噶瑪蘭語及賽夏語情緒及思想語言之研究

Abstract

本文旨在探討人類兩項最為重要的內在活動及經驗:情緒及思想語言。過去文獻中有許多研究投入情緒語言的研究,可是思想語言的研究則相對的減少許多。然而將人類這兩項最重要的內在活動經驗放在一起探討的研究‚則更為稀少。 這或許應歸咎於西方將情緒與思想,或是情緒與理智,視為兩個絕不相容的範疇的偏執看法。然而, Damasio (1994)的神經生理學個案告訴我們這種將情緒與語言兩分的看法在本質上是不正確的。再者‚先前有關情緒語言的研究指出‚概念隱喻是所有人類語言都使用將抽象概念概念化的唯一途徑。然而Huang (2002a)有關鄒語的研究以及我們有關賽夏語的研究顯示‚概念隱喻並非是將抽象概念概念化的唯一途徑。而且‚諸如Barsalou (1999)等心理學家的實驗顯示‚我們所需要的是一個直接、且非隱喻式的概念表徵。我們因此提出‚語法模式或許是得到情緒事件是如何在語言中被闡釋陳述建構的一個比較好的方式。 我們有關情緒事件的闡釋研究探討了語言使用者如何透過格位指派的手段來闡釋陳述情緒事件參與者;我們的研究也揭露原因(Cause)在害怕事件(FEAR event)及生氣事件(ANGRY event)是相當與眾不同。在害怕事件(FEAR event)中的原因‚可以是泛指的(generic);可是在生氣事件(ANGRY event)中的原因總是定指 (specific)‚或至少是有所指(referential)。而且在不同的語法句式中原因的闡釋陳述也有所不同。在AF句中‚原因被闡釋陳述為中立原因(neutral Cause)‚在PF/LF句中‚則為標的原因(Target Cause)。在賽夏語的RF句中‚則是間接原因(indirect Cause)‚或稱為遠因(remote Cause)。在pa-使役句中‚則為主事原因(Agent-Cause)。再者‚噶瑪蘭語使用tu maqzi句式來闡釋陳述起源原因(Source Cause)‚用pasazui句式來陳述目標原因(Goal Cause)。並且不同的語法句式也用來側錄突顯某位事件參與者:在AF句中被側錄突顯的是經驗者(Experiencer); 在PF/LF句中則是原因(Cause);而在賽夏語的RF句中則是情感感受者(Affectee)。 接著本文也點出情緒語言的研究也不應將語言的情感系統(affective system)排除在外。情感語言涵蓋語言使用者為了表達傳遞他們自身的內在心理狀態或情緒感受或表達對某一事件的態度所使用的語言特色。賽夏及噶瑪蘭所使用的語言策略不同。噶瑪蘭運用較多的詞彙手段‚尤其是感嘆詞及語尾助詞、第一人稱複數代名詞的佈署、報導語言及詞彙框架等策略來表達語言使用者的情感感受狀態。 賽夏則用si-句構來表達他們的情感感受態度;這一si-句構中由兩個次事件組成:事件一是為si-子句譯載了感知事件(percept)‚其功能為感受促發者;而事件二則是感知者經由感知經驗而被促發的感受。此感知者可能會也可能不會因此而採取進一步的行動或因而進入某種心理狀態。每當si-句構被使用時‚總是會有情感感受經由感知經驗傳遞到感知者身上。 根據Goddard (2003)所提出的六個量表‚我們探討思想動詞及其構詞語法句型、詞彙多義、以及隱喻延伸。我們的研究顯示知道動詞(KNOWING verbs)在這兩個語言都是獨特的‚因為賽夏的三個知道動詞‚也就是 ra:am ‘知道;會’、sekla’ ‘確知’、haSa’ ‘不知道;不會’‚在構詞語法句型上自然而然形成一組;他們都接否定詞 ’okik‚而且在使役、名物化及RF型動詞形式‚都有靜態詞素-k-出現‚這些似乎說明這三個動詞比起其他思想動詞更像靜態動詞。而噶瑪蘭的知道動詞則是在ma-標記上與眾不同;其他思想動詞所接的ma-標記是論元價減少標記‚因而整個動詞在句型上像LF句。而知道動詞所接的ma-則是經驗標記‚整個動詞句型則是AF句。而且兩個語言在知道範疇中‚正反兩個語意層面佔有最多詞彙。兩個語言都沒有單一詞素詞彙來指稱記憶範疇中的正面層面‚只有單一詞素詞彙來指稱其反義層面‚也就是「忘記」‚而用反義的否定詞‚也就是「不忘記」來指稱正面層面的活動。 在本文的最後我們則是探討有關人觀的民族文化理論。噶瑪蘭的anem ‘心’指的不只是生物體的內臟‚而且同時也用來當作情緒與思想的場所。要了解噶瑪蘭的anem ‘心’ 必須要了解社會文化的因素‚例如口述傳統。噶瑪蘭用同一個地方‚也就是anem來從事所有的認知活動。雖然噶瑪蘭也有另一個思想動詞qasianem ‚可是在概念上‚噶瑪蘭人認為所有qasianem動詞所指稱的內在活動都在anem中進行;因此我們認為噶瑪蘭的anem ‘心’實際上被概念化為一容器‚所盛裝的內容物不是一分為二的情緒與思想‚而是一個叫做情知(emo-cognition)的綜合體。因為當人的anem全裝滿時‚他是情緒化的;當他的anem只裝滿一半時 ‚他是智能不足的。 賽夏所呈現的情形略有不同。‘心’的概念在賽夏顯得相當微不足道‚不管是在生理上或是概念上。生理上‚賽夏人不覺得a:oe’ ‘心臟’會痛‚他們說是 ka:ala’ ‘胸部’會痛。概念上‚不管是a:oe’ ‘心臟’或是ka:ala’ ‘胸部’都沒有被用來當作思考或感受情緒的場所。賽夏人用’inaz’azem來指稱涵蓋大範圍的思想及情緒內在活動。然而在隱喻的表達方面‚’inaz’azem則主要被用來指稱思想活動而不是情緒經驗。而且賽夏的’inaz’azem似乎不依藉任何身體部位或器官而存在‚儘管有些賽夏人認為’inaz’azem的活動跟頭或腦有關。相較於噶瑪蘭的anem被概念化為一綜合情知者(emo-cognizer)‚賽夏的’inaz’azem則被概念化為帶有情感的認知者;其主要功能是思想的活動‚可是其情緒卻會隨著思想活動的增加而出現。 賽夏與噶瑪蘭在表達肉體病痛上都有特殊的語法。在這種特殊的語法中‚賽夏的身體部位被當作是可切割的個體‚獨立於人存在‚因為在語法上‚它被當作是獨立於人的獨立核心論元‚而且有自己的格位標記。而噶瑪蘭則是將身體部位當作不可分割的擁有物‚因為他都被標記為身體的部位(Location);而且在語法上與人論元同時出現時‚身體部位永遠無法成為核心論元。 簡言之‚本文有關人類兩項最為重要的內在活動經驗‚也就是情緒與思想‚的研究所得到的結論是‚這兩項活動經驗不是一切為二、阡陌分明的範疇。也因此 雖然在人類存在的某種基本層面‚思想與情緒在表達上雖是可分割的‚可是我們的日常生活中他們卻是密不可分的。而且‚情緒語言的研究讓我更加清楚語言使用者如何闡釋陳述情緒事件;換言之‚我們可以經由他們選來譯載此一事件的語法句構來得知他們對此一事件的詮釋角度。有關用來突顯情感系統的語言特色方面的研究‚我們瞭解了言談互動中的互動線索。而探索思想語言‚則讓我們更為清楚我們形上認知的結構。最後‚將人觀的民族文化理論納入‚則有助我們在研究人類思想及情緒語言時避免偏頗或狹隘的觀點。

This study demonstrates an attempt to explore the language of emotion and thought, two of the most important mental activities of a person. Numerous studies are devoted to the study of emotion languages. By contrast, few studies are found to exploring the talks of the thinking. However, even fewer studies are aimed at putting together and investigating these two important mental activities and experiences of human beings. This might be attributed to a prejudiced western view which views emotion and thinking, or rationality, as two experiences that belong to two mutually exclusive domains. However, Damasio’s (1994) neurophysiological cases convince us that the bifurcated view of emotion and thought, or feeling and thinking, as two isolated aspects of a person’s mental experiences is in essence incorrect. Moreover, contrary to what is claimed in previous studies on language of emotion and thought that conceptual metaphor appears to be a universally preferred strategy in conceptualizing abstract concepts, Huang’s (2002a) study on Tsou and our study on emotion language in Saisiyat reveals that metaphorical expression may not be a universally preferred strategy in doing so. Based on their experiments, psychologists, e.g. Barsalou (1999), urge on us the need of the direct, non-metaphorical representation of abstract concepts. We thus propose that grammatical model may be a better way to get a clearer picture of how emotion events are construed in the language. Our study on the construal of emotion events investigates how event participants are construed in an emotion event via the case marking assignment. It reveals that the FEAR event appears to be distinctive in that its Cause can be generic. To the contrary, the ANGRY event shows its distinctiveness in that its Cause is always specific, or at least referential. The Causes construed in different syntactic constructions are different (Dirven 1995, 1997). AF-clauses code a neutral Cause in Saisiyat and Kavalan. PF/LF clauses take a Target-Cause in both languages. It is a remote Cause, an indirect Cause, that is coded in the RF clauses in Saisiyat. And the pa(k)- Causative clause encodes an Agent-Cause, who does something on purpose to provoke the Experiencer’s emotional state. Furthermore, Kavalan uses the tu maqzi ‘(starting) from here’ construction to encode a Source Cause, and makes use of the pasazui ‘toward there’ construction to encode a Goal Cause. Moreover, different syntactic constructions profile different event participants. AF-clauses profile the Experiencer. PF/LF-clauses profile the Cause. In the RF-construction, it is the Affectee that gets profiled. A study of emotion language should not exclude the study of affective features in the language. Language of affect includes those linguistic features that the speaker uses to communicate attitudinal information, relating to the emotional or mental state of the speakers. The linguistic strategies selected by Kavalan and Saisiyat to convey affect are very different: Kavalan employs more lexical strategies, especially interjections and particles, deployment of first personal plural pronouns, reported speech, and lexicon-schema, to represent the language user’s affective state. Saisiyat has affect conveyed in one particular grammatical construction, i.e. the si-construction. In this construction, there are two sub-events: Event 1 is the si-clause, which encodes a percept functioning as an affect-trigger, and Event 2 is the affect triggered in the perceiver via perceptual experiences, who may take an action or enter into some certain state as a result. Whenever a si-construction is used, there is always an affect conveyed across on the perceiver via perceptual experiences. Based on the six dimensions proposed by Goddard (2003), we explore the thinking verbs in both Kavalan and Saisiyat in relation to syntactic patterns, lexical polysemy, and metaphorical extensions. The KNOWING verbs in both languages appear to be distinctive in that the three Saisiyat KNOWING verbs, i.e. ra:am ‘know’, sekla’ ‘know for sure’ and haSa’ ‘not know’, fall naturally into a group in terms of the syntactic behaviors: they are negated by the stative negator ’okik, and there is a stative morpheme –k- in their causative, nominalization, and the si-(RF) form. This may imply that these three KNOWING verbs are treated more like stative verbs than the other thinking verbs in Saisiyat. The KNOWING verbs in Kavalan distinguish themselves from the other thinking verbs in the ma-forms. While the ma-forms of the other thinking verbs in Kavalan behave like LF verbs, those of the knowing verbs, i.e. supaR ‘know’ and Rayngu ‘not know’, behave like AF verbs and denote a past event or experience. Moreover, both languages have more words in both positive and negative aspects of the KNOWING domain than in the other thinking domains. Both languages have monomorphemic words to denote the mental activities in the negative aspect, i.e. forgetting, of REMEMBERING, and have negation of forgetting to denote the mental activities of remembering. Finally, the THINKING verbs in these two languages are extended from thinking to feeling. Regarding the ethnotheory of the person, the Kavalan anem ‘heart’ refers to the visceral organ and at the same time the locus of emotion and thought. An understanding of the concept of the Kavalan heart requires an understanding of the socio-culture aspects. Kavalan uses the same place, i.e. anem, for the locus of all cognitive activities. Although Kavalan has a thinking verb qasianem ‘think’, they conceptually conceive that all the mental activities reside in anem ‘heart’. The Kavalan anem ‘heart’ is indeed the container of the content called emo-cognition; and anem ‘heart’ in Kavalan, conceptualized as an integrated emo-cognizer, is responsible for all the mental activities of thinking and feeling. Saisiyat tells a different story. The concept of heart is of little significance in Saisiyat physiologically and conceptually. Physiologically, the Saisiyat people do not feel a:oe’ ‘heart’ hurt, but feel ka:ala’ ‘chest’ hurt, instead. Conceptually, neither the visceral organ a:oe’ ‘heart’ nor the body part ka:ala’ ‘chest’ provides a ground for emotion or thinking in Saisiyat. The Saisiyat people use ’inaz’azem ‘thought’ to denote a broad range of the mental activities of thinking and feeling. However, the use of ’inaz’azem ‘thought’ in the related metaphorical expressions denotes the way one thinks, rather than the way one feels. And the Saisiyat appears not to have their ’inaz’azem ‘thought’ reside in any body part, although it is believed to be related to ta’oeloeh ‘head’ or tono’ ‘brain’. Nonetheless, it shall not lead us to falsely conclude that it is not embodied. It is embodied, since it relies on bodily experiences to make sense the mental activities of ’inaz’azem ‘thought’ in Saisiyat. Compared with the Kavalan anem ‘heart’, which is conceptualized as an integrated emo-cognizer, the Saisiyat ’inaz’azem ‘thought’ is conceptualized more as a cognizer penetrated with feeling. Both Saisiyat and Kavalan have special syntax regarding the expressions related to somatic illnesses. In these particular expressions, Saisiyat seems to treat the affected body parts as alienable parts, which are independent of the whole, i.e. the person. Kavalan, to the contrary, displays more like an inalienable possession on the affected body parts, as the affected body part is always coded as a location of the whole. Overall, our investigation of how natural languages structure two of the most important mental activities and experiences of a person, i.e. emotion and thought, has shown that these two are not separate domains in a person’s mentality. As remarked by Damasio (1994), although thinking and feeling processes and states may be expressed as separable at some basic level of human existence, they indeed operate together to a very significant degree in our daily life. Moreover, by studying the language of emotion, we get a better picture on how language users construe emotion events; in other words, we know their perspectives and their interpretations toward the event in question via the grammatical construction they select in coding this event. By investigating linguistic features that characterize affective system in a language, we understand more about interactional cues in the discourse. By exploring the talks of thinking in languages, we know better the meta-cognitive structure. By taking into consideration the ethnotheory of the PERSON, we set an integrated view on the study of language of emotion and thinking, as it is the person that makes all the emotions and thinking possible and sensible.