併購公司長期報酬差異原因之研究-更換併購標的高階經理人與重整行為

Abstract

本篇論文以Loughran 和Vijh所得出的結果和解釋作為基礎，檢視併購活動所提供的懲戒高階經理人機制是否為導致merger與tender offer兩者長期報酬差異的原因。我們發現tender offer 確實在成功取得控制權之後有較高的更換併購標的經理人頻率並且有較多的重整併購標的行為，若依據有無採取這些行動區分樣本，可以發現有懲戒經理人或是重整行為的那一組樣本有顯著較好的會計表現，沒有經歷這些事件的公司則績效下滑，長期(五年)股價表現也出現類似的結果，但不若會計表現明顯。最後納入各項控制變數進行迴歸分析，懲戒行為卻沒有出現預期的正向影響，而純粹縮小標的公司規模的政策對會計表現有顯著的正向影響，對股價表現亦有正向效果，不過該係數在統計上不顯著，因此我們推論雖然懲戒經理人可以視為展現重整決心的象徵，具體的行動才是導致tender offer長期表現優異的真正原因，也就是主併公司可以藉著積極地改善併購標的營運效能，將此效益反映在本身的表現上，而merger一般來說以獲得營運綜效為目的，tender offer則有較強的懲戒和重整動機，因此導致兩者長期報酬出現差異。

In this article we discuss the topic of disciplining target management after acquisitions and examine whether the move benefits acquirers in terms of long-term post-takeover performance. We document higher frequency of disciplinary turnover for tender offer than mergers after successful transfer of control. The frequency of undertaking a wide range of activities associated with target business is higher in tender offers as well. We find disciplinary sub-samples perform better than non-disciplinary sub-samples which experience a decline in profitability. Moreover, acquisitions are followed by improvement in operating performance if acquirers focus on contraction to restructure targets. The results in stock return for sub-samples are not as distinct as in operating performance, but abnormal returns for acquirers without disciplining target managers or downsizing target are significantly negative. Regression models don’t exhibit significantly positive effect of disciplinary turnover after controlling for other variables, but show positive effect of contraction measures. Therefore we suggest that higher rate of specific actions are probably the underlying force leading to better performance for tender offers rather than higher rate of disciplinary turnover following acquisitions.