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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 羅曉(Xiao Luo) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chih-Chun Yang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 楊智鈞 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T03:33:42Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2006-07-31 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2006-07-31 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2006-07-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | References
1. D.S. Ahn, Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs, mimeo, UC_Berkeley, 2006. 2. A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, forthcoming in: QJE (2006). 3. A. Ambrus, Theories of coalitional rationality, mimeo, Harvard U4. K.R. Apt, Order independence and rationalizability, mimeo, National University of Singapore, 2005. 5. R.J. Aumann, Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games, in: Contributions to the Theory of Games IV, Princeton University Press, 1959. 6. R.J. Aumann, Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies, JME 1(1974), 67-96. 7. R.J. Aumann, Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Econometrica 55(1987), 1-18. 8. R.J. Aumann, Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality, GEB 8(1995), 6-19. 9. K. Basu and J.W. Weibull, Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior, EL 36(1991), 141-146. 10. B.D. Bernheim, Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica 52(1984), 1007-1028. 11. B.D. Bernheim, B. Peleg, and D.Whinston, Coalition-proof Nash equilibria I. Concepts, JET 42(1987), 1-12. 12. Y.C. Chen, N.Y. Long and X. Luo, Iterated strict dominance in general games, mimeo, Academia Sinica, 2005. 13. M.S.Y. Chwe, Farsighted coalitional stability, JET 63(1994), 299-325. 14. M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman, Existence and uniqueness of maximal reductions under iterated strict dominance, Econometrica 70(2002), 2007-2023. 15. L. Epstein and M. LeBreton, Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian, JET 61(1993), 1-22. 16. J. Greenberg, The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 17. C.M. Kahn and D. Mookherjee, Universal Coalition-proof equilibrium: Theory and applications, mimeo, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group, 1994. 18. E. Kalai and D. Samet, Persistent equilibria in strategic games, IJGT 13(1984), 129-144. 19. D. Kreps, Notes on the Theory of Choice, Westview, Bouldler, 1988. 20. B.L. Lipman, A note on the implication of common knowledge of rationality, GEB 6(1994), 114-129.niversity, 2005. 21. X. Luo, General systems and '-stable sets –a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments, JME 36(2001), 95-109. 22. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities, Econometrica 58(1990), 1255-1278. 23. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities, GEB 17(1996), 113-128. 24. P. Milgrom and C. Shannon, Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62(1994), 157-180. 25. R. Myerson, Multistage games with communication, Econometrica 54(1986), 323-358. 26. R. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Con‡ict, Harvard University Press, 1991. 27. M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994. 28. D. Pearce, Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection, Econometrica 52(1984), 1029-1051. 29. D. Ray and R. Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, JET 73(1997), 30-78. 30. D. Ray and R. Vohra, A theory of endogenous coalition structures, GEB 26(1999), 286-336. 31. A. Roth, Subsolutions and the supercore of cooperative games. Mathematics of Operations Research 1 (1976), 43-49. 32. R. Selten, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, IJGT 4(1975), 25-55. 33. M. Shimoji, On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response, GEB 48(2004), 385-402. 34. M. Shimoji and J. Watson, Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms, JET 83(1998), 161-195. 35. T. Tan and S. Werlang, The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games, JET 45(1988), 370-391. 36. X. Vives, Complementarities and games: New developments, JEL 43(2005), 437-479. 37. M. Voorneveld, Persistent retracts and preparation, GEB 51(2005), 228-232. 38. M. Voorneveld, Preparation, GEB 48(2004), 403-414. 39. L. Xue, Coalitional stability under perfect foresight, ET 11(1998), 603-627. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/32144 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We extend Ambrus’s [QJE, 2006] concept of “coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)” to situations where, in seeking mutual beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations –i.e.
the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, not only against restricted subsets of strategies. In this paper we offer an alternative notion of c-rationalizability suitable for such complicated interactions. More specifically, following Bernheim’s [Econometrica 52(1984), 1007-1028] and Pearce’s[Econometrica 52(1984), 1029-1051] approach, we define c-rationalizability by the terminology “coalitional rationalizable set (CRS)”. Roughly speaking, a CRS is a product set of pure strategies from which no group of player(s) would like to deviate. We show that this notion of c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability. We also provide its epistemic foundation. JEL Classification: C70, C72, D81 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T03:33:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-95-R92323044-1.pdf: 317404 bytes, checksum: bb79f4ce36772da1ebbc49465eb8a782 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
1 Introduction 1 2 Preliminaries 5 3 Coalitional Rationalizability 5 3.1Existence 8 3.2 Iterated c-dominance 11 3.3 Epistemic Foundation 12 4 Concluding remarks 14 Appendix: Proofs 18 References 25 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Bayes Updating | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Rationalizability | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Coalition | zh_TW |
| dc.title | An Essay on Game Theory: Rationalizable
Behavior under Coalitional Interactions | zh_TW |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 94-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 古慧雯(Hui-Wen Koo),黃貞穎(Chen-Ying Hwang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Rationalizability,Coalition,Bayes Updating, | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.page | 27 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2006-07-28 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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