投票與代議制度下的最低品質標準會相同。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T04:11:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-95-D88323003-1.pdf: 3223401 bytes, checksum: d9f12d815f9fd313934e091b7d8a49b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
第一章 緒論 5 1.1 研究動機與目的 5 1.2 文獻回顧 9 1.3 論文架構 13 第二章 國內遊說、跨國遊說與最適關稅政策 14 2.1 前言 14 2.2 基本模型 18 2.3 本國廠商的遊說下之均 18 2.4 外國廠商的跨國遊說 27 2.5 本國與外國遊說之比較 34 2.6 結論 36 附錄 38 第三章 差別化關稅與政治獻金 41 3.1 前言 41 3.2 政治獻金模型 44 3.3 政治獻金模型下之最適差別化關稅 57 3.4 結論 59 附錄 61 第四章 政策之決定機制與最低品質標 65 4.1 前言 65 4.2 基本模型：自由經濟與社會福利 70 4.3 民主政治：公民投票與代議制度 75 4.4 模型擴展 83 4.5 結論 97 第五章 結論 99 參考文獻 101 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 遊說、政治獻金與最低品質標準 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Lobbying, Campaign Contributions and Minimum Quality Standards | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 94-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 周建富(Chien-Fu Chou),楊建成(Cheng-Chen Yang),陳恭平(kong-Pin Chen),邱俊榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 遊說,政治獻金,最低品質標準, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | lobby,political contributions,minimum quality standards, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 107 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2006-07-26 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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