DRAM產業競爭之資產專屬性優勢

Abstract

動態隨機存取記憶體（Dynamic Random Access Memory , DRAM）產業競爭，從1970年代美國以技術開發領先，到1980年代中期日本以製程及良率領先，轉變到1990年代韓國以規模及速度領先。1995年以後隨著DRAM產業在市場面、規模面及技術面的變化，DRAM產業的競爭優勢亦隨之改變。尤其DRAM產品大宗商品化及生命週期縮短的特性更加明顯，產品先趨者更具先行者優勢，製程的重要性對DRAM產業而言，相對提高。 本研究主要目的在探討資產專屬性（asset-specificity）對產業競爭優勢的重要性，並以DRAM產業為研究領域。鎖定研究範圍以1995年至2002年間，全球DRAM產業競爭之下，韓國三星超越日本半導體廠商的原因，及如何建立與維持此優勢。尤其，日本1980年代在半導體市場上，即以其DRAM產品的製程及良率優勢超越美國，何以1990年代改由韓國起而代之，而且延續其競爭力優勢，至2002年韓國三星電子的DRAM市場占有率為33％，若再加上韓國海力士的市場占有率13％，二者合計為46％，已大幅超過日本主要DRAM廠商爾必達的市場占有率5.6%。 本研究首先假設，韓國半導體廠商的競爭優勢，在於其與設備供應商之間，建立了專屬性資產及關係資產（relational assets）的優勢，從而使得日本半導體業者無法藉由跟進的投資，突破韓國DRAM產業既成優勢所形成的競爭障礙。本文除進行資產專屬性相關文獻探討，並從三個論點進行印證，包括：（1）製程設備廠商是主要的技術創新者，而韓國三星受惠於此；（2）韓國DRAM大廠以量產的速度建立與設備製造廠的資產專屬性，以排除競爭；（3）日本DRAM廠商投資力道減弱，難以突破三星與設備廠所建立之關係資產障礙。 一般研究認為，韓國DRAM廠主要在製程及量產上超越日本，本研究的結果，更進一步明確地指出，其優勢主要係建置在1994年以後韓國DRAM大廠與設備供應商之間的資產專屬性，以及日漸累積的關係資產，此優勢亦成為1995~2002年間造成國際DRAM大廠勢力消長的關鍵因素之一。且此結論，得以對於2002年以後全球DRAM產業的發展趨勢，做出合理解釋。

The industrial competition of DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) originated in the 70’s when the U. S. led by technological development, in the mid 80’s Japan led the competition by manufacturing process and yield rate, Korea won the race by manufacturing scale and speediness in the 90’s. With the market maturity, technological evolvement and entrance of new competitors, the competitive advantage of DRAM industry changes accordingly. From 1995 onwards, with the popularization of information, booming of internet usage and increasing industrial competition, product commoditization as well as shortened product life cycle become common characteristics of DRAM industry. Thus speed advantage had become the critical successful factor for DRAM’s competitive strategy. The manufacturing processes of DRAM also have relatively higher importance. The main objective of this study focuses on the significance of asset-specificity in relation to industrial competitive advantage of the DRAM industry. This study analyzes how Samsung established and maintained competitive advantages over its Japanese rivals in DRAM industry during 1995 and 2002. Especially when Japan had already exceeded the U. S. in its DRAM products by manufacturing process and yield rate advantages, how and why Korea can take over the leadership from Japan and maintained its competitive advantage? In 2002, Samsung had a market share of 33% in DRAM industry, when we add up the 13% of market share from another Korean manufacturer Hynix, Korea had an overall market share of 46% in DRAM industry, which exceeded the total market share of major Japanese DRAM manufacturers by 5.6%. The findings of this study show that the competitive strategy of Korean semi-conductor manufacturers is based upon establishing asset-specific competitive advantage with their equipment suppliers and forming relational assets gradually. The Japanese semiconductor manufacturers are not able to break through the competitive barriers set up by their Korean counterparts by further investment. Other than researching through references about asset-specificity, further analyses are done based on three aspects including: 1). The suppliers of manufacturing process equipment are also leaders in technological innovation, Samsung is a beneficiary of this; 2). The major Korean DRAM manufacturers established asset specificity with their equipment manufacturers by speediness of volume production to rule out competition; 3). The Japanese DRAM manufacturers did not invest enough to break through the barriers set up by Samsung with its equipment sppliers based on relational assets. The conclusion of this study not only indicates that the asset-specific advantage established by the Korean DRAM industry during 1995 and 2002 is the key determining factor for its growing influence among international rivalries, it can also provide reasonable explanations for the DRAM industry development trend after 2002 and onwards.