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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 管理學院
  3. 商學研究所
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/30842
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor周善瑜
dc.contributor.authorHSUEH PEI CHUNGen
dc.contributor.author薛培忠zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-13T02:17:49Z-
dc.date.available2007-02-27
dc.date.copyright2007-02-27
dc.date.issued2006
dc.date.submitted2007-02-02
dc.identifier.citation參考文獻
1. Alessandro Acquisti, Hal R. Varian (2005)“Conditioning Prices on Purchase History”, Marketing Science, 24, 3,367-381
2. Bitran, G. R. and S. V. Mondshein (1997), “Periodic Pricing of seasonal Products in Retailing”, Management Science, 43, 127-137
3. Breker, L. P., Williamson, C. L., (1996). “A imulation study of usage-based pricing strategies for packet-witched networks”, Proceedings of the 21st Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks, 278-288.
4. Davis, S., E. Gerstner, and M., Hagerty (1995), “Money Back Grarantees in Retailing: Matching Products to consumer Tastes”, Journal of Retailing, 71, 1, 7-22.
5. Davis, S., M. Hagerty, and E. Gerstner (1998), “Return Policies and the Optimal Level of ‘Hassle’”, Journal of Economics and Business, 50, 445-460.
6. Emons, W. (1989), “The Theory of Warranty Contracts”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 3, 1, 42-57.
7. Ganesh Iyer, Amit Pazgal.(2003) “Internet shopping agents: Virtual co-location and competition”, Marketing Science., 22, 1; 85
8. Grossman S. J. (1981), “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality”, Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 3,461-483.
9. Hamilton Emmons, Stephen M Gilbert.(1998), “Note. The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods”, Management Science, 44, 2; 276
10. Hao Wang (2004) “Do Returns Policies Intensify Retail Competition? ”, Marketing Science., 23, 4; 611-613
11. Harish Krishnan, Roman Kapuscinski, David A. Butz (2004) “Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort”, Management Science, 50, 1, 48-63
12. Hess, D. J., W. Chu, and E. Gerstner (1996), “Controlling Product Returns in Direct Marketing”, Marketing Letters, 7, 4, 307-317.
13. John Conlisk, Eitan Gerstner, Joel Sobel,.(1984) “Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 3; 489
14. Mann D., and, J. Wissink (1990), “Money-back Warranties vs. Replacement Warranties”, American Economic Review, 80, 2, 432-436.
15. Matthews S. and J. Moore (1987), “Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: an Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening”, Economerica, 55, 2, 441-467.
16. Narasimhan,Chakravarthi(1988) “Competitive promotional strategies”, The Journal of Business , 61, 4; 427
17. Pasternack, B. A. (1985), “Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities”, Marketing Science, 4, 2, 166-176.
18. Shieh, S. (1996), “Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5, 3, 361-377.
19. Welling, L. D. (1989), “Satisfaction Guaranteed or Money (partially) Refunded: Efficient Refunds Under Asymmetric Information”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 22, 1, 62-78.
20. Wedad Elmaghraby, Pmar Keskinocak (2003), “Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations: Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future
Direction”, Management Science, 49, 10, 1287-1309
21. V. Padmanabhan, I. P. L. Png (1997), “Manufacturer’s Returns Policies and Retail Competition”, Marketing Science, 16, 1, 81-94.
22. V. Padmanabhan, I. P. L. Png (2004), “Reply to Do Returns Policies Intensify Retail Competition?” , Marketing Science, 23, 4, 614-618.
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/30842-
dc.description.abstract本研究主要在探討零售商在假日時期最適的定價策略與退貨政策之設計。過去有關退貨政策的文獻大多都在研究是否要給予退貨權利,而甚少討論退貨期限長短對消費者及廠商的影響,因此本文嘗試分析在假日時期如何選擇退貨期限的長短以輔助廠商的定價策略之制定。我們建立一三期的賽局模型,假設零售商面對必須在假日前購買且有時間束縛的禮物購買者與無此限制之常態購買者,可擬定每期的價格策略與退貨期限的長短。研究發現廠商的定價策略與退貨政策之設計取決於販賣商品的性質以及假日時期禮物購買者高低需求的人口比例與對商品的願付價格。當高需求禮物購買者僅能於第二期購買的比例夠高,且高需求禮物購買者人數眾多時,市場上會出現與實証現象相符的價格先高後低且退貨期限延長情況。當禮物購買者對商品願付價格越高時,在假日後的折扣深度越深,而在禮物購買者異質性越低時,假日後的折扣幅度相較於假日前顯得越深。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the optimal pricing strategy and returns policy for a retailer during holiday seasons. Most of previous literature addresses whether the manufacturers or retailers offer full returns or not. Little attention is given to returns duration. We build a game-theoretic model for three periods where a firm chooses its price and returns policy every period during holiday seasons. The market consists of gift buyers with time constraints and regular buyers without time constraints. Our results show that the optimal pricing strategies and returns policy depend on product characteristics, and the proportion of gift-buyers. In particular, the following results are obtained. First, if the importance of gift buyers is sufficiently high relative to that of regular buyers, and if there are sufficiently many gift buyers who can only shop when the holiday gets very close, then there exists an equilibrium in which the price of the product first increases before the holiday and then decreases after the holiday.. This equilibrium is consistent with empirical evidences. Second, the higher the valuation of gift-buyers, the higher the depth of dealing after the holiday. When the heterogeneity of gift-buyers is low, the depth of dealing after the holiday relative to that before the holiday is high.en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T02:17:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-95-R93741054-1.pdf: 428243 bytes, checksum: 3e4700451bfa0ed879eaf554fdb46a74 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2006
en
dc.description.tableofcontents目錄
謝辭…………………………………………………………………….I
論文摘要……………………………………………………………..III
英文摘要……………………………………………………………..IV
目錄……………………………………………………………………..V
表次…………………………………………………………………..VI
圖次………………………………………………………………….VII
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機……………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………2
第三節 研究方法與研究結果………………………………………2
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………………………………4
第一節 退貨政策……………………………………………………4
第二節 動態定價……………………………………………………6
第三章 獨占狀態下,零售商的最適決策……………………………8
第一節 模型設定與假設……………………………………………8
第二節 均衡分析……………………………………………………10
第三節 結果討論……………………………………………………22
第四章 競爭狀態下,零售商的最適決策…………………………26
第一節 模型設定與假設……………………………………………26
第二節 均衡分析……………………………………………………27
第三節 結果討論…………………………………………………38
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………40
第一節 結論…………………………………………………………40
第二節 管理意涵……………………………………………………41
第三節 研究限制……………………………………………………43
參考文獻………………………………………………………………45
附錄……………………………………………………………………48
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.subject退貨政策zh_TW
dc.subject動態定價策略zh_TW
dc.subjectReturn Policiesen
dc.subjectDynamic Pricing Strategyen
dc.title假日時期零售商動態定價策略與退貨政策之設計:消費者搜尋與跨期差別取價zh_TW
dc.titleConsumer Search, Dynamic Price Discrimination, and Optimal Return Policies for a Department Store During Holiday Seasonsen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear95-1
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.coadvisor陳其美
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee王泰昌
dc.subject.keyword動態定價策略,退貨政策,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Pricing Strategy,Return Policies,en
dc.relation.page54
dc.rights.note有償授權
dc.date.accepted2007-02-04
dc.contributor.author-college管理學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept商學研究所zh_TW
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