第一人稱權威及其密徑

Abstract

一般而言，我們對自己的心靈狀態的掌握有兩個特點：一、我們對自身心靈狀態的信念有特殊的權威，沒有人（在正常情況下）可以挑戰我們對自己心靈狀態的認知。並且，除了我們自己以外，沒有人可以有這樣的權威。二、只有我們自己可以使用第一人稱角度(first-person perspective)來認知自己的心靈狀態，別人只能透第三人稱角度(third-person perspective)來認知我們的狀態。論文中，我把這兩點統稱為「第一人稱優越性」(first-person superiority)。在導論中，我指出對此優越性的探討必須包含三部分：一、對第一人稱權威(first-person authority)的分析。即是，精確地勾勒出第一人稱角度在認知上的權威的範圍；二、第一人稱密徑(privileged access)的探究。即是，處理第一人稱角度在認知途徑上有別於第三人稱角度的地方；三、對第一人稱權威的證成。即是，指出第一人稱權威為何可能。這篇論文的目的在於對此三者進行綜合的研究。這樣的研究是必須的，因為這三個研究某種意義下是相互蘊含的：對其中一者的理解將影響我們對另外二者的理解。我將在前三章分別探討這三者，並提出自己的主張。 第一章分析各種第一人稱權威的原則，尤其著重Alston (1971)中所提出的各種原則。我將論證，最成功解釋第一人稱權威各種現象的原則是the principle of luminosity (PL)。PL認為：必然的，如果主體正處在某意識狀態之中，則該主體原則上可以知道自己的心靈狀態。PL可以合理解釋我們對第一人稱權威的直覺，並且對哲學議題的處理有很大的幫助。在第一章結尾部分，我將應用PL來解釋Moore’s paradox。 第二章處理第一人稱密徑。第一人稱密徑的基礎為一特殊的自我意識。根據本文的研究，這種自我意識的基礎在於某種基本的「再現模態」(mode of representation)，我把它叫作「I-mode of representation」。據此，自我意識並不包含對對象的認知，因此自我並不是一個對象(object)。換言之，所謂的自我並不存在，我們在一般內省中所認知到自己其實只是I-mode of representation作用時所產生的「我」的感覺。另外，Davidson和Shoemaker主張沒有心靈對象(mental objects)。我認為他們是錯誤的，心靈事實上是由心靈對象──但不包含心靈主體──所組成。 第三章討論第一人稱權威的證成。我先分析Davidson和Shoemaker所提出的證成，然後指出它們各自不足之處。然後，我提出自己對第一人稱權威的證成。我的證成預設了心靈狀態依附(supervene)大腦狀態。我認為，一旦我們接受這個預設，則我們就必須接受PL。 第四章處理Williamson對PL的挑戰。我分析了Williamson兩個對PL最重要的批評。我指出它們都不成立，因為它們各自包含了一些錯誤的前提。

A complete analysis of the epistemic superiority of first-person perspective should consist of three parts: firstly, an account of first-person authority, secondly, an account of privileged access, and, finally, a warrant for first-person authority. These parts are indeed interdependent. Different answers to any of them will cause different answers to the others. My aim in this thesis is to offer a theory of first-person perspective whose accounts of these parts are unified. The merit of such a theory is that it provides us a complete view of the subject matter. In chapter one, I offer an investigation into principles of first-person authority. I conclude that the most promising principle of first-person authority is the so-called principle of luminosity (PL), which claims that, necessarily, one is always in a position to know one’s mental states. I argue that PL is most promising since it is the most general principle which is also immune to counterexample. Moreover, PL can well explain our intuition about first-person authority, and it also has merits in dealing with philosophical questions. I will point out that PL is extremely useful in explaining Moore’s paradox. I examine privileged access in chapter two. The base of privileged access is a particular form of self-awareness. I offer my own account of privileged access which claims that the very self-awareness consists (partly) of a particular mode of representation I call I-mode of representation. Accordingly, the mind does not consist of mental subject (or the self), but solely of mental objects. What is usually known as the self is in fact not an object at all. By contrast, what is sense as the self is just a sense of selfhood caused by activations of I-mode of representation. However, some philosophers, e.g. Davidson and Shoemaker, go further to reject the existence of mental objects. I argue that they are in a wrong track. In chapter three, I give my own account of warrant for first-person authority. Davidson and Shoemaker have offered their own justification, but none has succeeded. My justification rests on the philosophical notion of supervenience. I argue that, given that mental states supervene on brain states, the violation of PL is implausible. Timothy Williamson (2000) offers two subtle arguments against PL. In chapter four, I analyze his arguments in detail, and show that it is not PL, but some other premises in his arguments which should take responsibility of rendering mistaken conclusion. So since his arguments are incorrect, the arguments themselves cannot reject PL.